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ABSTRACT
THE MANAGEMENT OF STRINGENCY AND THE NATURE OF ORGANISATIONAL SUB-CULTURES
BY
PHILIP GEORGE FRAME B.A. (HONS) M.Sc.
The thesis explored financial stringency by analysing differing managerial interpretations and responses. The data was partially collected through an action research process with three management teams in a Social Services Department of a Local Aufhority.
A concept of organisational monetarism was developed as a description of those approaches which predict positive benefits from restricted resource growth. Organisational monetarism, together with other analyses which also explain managerial responses solely in terms of characteristics of the stringency itself were found to be inadequate.
Additionally sub-cultures and contextual features were identified as significant determinants of responses to stringency. Sub­culture is defined as collective, taken for granted, values and behaviours of a management team. These included management style and role and their definitions of the task. Contextual features were defined as variables within each group's internal environment. The five variables identified were: environmental control, task visibility, pattern of spending, unionateness and degree of professional development. Because these factors differed for each team, the extent to which management teams could effectively manage stringency also varied.
The degree of congruence between organisational factors and the reductions task, and thus, the extent of management change required if the task is to be accommodated, determined the interpretation and response to stringency by management groups. With a high degree of congruence, where both sets of organisational factors facilitated the performance of the reductions task, stringency was interpreted as a routine matter and assimilated. With less congruence, stringency posed a threat and was avoided. A low degree of congruence indicated a need for radical change if the task were to be routinised. In this latter case stringency led to crisis and managers responded by overt resistance and withdrawal from reductions related activities.
The organisational costs and benefits of these different responses, in terms of resource consumption, conflict, control and innovation, were explored. Finally, the significance of managing diversity and reformulating the organisation's strategy in circumstances of financial stringency was stressed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
How and why distinct groups of managers in the same organisation 
responded differently to the instruction to manage a reduction in 
expenditure is the principal problem explored in this thesis. A 
secondary issue, the nature of management sub-cultures, is addressed 
and utilised in analysing members' constructions of, and responses 
to, reduced resources. The researcher used an action research model. 
The data base for this work is members' accounts. These were 
analysed in the light of organisational documents, researcher 
observation, and relevant academic work.
This introductory chapter examines the genesis of expenditure 
reductions, sub-cultures, action research, and the issues raised by 
these topics. It then describes how the issues are presented, and what 
contribution the thesis makes to the general stock of knowledge.
Origins of the Research
I became interested in the management of expenditure reductions 
(defined as an externally enforced reduction of spending) for four 
reasons: the extensive media coverage of financial reductions at the 
time the research began; the identification of reductions as a major 
problem area for members of the organisation who granted access; my 
personal work experience; and the limited academic attention the
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subject had received at that time. There is now, however, a growing 
North American literature.
Towards the end of 1979 there were numerous media reports on the 
implementation of financial stringency measures in the public sector. 
These frequently focussed on the cause (usually defined as resulting 
from Government policy); on the affected individuals, (both employees 
and clients); or on conflicts between parties with opposing views. 
Whilst the coverage was necessarily limited, it left an impression 
that whilst the management of financial reductions was a novel task 
for public sector managers, experience of this task was becoming 
widespread. By implication, reductions were being managed: some form 
of decision making and implementation process was being adopted. How 
this new management task was in practice carried out seemed a signific­
ant area of study.
An action model of research was adopted for reasons which are 
explained below. Topics suggested by members of the organisation to 
be studied were treated as significant. In my initial discussions 
with managers of the Social Services Department where data was 
collected, expenditure reductions and their management were 
identified as being current and problematic issues. This was an area 
where use could be made of the services I was offering. Although at 
that initial stage no details emerged of why expenditure reductions 
were problematic the flavour was conveyed by the use of terms such 
as 'difficult', 'explosive' and 'sensitive'. It was clear that 
such reductions were a significant issue for managers.
On the assumption that expenditure reductions could create a high 
degree of uncertainty, I anticipated a certain amount of affinity 
with members of the Social Services Department resulting from my own 
experience of coping with uncertainty at work. During the final two 
years of the Race Relations Board, members faced an uncertain future. 
Whilst the organisation was certain to cease existing as a separate 
unit, what the outcomes of this would be for staff in terms of 
redundancies, re-locations, and new types of work, remained unclear.
I questioned whether various mechanisms for coping with uncertainty, 
including withdrawal of labour to force decisions from planners, 
would be found in another organisation.
The management of expenditure reductions is an area in which interest
is now growing, though until recently it commanded little attention 
amongst organisational theorists. Thus in 1978, Levine felt able to 
assert that there was an assumption of growth in most organisational 
literature. This orientation was reflected in the M.Sc. in
Organisational Development I undertook prior to beginning this
research. Development was defined only in terms of growth; other 
forms of change, and in particular those associated with resource 
decline, were not addressed. Resource pressure, though, was not as 
strong a feature of the environment as it subsequently became.
By 1985 however, Murray and Jick acknowledged a "remarkably large 
body of literature" (p.112) in the area.
Despite this growing body of literature, which comes mainly from 
North America, there is as yet no in-depth study or ethnography of
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how managers respond to instructions to reduce expenditure, and why 
they respond in the ways they do. Glennester (1980) suggests that
"more evidence of organisational practice is needed before 
we can test these hypotheses further. It is important to 
study closely and at close quarters just how authority 
members, officials and professionals are reacting to 
different sources of constraint", (p.381).
This thesis provides evidence of practice in respect of one of these 
groups, which Glennester terms 'officials'; here it is described as 
'managers'.
My interest in this subject grew, then, from my own experience as a 
recipient of information from the media, and as an employee. 
Organisation practice and academic texts confirmed that it was an 
area of work with practical and theoretical value.
Focus of the research
The research focusses primarily on such questions as why expenditure 
reductions management was problematic and whether all managers 
perceived reductions as difficult. In practice, this involved 
discovering how and why managers responded to the instruction to cut 
expenditure and whether such an instruction had any effect on the way 
management carried out its job. How far, it was speculated, did 
managers re-define their roles in response to such instructions?
Many writers assume that managers are 'economic men' (Martin and 
Fryer: 1970) who act primarily in terms of formal rationality 
on the issue of expenditure reductions. On the contrary,
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authors such as Weber (1968), Eldridge (1968) and Glennester (1980) 
offer evidence of the variety of rationalities in use in an 
organisation. An economic view of the manager may well limit a 
comprehensive exploration of the issues associated with reductions 
by assuming that problems will be financial rather than behavioural. 
Whilst the financial aspect is not insignificant, the process of 
managing expenditure reductions was identified as equally important. 
This process included a variety of responses and rationalities.
In the literature on expenditure reductions, the assumption of 
'economic man' manifests itself in a particular form which I term 
'organisational monetarism'. This concept suggests efficiency or 
rationality gains from resource loss. It is used by authors such 
as Bogue (1972), McTighe (1979), Stewart (1980), and Davies and 
Morgan (1981), although they do not use the term 'organisational 
monetarism'. Does this concept clarify the experiences of organis­
ational managers and is some form of organisational slack beneficial 
(Cyert and March: 1963) or unhealthy? Does less 'money' in practice 
result in defensive concentration of managers' energies towards self 
and group preservation, and to the detriment of flexibility and 
forward planning, notions of effectiveness and efficiency, and change 
of any sort?
The failure to address the variety of managerial responses to 
adversity stems from the adoption of a unitary view both by managers 
who are termed 'senior', and by writers on organisations. For 
example, Staw et al (1981) points out that
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’’current models emphasise organisational, and not individual 
or group, responses to adversity" (page 501).
In this thesis the extent to which senior managers' views are similar 
to those of middle managers is examined, and the variety of views and 
actions is exposed. By focussing on groups the thesis expands and 
qualifies the work of Staw et al. The problem of expenditure reduct­
ions is the effective management of resources; it is also the in­
effective management of variety.
A concern with exploring the variety of management responses to 
expenditure reductions was facilitated by an analysis of the nature of 
organisational sub-cultures, and in particular those associated with 
management teams. Access negotiations changed the focus of the 
research away from sub-cultures and towards expenditure reductions as 
the major topic.
An interest in organisational sub-cultures pre-dated contact with the 
Social Services Department, and was the research focus of the agenda 
for negotiating access. In the initial approach to the Department,
I identified organisational sub-cultures, and the interaction between 
different group cultures, as a research area of interest. The access 
agenda included an expressed willingness to examine a mutually agreed 
topic identified by organisational members. The topic so identified 
was the management of expenditure reductions. The agreed research 
agenda involved then both sub-cultures and expenditure reductions 
with the emphasis on the latter. In fact, it was in the context of 
expenditure reductions, and the effects of this on intergroup
- 6 -
relations between management teams, that an interest in group sub­
cultures was expressed by organisational managers. This interest 
was confirmed during the process of data collection, as was the 
growing significance to managers of expenditure reductions.
In adopting an action model, which involved both advancing theory 
and helping clients, a client-identified problem area was desirable 
as a starting point. The research was thus both client-centred and 
researcher-centred, and involved a degree of flexibility in terms of 
topic selection. One advantage of this approach is that members may 
be more, rather than less, willing to 'own' the resultant data and 
its analysis, because they have been involved in the selection of 
the problem to be researched. Client action, it is argued, is then 
more likely.
Access can be difficult to obtain to study issues which organisation­
al members find sensitive or threatening. An approach based on a 
stated focus of expenditure reductions may have led to rejection, 
because of the anxiety this topic created. This assumption was 
confirmed when a direct but unsuccessful approach (described in 
Chapter II), was made to another organisation. In contrast, sub­
cultural phenomena was a non-threatening topic for obtaining access.
Organisational Sub-Cultures
In my work experience the focus of investigations of racially 
discriminatory acts was organisationally specific practice, and the 
logic or rationality in use. In obtaining members' accounts of
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particular rules and regulations, and custom and practice, I became 
aware of the variety of practice amongst organisations in respect of, 
for example, promotion procedures. At the same time, discovering the 
reasons behind particular actions involved questioning the rationale 
involved, the 'taken for granted' assumptions (Schutz: 1973; Schein: 
1985) of decision makers, about the qualities and characteristics of 
ethnic minorities.
When, as Training Officer for the Race Relations Board, I monitored 
the progress of new employees, I was made aware of the 'taken for 
granted' nature of much work activity, and the differences between 
organisations. For example those with experience of other organisat­
ions made 'mistakes', that is, they applied a task definition which 
was appropriate to their previous workplace rather than their current 
one. The 'taken for granted' nature of such definitions was thereby 
exposed, and mistakes were dealt with by explicitly defining the 
expectations members had of the neophyte in relation, to the task in 
question.
Thus at both a common sense and a professional level I was aware of 
differences in organisational practice, and the 'taken for granted' 
nature of much of this practice.
My undergraduate training in social anthropology - the observation 
and analysis of social interaction - gave me a perspective on social 
activity which recognised the existence of different groupings 
within the whole. It led me to ascribe prime legitimacy to the
accounts of group members, or 'emic' descriptions, as the basis for 
analysis. It also pointed me in the methodological direction of 
collecting data by participating as an observer within groups being 
studied.
During data collection for my M.Sc. dissertation (Frame: 1979) 
differences between the three divisions of a government funded 
research institution - pure research, applied research and administ­
ration - were highlighted by members. The dimensions identified then 
were orientation towards management and the environment (Lorsch and . 
Lawrence: 1965); technology and territory (Miller: 1959); environmental 
constituents and rate of change (Duncan: 1972); level of environmental 
uncertainty (Perrow: 1967); and significant others (Shibutani: 1971).
In literature on organisations, culture is a topic which has received 
some attention from, for example, Jacques (1951), Handy (1978), 
Pettigrew (1979), and Schein (1985), usually in the form of one 
organisation having one culture. Cultural plurality within an organis­
ation, or the existence of organisational sub-cultures, is referred to, 
though infrequently explored, by authors such as Bennis (1969) and 
Handy (1976). Silverzweig and Allen (1976) state that
"every sub-group within each business organisation has its 
own distinctive set of norms or cultural influences" (p.33).
As an analytical device, group culture is sometimes considered to 
provide only a partial explanation of intergroup difficulties, (Burns 
and Stalker: 1966).
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In a comprehensive survey of the literature on organisational 
culture Schein (1985) asserts that
"an organisation tends to be a conglomeration of sub-cultures"
(p.43).
He does not, though, explore this issue in any detail. It is, he 
suggests, an empirical question, best answered by researching 
particular organisational settings. Schein's data tends to support 
a unitary view of organisational culture, with one exception. He 
notes the occurrence of sub-cultures in the mid-life of organisat­
ions , that is, when the founder and his family are no longer in a 
dominant position. In part, this thesis focusses on management 
sub-cultures, and thus builds on and expands the work of Schein.
In literature on expenditure reductions, culture is infrequently 
addressed, though a number of authors (Hirschhorn and Associates: 
1983) refer to culture as a significant but inhibiting factor in 
organisational change aimed at facilitating reductions. Their terms 
'professional culture'and 'management culture' .remain largely 
undefined. The significance of a cultural approach to scarcity at 
the macro level is emphasised by Stanley (1968); scarcity must
• "first be defined culturally in terms of the available 
systems of meaning" (p.866).
A cultural approach, which attaches significance to an organisat­
ion's 'meaning-making' systems is also identified by Nottenburg and 
Fedor (1983). The cultural form which they term myth influences an 
organisation's response to decline because it has
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"the role of providing meaning for past events and constraining the alternatives for future action" (p.334)
Sub-cultures may be differentiated from more transitory phenomena 
which influence managerial action, such as fashion or a "flavour 
of the month" approach, in that sub-cultures exist and persist 
over time, and so provide a means of evaluating and introducing 
new developments. At the same time, of course, sub-cultures change; 
they grow, develop and decline; they are not fixed for all time 
and any analysis needs to be aware of their changing nature.
A particularly significant source of group sub-culture is derived 
from professional training. Such training provides the individual 
with a normative model for carrying out professional duties. When 
the professional becomes a manager this model is utilised in the 
performance of the managerial role. Those who have experienced 
similar training will subscribe to similar values, and it is these 
that will form the basis of the group sub-culture. It is 
predicted that, irrespective of the particular organisational 
setting, groups with similar training will subscribe to and be 
guided in their management by similar sub-cultural norms. Changes 
in the course of the professionalisation process will directly 
influence the form and content of a particular sub-culture.
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Methodological focus
Methodologically the cultural perspective defined by Stanley (1968) 
as members' views, seemed appropriate as a starting point. Analytic­
ally, I wanted to know whether cultural traits invariably inhibited 
reduction-related change. I also wished to explore the nature of 
the interaction between a group's sub-culture and expenditure 
reduction events, and the extent to which a cultural explanation is 
limited.
As a basis for this I firstly considered whether management team 
cultures existed, how they were maintained and elaborated, and their 
content and function. Following Schein (1985) my definition of 
culture emphasises the 'taken for granted', or unquestioned, nature 
of these phenomena in organisational life. Culture includes ways of 
thinking, working and evaluating: the term comprehends the conceptual, 
behavioural and evaluative aspects of action. The term sub-culture 
is used to designate the culture peculiar to particular organisat­
ional groupings, in this case, management teams.
My definition of the term 'action research' follows Rapoport (1970):
"Action research aims to contribute both to the practical 
concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation, 
and to the goals of social science by joint collaboration 
within a mutually acceptable ethical framework" (p.499).
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He suggests it is the immediacy of the researcher's involvement 
in the action process which distinguishes it from other forms of 
applied research. My commitment to this approach grew, in part, from 
the theoretical inputs to the M.Sc. in Organisational Development 
where it was the preferred mode for initiating organisational change.
It seemed an appropriate way of simultaneously advancing theory and 
addressing practical managerial problems leading to an involvement in 
organisational change. Particularly this seemed appropriate as prior 
to the course referred to above, I had been recommending organisation­
al changes in, for example, promotion procedures for ethnic minorities.
I was keen to do a piece of applied research which had relevance to, 
and was based on, an involvement in organisational practice and which 
simultaneously made a theoretical contribution. In particular, I 
wanted to produce something which was of value to, and would be used 
by, any organisation which provided me with data. Pragmatically, 
such an approach was said to facilitate access though I found in 
practice that this was not invariably the case. In addition to 
putting action research into practice, I wished to improve my skills 
in consulting: obtaining access, and negotiating and implementing 
solutions. How an intervention was utilised by members would also 
be a useful source of information to test the researcher's diagnosis.
In the thesis three aspects of the action.research process are addressed : 
the problem of access; an action intervention as a diagnostic tool; 
and action in circumstances of overt conflict.
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Structure of the thesis
The thesis comprises eight further chapters. The purpose of 
Chapter II is two-fold: firstly to set out the methodology used 
and secondly to discuss organisational access. The first part of 
the chapter justifies the epistemological perspective and the 
methodology of data collection and analysis.
In the second part of Chapter II, the problem of access is addressed 
both generally and with specific reference to organisations experienc­
ing expenditure reductions. Access and how it is achieved is a 
significant issue, yet.action researchers' reports often take for 
granted this aspect of their work, usually because they were invited 
in by the client system. Accounts of field researchers are analysed, 
to determine those sources of influence which facilitate self­
initiated access. Access is addressed at an early stage in this 
thesis, not-only because it took place at the beginning of the research 
work, but also because it was useful in preliminary organisational 
diagnosis.
Chapter III provides the theoretical context within which the data 
in subsequent chapters is considered. This scene setting is most 
logically placed towards the beginning of the thesis. Firstly the 
literature on expenditure reductions is reviewed and the concept of 
organisational monetarism is identified and elaborated to locate 
the research within the development of academic work in this field.
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Data on the precipitating events is also presented in Chapter III.
The instructions to reduce expenditure, and the terminology in use 
by members to define them is described. A knowledge of how expendit­
ure reductions were introduced will assist understanding of material 
presented in subsequent chapters. A consideration of terminology as 
a means of defining the reality of reductions provides an introduction 
to the variety of meanings placed on the subject by organisational 
managers.
Chapter IV contains a consideration of management sub-cultures: 
whether they are perceived by members, how they are maintained and 
elaborated, and their content and function. Though this is not the 
primary focus of the thesis , it remains a topic of major significance 
to the analysis of expenditure reductions management. Chapter IV 
provides a basis for exposing and analysing the impact of culture 
on decline management, and thus our understanding of managerial 
responses in this task area, by introducing the notion of management 
group sub-culture. It identifies and elaborates the meaning and 
content of sub-culture for both organisational managers and the 
researcher. Data in subsequent chapters supports the view that a 
group's sub-culture strongly influences collective responses to 
stringency, and that stringency in turn influences the sub-culture 
of a group.
Expenditure reductions pressure is treated as an example of what 
Pettigrew (1979), (following Turner: 1957), terms a 'critical event': 
that is, one which exposes a group's culture to an extent not usually
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apparent in routine activities. In critical events, debate around 
appropriate action takes place, and 'taken for granted' assumptions 
are exposed. In practice, the extent to which reductions were 
interpreted as a threat over time, or the facility with which they 
were routinised, exposes the relationship between a group's sub­
culture and the management of expenditure reductions.
In addition a sub-cultural perspective is significant in analysing 
stringency for the following reasons. Group related values and 
behaviours were a popular explanatory device used by social service 
managers to account for responses to financial decline. A focus on 
sub-culture facilitated the analysis of variety in behaviour and 
values observed by both members and the researcher, in respect of 
different management groups. Thus 'management' was not treated 
uniformly and there was no assumption of unanimity. At the same 
time, a sub-cultural focus enabled the significance of behavioural 
issues, as well as financial issues, to be considered: that is, the 
analysis of expenditure reductions was not confined solely to a 
consideration of financial management. A focus on sub-cultures 
enabled the assertion that culture invariably inhibits reduction- 
related organisational change (Hirschhcrn and Associates: 1983) to 
be critically examined and more specifically stated in terms of 
which cultural traits inhibit reductions management, and which do not.
Chapter V examines the way managers responded to an instruction to 
reduce expenditure. An account is provided of the variety of 
strategies adopted, and the justification for these strategies.
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Members' categories for strategies - 'resisting' and 'co-operating'
- are identified and three defensive reactions, including resistance, 
are elaborated and examined by reference to the literature. The 
type of responses predicted by organisational monetarism were found 
to be absent in practice.
Chapter VI utilises the content of the two previous chapters to 
analyse managers' interpretations of their role in expenditure 
reductions using members' own descriptive terms. Interpretations 
varied in that, for example, managers who formed the team which 
subscribed to values such as consultation and democratic management 
were much less certain that their actions, which were classified as 
resistance, were appropriate. In addition this chapter contains a 
report of the changes to intragroup and intergroup relations, 
none of which accord with the predictions of organisational monetarism.
The action intervention, which included the organisation's two 
middle management teams and focussed on intergroup relations and 
expenditure reductions, is described and analysed in Chapter VII.
The advisability of action in circumstances of overt conflict is 
considered together with the source of conflict. The intervention 
produced data which was particularly important to the analysis 
because it served to emphasise and direct attention to the contextual 
features as well as to the values, which managers reported as 
influencing their ability to act. It determined the difference 
between 'being able to' and 'wanting to' manage reductions.
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In Chapter VIII factors which facilitate and inhibit reductions 
management are addressed by comparing the organisation's two middle 
management teams, and critically examining some assumptions on which 
the concept of organisational monetarism is based. Sub-cultural and 
contextual features are identified as either helping or hindering 
reductions management, thus continuing the analysis from the previous 
chapter. In addition, members' views of the future are examined, to 
determine whether the positive innovations predicted by organisational 
monetarism were anticipated. In fact members' perceptions of the 
future were invariably negative.
Chapter IX summarises the contribution of the thesis to knowledge in 
the areas addressed. It defines the limitations of the work and 
areas for future research. The major contribution is to the theory 
of managing expenditure reductions, and the influence of both manage­
ment sub-cultures and contextual features. It meets the need identified 
by Glennester (1980) for 'more evidence of organisational practice'
(p.381) in order to advance theory. At a descriptive level, the thesis 
presents a detailed picture of how management in one organisation 
responded to the instruction to reduce expenditure, and the variety 
of management tasks involved. The analysis shows that management 
groups construct the meaning of expenditure reductions in different 
ways, and thus respond diversely to the instruction to reduce 
resources. These constructions seem to owe more to the nature of the 
context within which groups work, and their respective sub-cultures, 
than to any behavioural imperative inherent in reduced circumstances. 
What seems significant is the extent of congruence between context/
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sub-culture and required expenditure reductions. Where there is 
congruence, managing reductions is relatively straightforward. Where 
there is less congruence, management is problematic. To deal with 
reductions then, managers need to 'be able to' as well as 'want to'.
Data on management practice is provided which enhances the value of 
both the predictive and prescriptive literature, enabling both 
theoretical constructs and practical advice to be tested against the 
realities of managing expenditure reductions.
Financial stringency, and therefore the management of stringency, 
continues to be an issue for the public and the private sectors.
The issues which are explored in this thesis continue to have con­
temporary relevance both for the practising manager and for the 
organisational theorist. Decline management remains a relatively 
under-explored area, particularly at the micro organisational level.
Conclusion
In concluding this introduction, it may be useful to say something 
of my personal values in relation to the subject of expenditure 
reductions. As an issue, it is particularly value-laden: it is 
sensitive, conflict producing, and a current and overt party 
political issue.
Prior to the research I had an expectation that fewer resources lead 
to a reduction in service rather than to an improvement in efficiency.
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Because of the positive value I attached to organisations affected,
I regarded managers' active co-operation in implementing reductions 
as undesirable. Now I am less sure: diametrically opposed and 
conflicting managerial responses were each seen as having validity 
by different managers in the same organisation. Ideologically I 
hold the view that society has a responsibility to provide for those 
in need, and that reductions which are unrelated to a decrease in 
demand, are unjustifiable. However, how the manager anticipates 
and deals with fewer resources has for me become more problematic. 
Managing is no longer seen as undesirable; rather in fact the reverse, 
because the effects of not managing the resources that remain may be 
as damaging to service delivery and inter-managerial relations as 
the effects of the financial reductions themselves. Both resistance 
and managing, as strategies at the disposal of managers, are discussed 
later in Chapter V.
Whilst asserting that value-free sociology is impossible, Becker 
(1971) suggests that a charge of bias, or accepting the perspective 
of one organisational group, is less likely where there is overt 
conflict:
"the right to define the nature of reality becomes a matter 
for argument .... the researcher is made aware that there 
are at least two sides to the story" (p.130).
Overt conflict was reported by members, and observed in the organisat­
ion studied. Whilst this was problematic for managers, and for the 
interventionist, it was beneficial to the researcher because at 
least two sides to the story were revealed.
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In his essay 'On Methodology', Becker (1971) stresses the importance 
of the researcher making "imaginative use of personal experience"
(p.22). This introductory chapter indicates how I have used my 
experience, as an employee, as a student, and as an action researcher, 
in generating the issues which are considered in this thesis. What 
these issues are, and the stages at which they are addressed, are 
set out. The contributions to knowledge are indicated, and my own 
value position in relation to the major focus of the research - the 
management of expenditure reductions - is elaborated.
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY AND ACCESS
Introduction
This chapter provides the epistemological and methodological bases 
for the research, and then addresses the issue of access. The 
actor's interpretation of events, and resultant behaviour, forms the 
basis of the analysis. Data, obtained by interview, document search, 
and observation was used to devise categories of information which 
were then compared to the literature. Sources of influence in 
obtaining access are then considered using reports by both field and 
action researchers. Finally, access in circumstances of resource 
stringency is examined in the the light of empirical data.
Actor's Perspective
Though Schutz (196 7) terms the actor, the forgotten man of sociology, 
a number of writers support the prominence which he gives to the 
actor's perspective. In his review of the 'action approach' to the 
study of organisations, Silverman (1970) provides examples of 
research which focus on the construction and reconstruction of 
reality by social acts on the part of actors. Schutz (1973) states 
that
"if the social sciences aim indeed at explaining social reality, 
then the scientific constructs on the second level must 
include a reference to the subjective meaning an action has for 
the actor" (p.20).
- 21 -
That is, the analysis, or 'second level of constructs', is based on 
the actor's interpretation, or 'first level constructs'. The actor 
is the source of data on what his activities mean to him, and thus to 
understand these activities we must refer to the actor.
A number of expressions are used to identify this perspective: 
'actor's perspective', 'action perspective', and 'first order 
constructs'. Schutz also refers to 'common-sense understanding' and 
'subjective interpretations' as his focus. Similarly, the Weberian 
term 'Verstehen' refers to the participant's understanding of his 
situation. Examples of authors who have used this perspective to 
advantage are Becker (1971), Dalton (1959) and Roy (1955 and 1973).
A further advantage of this focus lies in the richness and variety of 
perspectives which are produced. Members' own models are particul- 
ularly important for this study which is, in part, exploratory, in
that it concerns a relatively new area of managerial activity.
The Nature of Qualitative Data
Because of its methodological focus, work of this nature is less
systematic than, for example, experiments or surveys. Variations on
the theme of observer participation assume that the best way to 
obtain members' perspectives is to observe them in practice. Thurley 
(1971) for example, suggests that
"structured questionnaires are of little value in catching 
the meaning behind many of the actions of tenants , operatives 
and foremen" (p 272).
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Instead he recommends semi-structured interviews and observation.
Yet it has been argued that these methods, which are usually 
described as qualitative, are less 'scientific', because, for 
example, the observer can mould the data he obtains to fit his own 
preconceptions. In fact, as Becker (1971) points out, this is less 
likely than with more systematic methods. The richness of data 
obtained frequently requires the observer
"to sacrifice his pet ideas and hypotheses to recalcitrant 
facts in his field notes" (p.43).
Another criticism of this method involves the possibility of 
researcher 'going native', or accepting and adopting members' 
perspectives to the detriment of his researcher role. This assumes, 
though, a consistency of perspective within an organisation and 
amongst its members. This was not apparent in my experience. Whilst 
accepting members' perspectives as they were presented, the conflict­
ing perspectives obtained made it extremely difficult to regard one 
set as 'correct' A measure of objectivity resulted from these very 
differences. Additionally the thesis is not confined to a 
presentation of members views, but rather uses these as a basis for 
analysis.
On a pragmatic note, qualitative data is more likely to facilitate 
the internalisation of information by members to elicit action. 
Research by Van der Vail et al (1976) indicates that action is more 
likely to be taken on qualitative research data than on quantitative 
data. They define 'quantitative' to include: survey research,
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whilst 'qualitative' refers to participant observation and case 
study analysis.
Observer Participation
I term my method of data collection observer participation to 
distinguish it from the more usual term of participant observation. 
This latter term has been used to describe a range of relationships 
between the researcher and his data source. Gold's (1958) typology 
of research methods provides a useful starting point to consider the 
elements of my relationship with social services managers.
Gold defines four relationships between the researcher and the 
data sources, using two sets of categories:
(a) overt and covert: whether or not the researcher's purpose is 
known to the subjects;
(b) participation and formal observation: whether or not the 
researcher is involved in social interaction with subjects.
These categories are tabulated as follows:
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FIGURE 1
RESEARCH RELATIONS GOLD (1958)
OVERT COVERT
PARTICIPATION COVERT
PARTICIPATION AS PARTICIPATION
OBSERVER
FORMAL OBSERVER COVERT
OBSERVATION AS FORMAL
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION
My activities were 'overt', and involved both participating z
observer, and observing as a participant. With the former, 
according to Gold, both parties know the relationship is one for 
field-research purposes, but the researcher participates in group 
activities. Being an observer as participant on the other hand 
entails one-visit interviews and formal observations. In general, my 
method alternated between these two.
Further examination of my own experience led me to question the 
extent to which it is possible to categorise research activities into 
participating or observing. Rather than regarding these as either/or 
categories it would be more useful to regard them as lying at either
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end of a continuum, with the researcher moving back and forth, 
depending on his requirements and the exigencies of the field.
In addition to the above categories, Gold also refers to informal and 
formal, though it is unclear whether he is referring to the 
activities of members or researcher. Assuming this applies to both, 
and combined with the categories identified in Figure 1, the 
following model can be drawn up.
FIGURE 2
DIMENSIONS OF RESEARCHER ACTIVITY AND FOCUS
(1) Researcher Activity : participation 4-- -- ►> observation
(2) Research Method : formal 4|--------------^  informal
(3) Researcher's Purpose : covert <4--------------^overt
(4) Members' Activity : formal ^ --------------►  informa1
The first dimension distinguishes between the researcher's active 
participation in members' activities, and passive data collection by 
observation. Formal and informal methodologies define the extent to 
which data collection procedures are structured, specified and 
restricted prior to the data-producing event. The third dimension 
identifies the extent of members' knowledge of the researcher's 
purpose. The fourth and final dimension distinguishes between 
members' activities resulting from the occupation of a particular 
position within the organisation, and the less structured social
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interactions between members as they carry out their formally defined 
tasks.
The first three dimensions represent the 'how' of the research 
process, or its operationalisation, artd the last one represents the 
'what' or the focus of research activities. Using these, the 
researcher's activities can be described more adequately. In fact, 
the researcher's relationship is in a fluid state, and will move 
backwards and forward between the extremes represented by the above 
continuum. An example will illustrate this point.
As I was in the organisation on a daily basis for a number of months, 
I was able to observe and talk to members informally and thus 
participate in the social-life of the organisation. Additionally I 
participated as a member when obtaining stationery, and trivial 
changes here provided me with an example of the effect of expenditure 
reductions. Control was imposed by requiring completion of a 
'request for stationery' form, and the obtaining of a superior's 
signature whereas previously a verbal request had been sufficient.
My activities were not confined to Gold's definition of an 'observer 
as participant'.yet I did not perform the activities associated 
with the role of manager. For example, when I observed meetings I 
did not contribute to the discussion or raise items for consideration 
though I did participate at an informal, process level. I chatted 
with other members before and during breaks and after meetings. I
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passed out tea and biscuits and collected money for these, much as 
any other member would do. I was always a part of the group being 
observed, either sitting round a table or in a circle, rather than 
sitting outside it. I participated in general responses, such as 
laughing at jokes, and acknowledging eye contact, smirks or looks of 
impatience. Thus in Gold's terms I was a 'participant as observer'.
In fact during the course of one meeting I could be involved 
sequentially in participating in informal activities, and observing 
informal or formal activities; pre-meeting chat; observation; passing 
round papers;observation; passing round tea; observation; 
post-meeting talk. Latterly I was also involved as an active 
participant in the action intervention I initiated for and with 
members. Thus the researcher's role is more usefully characterised 
as being in a fluid state, moving along the four dimensions referred 
to above.
I now examine my three methods of data collection in some detail, 
namely interviewing, observation and documentary analysis.
1) Interviewing
I saw members individually to obtain information by a process of 
question and answer. General questions areas were determined prior 
to the interview, but the process was sufficiently flexible to allow 
other matters to be probed. I was interested in the individual's 
job; accounts of contact with and impressions of other divisions; 
involvement in expenditure reductions; and the individual' s responses to
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expenditure reductions with their reasons. The questions I asked 
were usually open ended to allow members to select for themselves 
the data they gave, and to reduce the likelihood of my influencing 
what data was offered. For example, I would ask "what about the 
cuts?" or "did the cuts affect you?" or "were you involved in the 
cuts?". Of course more specific questions demanding particular 
pieces of information were asked to clarify detailed points.
As I was interested in managers' perspectives, I interviewed all 
management members of the organisation, usually on two occasions, 
and observed them in operation in their three respective management 
teams: Directors management team (D.M.T.), Field Work management team 
(F.W.M.T.), and Residential and Day Care management team (R. and 
D.C.M.T.).
Interviews serve to provide the individual's perspective on the 
issues being considered, to expand and re-orientate information 
and impressions obtained from other sources, including other 
interviews. It enables the researcher to check on what has or has 
not been said at meetings, and to discover how far the individual's 
position varied from that of other group members. The informant 
is aware that the researcher will see him in other settings and 
will therefore be less inclined to present an image which varies 
too much from his usual public one.
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2) Observation
Observation took place in two settings. As a temporary member with 
office space on the organisation's central site, I observed some
of the day-to-day life that went on there. This enabled me to 
get the feel of the organisation and acquire the knowledge to 
understand incomplete references to the site in other settings, 
and to chat to members as I walked around. The other and more signif­
icant setting was meetings of the organisation's three management 
teams. I sat in on a series of meetings of each group and noted 
what topics were discussed. Of particular interest were references 
to expenditure reductions and comments on out-group members.
As well as providing data on substantive matters each group's process 
provided diagnostic material such as how they conducted their meetings. 
A group's process provided data on the creation and re-creation of 
that group's culture. It was, therefore, of particular interest in 
discovering the dimension of culture, and in determining whether any 
of these dimensions facilitated or inhibited reduction-related manage­
ment tasks. Conversely process was also of interest in identifying 
the extent to which group culture was affected by the advent of the 
expenditure reductions task. Finally I was able to compare public 
contributions with those made to me privately, and thus check on the 
reliability of the latter.
By observing a number of meetings of each group I reduced the 
possibility of stressing an unrepresentative event. Thus I sat in 
on six meetings of the organisation's senior management team (D.M.T.)
- 30 -
I was able to follow the progress of items which were, or were not 
dealt with over time, such as the issue of financial control by 
the Field Work Management Team (F.W.M.T.). As these meetings were 
at different levels in the organisation, I was able to observe how 
the same item was dealt with at these different levels. Thus a 
discussion paper on the management of expenditure reductions for 
field work managers was initially presented to senior management 
and then to the F.W.M.T. By observing two teams at the same 
horizontal level a comparison was made of the issues they consider­
ed and of the similarities or differences between the ways they 
dealt with them. Finally I attended joint meetings between the 
two middle management teams, in order to observe how they functioned 
together.
A number of authors are critical of observation as a means of data 
collection. For example, Blumer (1971), from his symbolic-interact- 
ionist perspective, maintains that behaviour in groups can only be 
usefully understood by participating in the meaning-making activities 
of the group. Non-participation he suggests, can lead to "the worst 
kind of subjectivism" (p. 188), where the 'objective' observer's 
surmises are substituted for those of the actor's. Schutz (1967) 
makes a similar point: the meanings assigned by actors and observers 
to an action may be different. He points out that negative actions, 
or actions which were considered and rejected, are obviously not 
apparent to the researcher who has no knowledge of them or of the 
reasons lying behind such choices. But if the researcher has access
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to members, he can check his surmises, and their reasons for 
negative actions. Thus for example I probed F.W. managers as to 
why managing expenditure reductions was not raised by them in team 
meetings since I knew from interviews that it was a management 
problem.
Criticism of observation is based on a definition of what is observed 
which is limited to overt physical actions. Meetings were also 
fora where items were discussed and reasoned out, argued about, or 
responded to. Sometimes only bald statements were made, for example, 
"cuts are against everthing we stand for". Sometimes the grounds 
for adopting a particular position were justified to other 
members. Often these discussions represented off-the-cuff responses 
to the issue. Sometimes they were a repetition of old arguments , and 
on occasions they were 'planned', that is, members decided before 
the meeting what they were going to say. Nevertheless, the substance 
of members' contributions was of interest to the observer for they 
provided an insight into the group's creation and re-creation of 
reality.
It has been suggested that an observer influences a group. This is 
less likely if observation takes place over time, as in this study. 
Becker (1971) suggests this is because 'putting on a show' becomes 
difficult to sustain. Members are also "enmeshed in social relation­
ships which are important to them" (p 46) which, Becker suggests, 
are a more potent force than the researcher's influence.
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A continuing presence over time also aids the researcher's social 
interaction with members as individuals. He becomes familiar and 
thus less threatening. Members know the researcher is in an 
informed position because of his observations; it provides a joint 
experience which can be referred to later in individual settings.
3) Documentary Analysis
I examined minutes of the two middle management team meetings for a 
period prior to, and during my time with the organisation. I was 
unable to examine minutes of the Director's management team meetings 
as none were produced.
I obtained information on the frequency of meetings, their form, 
and the issues which had been considered. Any reference to expendit­
ure reductions and to relations with other divisions were of 
particular interest. In addition I scrutinised discussion papers 
which were circulated at meetings I attended, paying particular 
attention to those which concerned expenditure reductions. One of 
these detailed how their team leader suggested the F.W.M.T. should 
deal with the effects of expenditure reductions. The other repres­
ented a F.W.M.T. strategy for exerting influence on councillors by 
providing them with information on the effects of reductions in the 
field work division.
Reservations about the use of written material as a source of data 
often focus on the disadvantages of retrospection when no one
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involved either rn producing or receiving them is available to 
interpret their meanings except with hindsight. This criticism 
often also applies to recent documents in cases where the researcher 
has no access to the producers and their intended meanings, nor the 
recipients and their interpretations. But such criticism is less 
relevant if the researcher has access to producers and recipients, 
as I did. This is not to argue that documents have only one set 
of meanings. What is of interest is the intended purpose of such 
documents and how they are interpreted by the audience for which 
they were produced. Thus Cicourel (1964) states that historical 
documents
"may contain idomatic expressions, group specific jargon or 
connotations which the researcher must try to determine 
without prior knowledge of the writer's objectives or ways 
of interpreting the world" (p 154)
Access to members enables the researcher to overcome this, particul­
arly if he was present at the events which form the substance of 
these documents, and if he was present at their creation. In fact, 
the creation process itself was illuminating for often minutes 
made no reference to lengthy discussions, or contained a much shorter 
version. Questions such as "shall I put that in the minutes?",
"how shall I phrase that?", or "I don't think we'll include that in 
the minutes", were signs that an account of the group's performance 
was being created for the benefit of non-group members. Thus group 
members were conscious that minutes were a means of influencing non­
members and some referred to minutes in this way.
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Data Analysis
I examined and compared data as I went along, looking for links and 
contradictions between what had been obtained from different sources. 
These links were used to form categories of data. The data was then 
re-examined in the light of these categories , to check for information 
which might have been overlooked, or which might have become relevant 
in the light of the categories devised. An example will serve to 
illustrate this.
During a number of interviews I was told that there was a lack of 
interest in the financial control aspect of management in the F.W.M.T. 
This was linked to the group's response to expenditure reductions.
I
It was also linked with their team leader's statement to me about 
his intention to introduce a regular review of spending, or 
'calendarisation', at this group's meetings. (Calendarisation 
involved a comparison of actual spending during a month with a 
notional figure, arrived at by dividing total annual budget, in each 
spending area, by twelve. Under this system, spending per month 
should roughly match the month's budget. If it does not, overspend­
ing or underspending, is identified). From my observation I noted 
that he did not in fact do this. The difference in practice here 
between the F.W.M.T. and the R. and D.C.M.T. was pointed out by a 
number of managers, and I could and did confirm this from observation 
and from minutes. A difference in practice was apparent between the 
two middle management teams: R. and D.C.M.T., unlike their F.W. 
colleagues, did consider current spending on a regular basis as a
- 35 -
matter of course. I also observed differences between the two groups 
in terms of their respective resource allocating skills, their views 
of these skills, and financial management in general. Thus the 
category of 'financial management' emerged as a theme around which 
numerous pieces of data, from interview, observation and documents, 
could be organised. This organised data was then examined in the 
light of data from other categories, such as 'responses to reductions' 
and with literature on organisational decline.
Continuing this example, I concluded that an interest in, and 
experience of the financial aspect of management, was a significant 
factor in determining group reactions to the instruction to recommend 
and manage expenditure reductions and to an organisational climate 
where an emphasis on financial constraint was seen to be increasing.
In presenting my analysis, transcripts of the spoken and written word 
appear in inverted commas, otherwise a summary of the relevant data 
is presented. The source of the data is also indicated; usually this 
is a member of one of the organisation's three management teams.
What is quoted represents a 'typical' remark because it was echoed 
by a significant number of members in one form or another.
My aim in presenting the literature is to integrate it with my data. 
Traditionally in theses the research is introduced by a literature 
review but this may sometimes create a gap between the work of others 
and the author's own research. Instead an attempt is made at integrat­
ion by presenting what others have contributed when a particular
- 36 -
theme is discussed. This method also symbolises the data-led rather 
than the literature-led nature of this study. There are however 
number of points about the literature that do not fit easily into 
the body of the work. Additionally there is a major theme in the 
literature - improvements through reductions, or what I term organisat­
ional monetarism - which is not suggested by the data. Because it 
represents an opposite view it is a useful analytical device to examine 
both the theme itself and the realities of the Social Services 
Department. I now consider the process of gaining access as a 
source of organisational data.
Access
In order to determine what facilitates access to an organisation to 
collect data, I analysed my own experience as a student committed to 
action research, and accounts by both action and field researchers.
Of particular interest was whether the reality of expenditure 
reductions was a significant factor in determining access. Indeed 
access is important generally in diagnosing the readiness for change 
of an organisation. The ways the members react to the novelty of 
having an action researcher amongst them , gives an early indication of 
readiness or resistance. In order to examine this, it is necessary to 
identify forms and sources of influence.
The term access is used to define the initial stages of organisational 
contact when permission to gather data is being negotiated, and to 
distinguish this process from the first stage of action research 
which has been termed 'entry* Gill (1982), or 'scouting and entry'
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Gill (1975b), Henley (1975). These latter terms relate to activities 
after official permission for access has been given.
Access is clearly an important issue, for on it depends the future of 
both field and action research; that it is problematic is recognised 
by a number of authors. Delaney (1960) for example points to
"the relative inaccessibility of organisations for research 
purposes" (p 450).
Sofer (1961) refers to
"the problem of access that dogs the empirical sociological 
study of contemporary society" (p.110).
Strategies to overcome this are elusive. Beck (1970) points out that
"there are no easy formulae to finding your way through such 
(access) interviews" (p.14).
In view of the different sensitivities, ulterior motives, and 
ideological climates in operation, the
"best advice is to remain open to clues in the individual 
setting" (p 17).
"A more complex performance may be required of you, along with 
a more complex set of credentials , than formerly" (p.19).
Johnson (1975) is critical of traditional social science literature 
because it implies that gaining access involves purposive rational 
action and decision making only. The process is fraught with many 
uncertainties; responses from members can vary from
"gleeful acceptance to being thrown out on one's ear" (p.50).
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He qualifies his own account as follows:
"such an account necessarily emphasises the amount of rational 
calculation involved in gaining entry" (p.69).
It is best to emphasise at the outset that
"playing it by ear is an essential continuing component of
this phase of social research" (p.69).
Yet it is possible to extract a number of significant factors which 
have been identified by researchers in their accounts of access 
interactions.
Access is conceptualised here as a series of social encounters with 
members of the organisation when the researcher attempts to influence 
or exert power, in order that they become his allies and their 
organisation becomes his data source. The concept of power provides 
a useful link between various writings in this field, for aspects of 
power are what the researcher uses to achieve his initial goal of 
access.
The power aspect of access was highlighted for me during my first 
contact with the Social Services Department. In response to an
outline of my requirements, the deputy director said that he and
other members would need convincing of my worth:
"we need to decide whether we've got the resources and whether 
you're worth it."
- 39 -
Access thus involved convincing organisational members of the 
researcher's worth. Field and action researchers are in a different 
power relationship with regard to organisations at the access phase 
of research because action researchers are often, though not 
invariably, invited in whereas field researchers are not.
Invitations provide the action researcher with a power base. Thus 
whilst action research has been identified by,, for example, Sofer 
(1961) and Thurley (1971), as a means of overcoming the problem of 
access, their 'invited' status makes access unproblematic, and their 
power position in relation to the data source remains unexamined at 
this stage of the research process.
Field researchers, on the other hand, do refer to exerting influence, 
for example Geer (1970) and Delaney (1960). It is not the case, as 
Johnson (1975) states, that
"cunning and deception or other uses of power are never reported
by field researchers as elements of their own activities" (p.56).
Power is used here to mean the ability to influence, rather than 
coerce. Goffman (1971) provides a useful expansion of the term
power, which can be exercised by
"enlightenment, persuasion, exchange, manipulation, authority, 
threat, punishment or coercion" (p.234)
to direct the activity of others. He provides a pointer to the 
variety of processes whereby influence can be exerted, though he 
does not define his terms too closely.
- 40 -
In the mai n , field researchers rely on all but the last three methods 
referred to above. In particular, the use of authority and deception 
are two methods of influence which are frequently noted as being 
particularly useful. Additionally, their accounts refer to 
substantive issues in access negotiations, such as topic and method, 
as sources of influence. A distinction is infrequently drawn, 
though, between sources of influence, and how this influence is 
exerted. Below deception and authority as forms of influence are 
examined and how different types of influence may be exerted is 
considered.
Deception
Deception is defined as withholding information which will not 
facilitate the researcher's purpose. It is an aspect of Goffman's 
'manipulation'(1971). The extent to which the researcher should, or 
indeed can, be open with subjects is debatable. Geer (1970) reports 
that though generally open, she and her research team pretended to 
have a hierarchical structure, with a 'head' who negotiated access 
with the organisation's administrative head. The pretence was 
thought to facilitate access. Johnson (1975) reports using deception 
in a number of areas: his experience, his purpose, his topic and his 
methodology. Thus he concocted experience, used a cover story, 
defocussed the research topic, and only revealed some of his 
methodological requirements after access had been obtained. Not 
surprisingly, Johnson believes that deception plays an important part 
in obtaining access: some of his requirements, if revealed
initially, would have led to rejection. Additionally, until the
- 41 -
researcher has access and some knowledge of the setting, he cannot be 
too specific about all his requirements.
Beck (1970) suggests that
"coming on straight is the best approach" (p. 14).
As a rule
"make explicit the terms of the bargain you are making"
and do not try to gain access
"without making a full disclosure" (p.15).
Whatever advantages accrue from deception will
"come back to haunt you in later days" (p.15).
Delaney (1960) strikes something of a middle course:
"the research proposal must be presented to responsible 
officials ... for the most part accurately ... we used a 
minimum of dissimulation" (p.452).
The dissimulation concerned the researcher's desired ideological 
posture; the impression was given that the researchers were 
ideologically and politically on the organisation's side.
My own strategy was to be reasonably open. My growing interest in 
expenditure reductions was not made overt until members themselves 
expressed an interest. I was unsure of the effect of revealing my 
approach to a number of other organisations at the same time. It
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might for example, be construed as indicating a lack of commitment 
to their organisation. On the other hand it showed initiative and 
revealed that there were potential competitors for my services. I 
decided to be open for all these reasons and additionally because I 
was unsure of the inter-organisational and inter-departmental 
commmunications; any attempts to deceive might have led to discovery 
given my naivety.
Authority
As with deception, a number of substantive issues such as method and 
professional status are seen to be of use in providing the researcher 
with authority. Thus Geer (1970) built up the authority of her 
method by supplying examples of work where the same method had been 
used:
"the administrator should know that the researcher is not 
embarking on a fishing expedition; that a number of 
experienced social scientists have already made researches 
of this kind" (p 82).
Mauksh (1970), Beck (1970) and Johnson (1975) suggest that the 
researcher's position as a social scientist is most powerful in 
providing the authority that will facilitate access. Beck states 
that
"Generally the most effective method (of gaining access) is to 
be, and appear to be, a social scientist" (p.18)
This provides the
"best possible credentials" (p.14),
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and is conveyed by using
"the evolved rhetoric of the social sciences" (p.14).
To present
"the image of scientific respectability" (p.15)
is most effective. Johnson also believes in the magic of social 
science rhetoric, particularly in references and proposals. He 
refers to his use of
"powerful symbols of academic respectability" (p.64),
and
"social science rhetoric" (p.64).
Letters to the organisation where he was seeking access were written 
on university notepaper where
"academic titles were used to lend academic respectability to 
the field researcher and the faculty sponsor, and phrases 
such as dedicated young scholar, reliable and trustworthy 
were used" (p.65).
He refers to these as the researcher's credentials. Rose (1970) 
recommends a letter of introduction detailing one's academic 
credentials , which he terms a letter of legitimacy. This of course 
assumes that social scientists and their work are viewed as being 
useful and valuable by organisational members. A number of 
authors, such as Gill (1982) and Warmington (1980) suggest that
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this is not always the case: practising managers often react 
negatively and defensively to academics as 'theoreticians'.
In my experience the social science researcher was perceived and 
categorised as both academic and theoretical. A distinction was 
drawn between this and what was termed the practical. For example, 
during one access discussion, a financial controller said
"I deal in pounds, shillings and pence, not concepts"
with no apparent irony. For me the pound is just as much a concept 
as sub-culture, but for him it was not. A professional adviser in 
an Education Department said she saw my work as 'academic rather 
than practical'. A Director of Civic Amenities said
"we're a practical department; we're a 'doing' not a 'thinking' 
department'.
Furthermore, these remarks were made in the context of my emphasis­
ing the practical, organisationally relevant nature of the work I 
wanted to do. Academic and practical were often seen as antonyms, 
and the researcher was consigned to the former category. This is 
perhaps, an example of defensive stereotyping, where the researcher 
is seen as a threat to current practice. Though action research is 
seen by authors such as Sofer (1961), Thurley (1971), and Rapoport 
(1970) to overcome problems of access, where there is no invitation, 
the offer of action research does not automatically open all doors , 
in part because of members' views of the social sciences.
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Authority also flows from the researcher's past work, or reputation.
For example, Schein (1969) and Trist et al (1977) report that their 
reputations as action researchers facilitated access.
My own use of authority utilised my past work and academic experience, 
and my current status. I thus referred to my S.S.R.C. grant, and the 
C.N.A.A. as the registering body for my thesis, and obtained an 
'academic' reference from my supervisor. As a student I was conscious 
that my authority was not particularly high. By making explicit my 
association with various authoritative institutions , and my employ­
ment and academic history I endeavoured to remedy this weakness.
The above consideration of two forms of power, deception and authority, 
also indicated means by which power can be exerted, such as through 
methodological stance and academic status. A more comprehensive 
summary now follows.
Means of Influence
1) Members' view of social science research: how far it is viewed 
as useful or a luxury (Scott: 1965), or a fringe service (Beck: 
1970).
2) Researcher's background: how far his experience exerts a positive 
or negative influence. Gouldner (1954) suggests that similarity 
of experience with members facilitates access.
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3) Academic status: the extent to which information about the 
researcher's funding body, academic institutions and 
references, post-school education and level of degree exerts 
a positive or negative influence. Johnson (1975) suggests it 
is positive.
4) Topic: whether the topic has a positive or negative effect.
Johnson (1975) and Delaney (1960) suggest that the topic
can adversely affect access. Thus Delaney excluded certain 
controversial topics from his access discussions, on the 
assumption that they would be too threatening or too 
impractical. Because he found this assumption was open to 
question, he concluded:
"Certainly, organisational researchers should not toss 
prudence to the winds (in respect of research topic) 
but neither should they mistake it for timidity" (p.453)
5) Self presentation: Little (1970), Scott (1965), and Johnson
(1975), all emphasise the importance of self presentation.
Johnson (1975) and Delaney (1960) stress the importance of 
the researcher having
"skill in explaining his initial interest in terms which 
make sense to members of the setting" (Johnson: p.56).
6) Values: Beck (1970) suggests it is better to appear value free, 
whereas Delaney (1960) advises the researcher to support the 
official perspective.
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7) Method: both Geer (1970) and Johnson (1975) stress the 
importance of methodology being seen as both appropriate 
and acceptable by those granting access.
8) Fore-knowledge: Johnson (1975), Geer (1970), Lawton (1970) 
and Delaney (1960) recommend researching the organisation 
prior to an approach for access.
In most areas of potential influence listed above, there is no 
certainty whether it will be positive or negative. The strength 
of the effect is also problematic. These issues serve to qualify 
the list of influencing behaviours which need further work to 
clarify their relative effect in particular cases.
Use of Allies
The purpose of exercising influence is to create allies within the 
organisation who will facilitate access in three ways: 
information-giving, supporting, and introducing. Dalton (1959) 
refers to the importance of allies. At an informational level, I was 
told by a member of one organisation who I should see and how to 
'dress-up ' my proposal to increase its chances of acceptance. 
Supporting can involve a stated agreement to the proposed access in 
written and verbal communications to other members. Thus my contact 
in the Social Services Department wrote to other members that he was 
'sufficiently impressed with Mr. Frame to want to pursue the 
matter '.
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Additionally this memorandum served as my introduction to other 
members with whom I had access discussions.
Allies do not always perform a useful function though. On one 
occasion my request was refused in part because my ally was not 
highly regarded by senior management, nor had he provided me with an 
accurate picture of how the organisation worked. In the Social 
Services Department though, the use of allies was clearly on the 
whole positive and allies who can exert a positive influence on the 
researcher's behalf are essential in obtaining access.
The action researcher is usually in a powerful position because he 
has allies if he is invited in. The majority of authors in this 
field state that they were invited in: Jacques (1951) , Glidewell
(1959), Tills (1961), Sofer (1961), Jones (1969), Clark (1972), Brown 
(1972), Henley (1975) and Foster (1972). There are exceptions, such 
as Sadler and Barry (1970): they took the initiative but they too had 
powerful internal allies.
If researchers are invited in, it is more likely that members will
have a positive view of the uses of social science research. As
Sofer (1961) states,leading members must realise
"that there is a relevant body of knowledge and category
of people (social scientists) who may contribute to 
its (the problems) solutions" (p.121).
Given that a choice of consultant is made, it is more likely that 
some members will know and approve of his background, based on his
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reputation. Schein (1969) lists a number of reasons for clients 
contacting him: they have, for example, heard him lecture, or seen 
an article by him on the presenting problem. Some sort of problem 
identification will have taken place prior to a consultant being 
contacted. Tills (1969) suggests that
"the problem area has to be fairly well staked out before an 
appropriate consultant can be selected" (p.91),
and Sofer (1961) points out that
"work of this type cannot be set in motion unless the organisation 
contains leading members who realise that a problem exists" (p.121).
Issues of values will be less problematic because of the action 
researcher's reputation and professional stance. His methods too 
will have the authority attached to his reputation and the organis­
ation will have decided to use resources and take some action on the 
issue. Organisational foreknowledge and self-presentation is less 
important because of the other factors listed above which exert a 
positive influence on the researcher's behalf.
Though the action researcher has a number of entry problems, these 
differ from those of the field researcher because of the former's 
power position in relation to members. For someone in the role of 
student, uninvited, with an interest in action, I found the work by 
authors in the field of action to be less helpful than it might have 
been, because, in general, access is assumed to be unproblematic.
For field researchers this was not the case, and their accounts 
proved more useful.
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My own strategy was to present myself to an organisation as a 
research resource, willing to examine a mutually agreed area and to 
produce something of practical value in return for data. This offer 
was of assistance in gaining access to the Social Services Department 
where their deputy director told me that they 'always insist on a 
quid pro quo* from the researcher. In the event, the mutally agreed 
topic of expenditure reductions became the major focus of this work.
Expenditure Reductions
Given the forms and sources of influence open to researchers , it is 
necessary to examine the place of expenditure reductions, both as a 
specific research topic, and generally as a determinant of how 
members will respond to research requests in other areas.
Expenditure reductions were highlighted as a significant factor of 
organisational life in three of the six organisations I approached. 
Significantly they were also the three where I achieved more than an 
initial contact and learned something of the organisation itself.
As a topic, expenditure reductions was viewed both positively and 
negatively. In the Social Services Department the topic was 
suggested by my contact as being a useful area of study which was 
also the view of the majority of managers with whom I discussed 
access. Of eight managers, one was non-committal, and one was un- 
enthusiastic. It was, he felt,
"too big; too sensitive. People are in the middle of coming 
to terms with the situation themselves".
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This member, and the one who was non-committal, were both members of 
the F.W.M.T.. This team, as we shall see, experienced great 
difficulties in responding as directed to reductions management.
For the majority of managers I spoke to however, the topic was of 
positive value in facilitating access.
The term 'sensitive' was also applied to expenditure reductions 
by a Chief Executive in another organisation approached. The 
Corporate Planning Unit for which he was responsible was 
enthusiastic about research which examined how different departments 
managed reductions. The Chief Executive, on whose approval the 
research depended, was not, and he questioned me for about an hour 
on my motives and politics , my knowledge of Labour councillors and 
how I came to choose their organisation. The Financial Comptroller 
also joined in this questioning. Expenditure reductions were a 
sensitive and political issue, I was told, and they were not 
enthusiastic that it should be studied. There were strong implicat­
ions for them of an undisclosed party political motive on my part, 
and access was refused.
In another organisation, expenditure reductions and responses to 
them were seen by the organisation's Director to preclude access for 
research in any topic. I was told that members would not co-operate. 
Their union had responded to impending resource reductions with a 
strategy of non-co-operation with management and co-operation would 
not be forthcoming for research either. Additionally, the government 
department to which the organisation was attached had decided that 
it was inadvisable to give researchers' access at a time of reductions.
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Thus openness to research was affected by the negative connotation 
of expenditure reductions.
Within the Social Services Department the resource demands made by a 
researcher at a time of stringency were raised by my first contact 
there, even before reductions as a topic was discussed.
"It's difficult enough providing services to clients, never 
mind time for researchers. We need to decide whether we've 
got the resources and whether you're worth it".
This suggests that at a time of reduced resources, members will 
think twice before using some of what remains to accommodate the 
researcher and will carefully evaluate research costs and benefits.
The topic of reductions and their management may facilitate or in­
hibit access, depending on members' views of the value of an 
outsider examining the issues involved. Access to research on other 
topics may be denied, or be vetted more rigorously than usual, at a 
time of resource pressure.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was twofold. Firstly, it provides the 
reader with details of the epistemological perspective and the 
methodology. The thesis focusses on the actor's interpretation of 
events and his behaviour, as the basis for analysing expenditure 
reductions and sub-cultures. Interviews, observation and document 
analysis were used to elicit data. This was analysed in terms of 
the categories that emerged from the data, and a comparison with the
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relevant literature in this and allied fields. Secondly, the problem 
of access was examined using field and action researchers' accounts, 
in order to determine the sources and nature of influence that can be 
utilised by the researcher to facilitate access. The different power 
positions of the field and action researcher were noted.
Access at a time of expenditure reductions was examined, using data 
from three organisations, to determine whether this phenomenon 
facilitated or inhibited access. In general, access appears to be 
difficult. Where the topic specifically concerns reductions, 
members' responses will depend on whether they think such an 
examination would be of benefit to them or not.
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CHAPTER III
ORGANISATIONAL MONETARISM
Introduction
This chapter provides a context with which data contained in 
subsequent chapters can be examined. Relevant literature is 
reviewed, and the concept of organisational monetarism in both its 
initial and elaborated form is analysed. Data on the instruction to 
managers to reduce resource' expenditure is provided. Finally the 
terminology in use by managers to define reductions-related events is 
considered.
Literature
In general, literature is integrated with the data in this thesis. 
Some points which do not fit easily into this scheme are set out 
below. In particular a general theme which is found in studies in 
this area, and which I term organisational monetarism, is presented.
In the main, research of financial stringency focusses on the 
organisation as a whole, or the macro-level. For the purposes of 
this micro-level study, it is assumed that theory derived from the 
macro-level is relevant and applicable.
As previously noted, much of the work on expenditure reductions comes 
from settings in the public sector of the U.S.A. and, in particular,
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Higher Education. It is assumed that these studies are of relevance 
to work in an English Social Services Department, principally 
because their linking theme is the experience of managing financial 
stringency.
In Britain there h!as been much less research than in the U.S.A. in 
this field, though there are exceptions. For example, Judge (1978; 
1981), Glennester (1980; 1981), and Ferlie (1980), examine resource 
decline in Social Services Departments. Fowler (1980), and the 
I.N.L.A.G.O.V. team (Wright: 1980) research local government's 
responses to scarce resources at a council-wide level. Davies and 
Morgan (1981), Pratt (1982), Sizer (1986) , '!iie Kogans (1983), and 
Gill and Pratt (1986) consider resource decline in Higher Education 
in the U.K.
Within the literature from both sides of the Atlantic there are a 
number of different foci used to examine resource decline.
One is the structuralist perspective, which recommends an increase 
in rules and regulations as the solution to the problems presented 
by resource decline. For public organisations this often entails a 
move from a public to a private sector model of management, 
introducing, for example, cost effectiveness criteria. Examples of 
this approach are found in the work of Cyert (1979), Cazalis (1979), 
and Pfeffer and Leblebici (1973). Authors such as Tolley (1980) and 
Sizer (1986) single out effective leadership as the solution to 
decline management. An alternative approach, represented by Scott 
(1976), may be termed the 'human relations' solution. Here
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quantitative growth is replaced by qualitative growth, for example in 
increased self-awareness for individuals. One group of authors 
emphasise the unique position in which organisations and their 
managers find themselves when new skills are needed for new 
situations. The essays in Hirschhorn and Associates (1983), and work 
by Boulding (1975), and Levine (1978 and 1979), exemplify this 
approach. Some authors concentrate on financial management and the 
budgetary process as the means of dealing with decline: these include 
Green (1974), Pondy (1964), Ogden (1978), Dworak (1975) and Wolman 
with Davies (1980). Finally, authors such as Freeman and Hannan 
(1975), Pfeffer (1978), and Ford (1980) focus on organisational 
demography, the changes in the proportions of administrative and 
professional staff during decline. The uniting theme in this 
diversity is the expectation or observation that financial stringency 
will affect how an organisation is managed, and this is worthy of 
study.
Literature on redundancy, crisis and goals has been consulted. 
Redundancy literature which concentrates on the effects of impending 
layoffs, the management of such layoffs and the subsequent effects on 
those who remain with the organisation is relevant to this study.
Gill (1975a), and Wood (1980), are examples of this focus.
Crisis was a term used by some organisational managers to describe 
the effect of expenditure reductions. Whetton (1980:a 6c b) , Murray 
and Jick (1985), and Gill and Pratt (1986) utilise the concept of 
crisis to analyse decline management. Hermann (1963), Billings et al
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(1980), and Staw et al (1981) all study the effect of crises on 
organisations.
Following Merton (1957) a number of authors, including Warner and 
Havens (1968), explain resistance to change in terms of goal 
displacement. The link between behaviour and plurality of goals was 
significant in the organisation studied, and work by authors such as 
Frances and Stone (1956), Cohen (1965), and Cressey (1965), was 
therefore utilised.
Organisational Monetarism
The major theme emerging from both the literature and from pronounce­
ments in the media by politicians or others on organisations~and 
declining resources, is one I term organisational monetarism. This 
concept is implicit, and often in fact explicit, in the policy and 
practice of resource reduction.
Overall, organisational monetarism postulates a positive correlation 
between resource pressure and improved organisational efficiency 
and/or effectiveness. However, it assumes that managers are skilled 
and interested in financial management and cost control, use rational 
decision making processes which entail zero cost, can specify and 
quantify tasks and outcomes, and make positive innovation in response 
to stringency. These assumptions are examined in subsequent chapters 
by reference to empirical data. Here the concept is set out and 
examined in initial and elaborated form.
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It may be argued that none of the elements of organisational 
monetarism are in themselves new, and do not therefore deserve to be 
distinguished by a specific label. It is, for example, merely the 
re-introduction of what Weber (1968) termed 'formal rationality' 
under a new terminological guise. Organisational monetarism does 
incorporate the notion of formal rationality as the organising 
principle of bureaucracies. In particular it uses that aspect which 
emphasises quantification and, as Weber puts it, "calculation in 
monetary terms" (p.86). But as Delaney (1963) points out, Weber did 
not study the decline of bureaucracies. What is new in this concept 
is the correlation between resource pressure and positive benefits, 
that is, the benefits of decline.
Organisational monetarism applies an economic hypothesis to the study 
of organisations. Within the discipline of economics, monetarism 
emphasises the benefit of reduced inflation which flows from the 
control and reduction of growth in the money supply. In organisat­
ional terms it suggests a causal connection between resource pressure 
and an increase in efficiency, or a reduction in waste. The benefits 
are therefore better resource use. Resources which were previously 
wasted will be used to make up the deficit caused by reductions, and 
the service will, it is assumed, be maintained.
The economist Donaldson (1982), describes the monetarist approach as 
follows:
"the basic tenet of monetarism is that inflation is caused 
by too much money" (p.23).
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"Gradually to begin with, and then quite dramatically, 
governments became converted to the view that strict 
control of the money supply was the main weapon by 
which they should regulate the economy" (p.25).
"Limiting the growth in the quantity of money in the 
economy will be transmitted to lower inflation" (p.57).
Much the same description is provided by another economist, Harvey 
(1983):
"They (monetarists) assert that increases in the money 
supply can be directly related to extra spending and 
that therefore, much more attention must be directed 
to controlling increases in the supply of money" (p.106).
At the operational level, Donaldson (1982) describes the Government's 
attempts to control the money supply indirectly, by regulating the 
demand for money. One prong of this attack is
"trying to reduce the public sector's demand for money 
through expenditure cuts" (p.4).
At a theoretical level monetarism postulates the beneficial effects 
of controlling, or reducing the growth of, the money supply. At a 
practical level this is achieved by reducing demand.
That this economic approach was applied to organisations is apparent 
from political statements at ministerial level. For example,
Mr. N. Ridley's comments on a reduction of forty-three million pounds 
in British Rail's grant from the Government were reported in both 
'The Guardian' and 'The Standard' on October 25th, 1983. 'The 
Guardian' reported that the Transport Secretary
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"wanted a more efficient rail service, run with less money, which 
should be achieved without any major closures" (p.16).
'The Standard' quoted Mr. Ridley as saying British Rail would be
"better, more efficient and cheaper to run" (p.3).
That is, resource reductions were presented in the context of 
improving organisational efficiency. The Kogans (1983) in their 
discussion of reductions in Higher Education note that ministers were
"hopeful that a beneficial reconstruction of Higher Education 
would result from cuts" (p.39)
and quote an unnamed government spokesman's suggestion that
"universities should welcome reductions as an opportunity to 
reform themselves" (p.59).
The media noted the anticipated connection between less money and 
improvements. Thus 'The Guardian's'editorial (26.10.83), on 
reductions in the National Health Service, described 
Mr. Norman Fowler, the Social Services Secretary as
"dressing up old-fashioned cuts as efficiency savings, 
which are assumed to be made after the budget is chopped 
and for which there is scant objective measure" (p.12).
Again then the tendency to establish a causal link between 
resources and efficiency is apparent.
This positive correlation is stated succinctly by Glennester (1980) :
"the more stern the financial climate, the more rationally 
organisations will react" (p.368).
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Similarly Caiden (1980) states:
"Common sense suggests that if officials and politicians 
have fewer resources at their disposal, they will have to 
accomplish objectives more efficiently" (p.135).
Though neither author supports this linkage, there are a number of 
writers including Bogue (1972) and McTighe (1979) who do.
As Judge (1981) tells us, a positive correlation is seen as the 
silver lining surrounding the cuts cloud. He quotes Glennester’s
(1981) summary of this position as follows:
"Without a regular increment to distribute, it is argued that 
local authorities will be forced to consider their base spending 
and make hard choices. It will become more important to 
consider the relative effectiveness of different programmes 
or activities. Authorities and professionals will be forced 
to question the purpose of things they traditionally do.
Services will emerge as from a health farm, toned up, slimmed 
down and altogether more effectively planned and co-ordinated." 
(Glennester p.50).
Though the author is acting as devil's advocate, it is a useful 
summary of the optimistic view of the effects of reductions. It is 
interesting for two reasons: it identifies the dietary focus of red- 
uctions-related symbpls, and focusses attention on spending reviews as 
the essential link between resource pressure and efficiency.
Dietary Symbolism
The use of dietary symbols with reference to organisations experienc­
ing resource pressure is noted, though not examined, by Caiden (1980) 
in the context of reductions resulting from tax revolts in the United 
States.
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"In the rhetoric of the tax revolts, slim is beautiful" 
(p.135).
"The image of the lean and purposeful organisation is 
compelling" (p.136).
Levine (1978) identifies two examples of what he terms
"official cutback rhetoric: 'cut the fat' and 'tighten our
belts'" (p.319).
Whilst such symbolism is not in itself new, its application to the 
context of reductions in public sector resources is worth consider­
ing because it can be seen both as an 'explanation' and as a 
justification of the theory/practice of organisational monetarism.
The symbolism is dietary, and uses opposing concepts of desirable 
and undesirable states, such as healthy/unhealthy, fit/unfit, and 
lean/fat. An analogy is drawn between the human body and the 
organisation. The terms used and the values attached to them are 
transposed from the body to the organisation. The process whereby 
the desirable state is achieved is slimming (operating with reduced 
calories) or resource reduction (operating with fewer resources). 
Undesirable overconsumption thereby becomes correct consumption, 
and the process is identified, in a commonsense way, by terms such 
as 'slimming down'.
The meaning contained in these symbols is contestable on the 
following grounds. Lean or thin is not always an indication of 
good health. It may be due to poverty, or ill health. In extreme
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cases it may be due to anorexia nervosis. Were this to be the case, 
any claim to causal connection with good health would be a contradiction. 
The important stage of diagnosis has been left out. Similarly, fat is 
not always caused by overconsumption. Moreover the body and the 
organisation are not as similar as implied. Only two factors, height 
and weight, are used to determine the desirable state of the body.
Both of these are easily measurable. Organisations are far more 
complex than the analogy suggests , and organisational theorists are 
as yet in no position to formulate a chart, similar to that devised by 
the medical profession, which indicates the range of desirable weight 
in relation to height.
By focussing on one factor, consumption, and ignoring the particular 
circumstances of this consumption, dietary metaphors ignore the 
complexity of the issue. They assume that there is 'organisational 
fat' in all public organisations. Potthoff (1975) tells us
"Don't fool yourself into believing you have no fat to cut.
Everyone has it. Cut away" (p.14).
Behn (1980) on the other hand, remarks that
"it would be nice if retrenchment could be managed by cutting 
the fat. And advocates of budgetary reductions can argue 
that this is all that is required. Wonderful if it can be 
done. In many situations, however, such a miracle is not 
possible" (p .614).
This assumes an agreed definition of what organisational 'fat' is.
Biller (1980) equates organisational 'fat' with 'organisation slack' 
(Cyert and March: 1963). Potential benefits of 'slack', such as
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flexibility and conflict reduction (Biller: 1980, and Levine et a l : 
1981), are not recognised by organisational monetarism.
It assumes the process of reduction will be unproblematic and have 
zero cost, based on the belief that organisations are formally 
rational. Chapters V - VIII detail the difficulties experienced by 
managers of one organisation and indicate the nature and extent of 
costs involved. A number of authors including some who support 
organisational monetarism, refer to the costly nature of the reductions 
management process , identifying pressure both on resources and intra 
organisational relations. Thus Davies and Morgan (1981) who adopt 
a stance in support of the concept, point out that
"to develop and implement a more rational pattern of reductions 
instead of an arbitrary one would require several years" (p.11).
Balderston (1972) suggests that
"these approaches (a concern with output measurement and product­
ivity improvements) will take a great deal of time, money, and 
above all, courage" (pp 26-27).
In referring to resource allocation, Pondy (1970) and David (1979) 
suggest that information costs are not zero, and Pratt (1982) asserts
"Any system to allocate resources must not in itself be dis­
proportionately expensive. It would be salutary for example 
to assess the hidden costs of the time given by all the 
academic staff and officials to the U.G.C. and N.A.B." (p. 13.7).
Hirschhorn (1983b) refers to the expansion
"of managerial and planning costs" (p.115).
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in retrenchment. Thus 'costs' result both from decision making on 
how to reduce expenditure, and from the operation of post-reductions 
control mechanisms. Assuming that productive intra organisational 
relations are a resource, there is a cost here too.
Organisational monetarism also assumes ease of task measurement, 
known and desired end states, and a causal relationship between 
scarcer resources and organisational health.
Resource Pressure and Increased Efficiency
Resource pressure, it has been suggested, leads to increased efficiency, 
because it necessitates a review and evaluation of all spending. For 
example, Stewart (1980) predicts resource pressure will result in a 
move from incremental to zero based budgeting because
"In a period of standstill, room for manoeuvre can only be 
created by examining existing resource allocation. This 
will involve a much wider scrutiny of resources and a much 
longer budgetary review" (p.20).
"New needs can only be met in so far as existing resources can be 
used in new ways" (p.21).
Biller (1980) indicates that
"Retrenchment makes possible the redeployment'of resources"
(p.605).
March and Cohen (1974) observed an initial period of confusion 
followed by improved decision making, as an outcome of fewer 
resources. Bogue (1972) suggests reductions result in institutional
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review and intense introspection. Greenwood et al (1980) noted 
a tendency for local authorities to move from a 'political' to a 
'rational' model of resource decision making, as a result of stringency. 
This was , however, only temporary and during the following year they 
found continued stringency and reduced rationality. Ferlie (1980) 
prescribes the fostering of innovative schemes as imperative
"if an authority wishes to meet the changing balance of needs 
and resources in a full cost-effective way" (p.l).
In the education field, Cheit (1971. and 1973) refers to the beneficial 
and desirable effects of stringency. He discovered a positive 
correlation over time between financial stringency and improved manage­
ment processes , such as budgetary controls and planning committees.
The Carnegie Foundation (1975) notes an increase in
"administrative muscle - to shift resources and make better use 
of them" (p.6).
And Davies and Morgan (1981) believe that
"fiscal uncertainty and stress can be a creative force for change, 
particularly programmatic reformulations, within institutions 
of Higher Education" (p.63).
Tichy (1980) states that
"cutbacks on grants forced the centre to be more efficient in 
the provision of health care and to demonstrate cost effective­
ness" (p.167).
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Financial stringency thus leads to efficient resource utilisation via 
a review of all spending, and the improvement of processes for 
carrying out such reviews.
Resource Pressure and Decreased Efficiency
In contrast to the above, a number of authors note that financial 
stringency results in decreased efficiency in respect of less 
effective decision making, an increased use of power, increased 
conflict, pressure against change and goal displacement.
Ferlie and Judge (1980) regard the optimistic view of reductions as 
based on a rational model of budgeting. They concluded that
"confusion and uncertainty were more in evidence in the 
fiscal experience of most Social Services Departments 
than substantive steps in the direction of a more rational 
and synoptic base searching" (p 2).
"The quality of Social Services Departments 1 decision 
making therefore has been one casualty of the shift 
from growth to retrenchment" (p 29).
In relation to a particular decision area they say policy
"owes everything to opportunism and administrative 
expediency and virtually nothing to rationality"
(p 24).
Bebbington and Ferlie (1980) make the same point. Caiden (1980) 
suggests that
"Politicians and officials may not accommodate fiscal stress by 
restricting expenditure, scaling down objectives to fit 
fiscal realities" (p 154).
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Based on a review of scarcity and budgeting in pre-revolutionary 
(1789) France, she suggested that fewer resources do not lead to 
improved financial management, but rather the reverse.
Hills and Mahoney (1978) observe that resource pressure results in a 
move from a bureaucratic to a political model of decision making, and 
Pfeffer (1978) notes a correlation between fewer resources and a 
greater use of power in the decision making process. March and Simon 
(1958) connect resource decrease with increased intra organisational 
conflict and competition. Manns and March (1978) report that 
university departments with the strongest reputations are least 
responsive to changes demanded by financial adversity. Since 
reputation is a source of power both in itself, and because it 
produces finance, this power is used to resist change.
Cheit (1973) noted that
"several colleges point out that financial stress also 
creates pressure against change" (p 64)
in the direction outlined above, though only in a minority of cases. 
The Carnegie Foundation (1975) states that early responses to reduced 
resources on campuses were largely negative:
"one finds disappointment, conflict, fear of rigidity" (p.11).
Wolman with Davies (1980) suggest that one of the most common and 
successful strategies to deal with fiscal pressure is
"to reduce by inaction" (p 244).
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With steady-state budgets, inflation rather than action by managers 
results in reductions. Rubin (1980) states that there is no 
automatic connection between less money and improved financial 
management; a strong authority structure and budgetary flexibility 
are pre-requisites of such a change. In the absence of these, she 
states
"retrenchment cannot be carried out" (p.175)
Attempts to do so
"will produce strangely ineffective results and paralyse 
the organisations involved" (p.175).
Frances and Stone (1956) concern themselves with the practices of a 
public sector employment bureau. They report that
"the constant pressure to cut the budget" (p.136)
resulted in an emphasis on productivity reporting, as a security 
or defensive device, to the detriment of the job finding service.
This type of goal-deplacement is also noted by Cohen (1965). Staw 
and Szwajkowski (1975) noted an increase in illegal acts by companies 
as their resources fell.
Finally, in her earlier work, Rubin (1976 and 1977) indicates that as 
a result of stringency and the accompanying uncertainty,
"some aspects of decision making improved, whilst others 
deteriorated" (1977: p.254).
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Thus the picture that emerges from the literature is contradictory 
both in terms of whether or not improvements are noted and whether 
these are apparent in the short or long term.
Organisational Monetarism Elaborated
The elaboration of organisational monetarism focusses analytical 
attention on the absence in practice of the predicted innovation. It
dismisses the positive changes reported above, such as greater
efficiency (Tichy; 1980) and tighter budgetary controls (Cheit:1971 
and 1973) as conservative, not innovative responses, and re-defines 
innovation as "doing things differently" (Whetton: 1981). Lack of 
innovative activity is explained by reference to characteristics of 
the resource loss. In summary, it suggests that the larger and 
quicker the cut, the greater the chance of innovation.
Examples of this elaboration of organisational monetarism are found 
in studies by both Murray and Jick (1985) and Gill and Pratt (1986). 
They explain, at the macro-level, the absence of innovatory responses 
to financial stringency by directing attention to characteristics of 
the stringency itself, and in particular, the size of the reduction 
and the speed with which it takes place. A distinction is drawn, 
based on the model provided by Zammuto and Cameron (1982) , between 
slow erosion and dramatic decline. More innovatory behaviour is
anticipated if reductions are large and speedy than if they are small
and slow. Large and speedy reductions generate a greater sense of 
crisis, and necessity is seen as the mother of innovation. Thus 
organisational monetarism is refined by moving from a position where
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reduction in general will be beneficial, to one where particular 
characteristics of reductions are seen to trigger positive responses. 
Before examining this causal connection, it is necessary to define 
the responses involved: efficient/effective and conservative/ 
innovative.
Whetton (1981) provides a useful summary in his macro-level analysis 
of educational institutions; he suggests that private organisations, 
spurred by competition, use times of resource plenty to innovate, 
that is, to alter the mix of their activities, and make
"a shift in the services provided or the clients served"
(p-83).
This strategy is termed the ’effectiveness option'. In time of 
scarcity, the private sector will focus on increasing efficiency:
"scarcity is the time to live off the organisation's fat, 
and not waste precious resources experimenting with new ideas"
(p.92).
This conservative response is termed the 'efficiency option' (p.83). 
In contrast, public sector organisations use times of plenty to do 
more of the same, and they respond to scarcity by doing less of the 
same, that is, increasing or decreasing current programmes. They are 
unlikely to innovate whatever their financial circumstances. For 
Whetton, scarcity should provide incentives for public sector 
organisations to innovate:
"The key to enhancing the adaptive potential of these 
organisations is utilising the pressure of scarcity to 
spur innovation" (p.92).
In analysing their field data, both Murray and Jick (1985), and Gill 
and Pratt (1986) link lack of innovation (the efficiency option) with 
moderate levels of stringency. Thus in respect of British 
polytechnics, Gill and Pratt (1986) "believe a crucial, underlying 
factor" (p.2), which elicited the efficiency rather than the 
effectiveness response, was the nature of resource pressure: erosion 
or small reduction over a number of years, rather than a sudden 
crisis, involving large scale resource loss. Murray and Jick (1985) 
analyse the lack of innovation in a sample of six American hospitals. 
They refer to "the absence of major cuts" (p.121), and the presence 
of "moderate cutbacks" (p.Ill), "moderate financial constraints"
(p.117) and "moderate long term squeeze" (p.117).
"In general, as would be consistent with a moderate level of 
crisis, efforts were made to save money only by relatively 
traditional attempts at increased internal efficiency"
(p.119).
In contrast, they suggest that
"had the decline been more severe or sudden" (p.118),
more radical changes may have occurred. This analysis raises 
questions of what a large/major reduction, or a small/moderate 
cutback is, and of whose definitions are in use. It also questions 
whether organisations can invariably be expected to respond 
innovatively to crisis, and why any response other than the 
efficiency one was expected.
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The definition of the significance of size was provided by the 
authors, rather than members of the organisation studied. Thus
Murray and Jick (1985) state
"It is significant that, in objective terms, the crisis 
represented by funding cuts was moderate. Budget increments
ranged from 1 to 4.67o below the level of inflation" (p. 117).
Yet Staw et al (1981) states that either
"incremental or radical environmental change can cause 
threat to an entity" (p.519).
Given Murray and Jick's purpose of linking organisational responses 
to characteristics of decline, the notion of 'objective terms' is
unlikely to be relevant. It would have been useful if members
perceptions on this issue were known, that is, whether the 
'objective' definition of the phenomena as moderately acceptable 
reflected the views of those who managed the organisations studied,
or whether they regarded the issue as one of major importance. In
the absence of this data, the material presented by Murray and Jick 
could be analysed in terms of the literature on crisis, and therefore 
without reference to the identified characteristics of decline.
Some analyses of organisational responses to crisis suggest that 
the advent of crisis does not necessarily produce the type of innovat­
ory responses predicted by, for example, Whetton (1981). In fact 
Whetton (1981) acknowledges that whilst in theory, public sector 
organisations should use the stimulus of retrenchment to explore new 
opportunities (the effectiveness option), in practice they do not do 
this. He identifies a number of "deeply entrenched organisational
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dynamics" (p.91), which militate against innovation. He offers a 
prescription for how organisations should respond to financial 
crisis, rather than describing the actual behaviour of organisations.
Staw et al (1981) similarly offer a prescription for organisations 
facing the threat of financial stringency, but suggest that in 
practice organisations respond to the threat not with innovation but 
with rigidity, that is, the 'efficiency option'. The same point is 
made by Hermann (1963). Ford (1981) also provides a prescription for 
coping with crisis after noting a number of organisational dynamics 
such as 'group think', whereby organisations contribute to their own 
crisis. Holsti (1978) suggests that crisis impares coping 
mechanisms, rather, than becomes the mother of innovation. Thus 
organisations do not inevitably respond to crisis by innovating.
One could argue that the lack of innovation noted by Murray and Jick 
(1985) resulted from organisational dynamics of the type referred to 
by Whetton (1981) and Staw et al (1981), rather than the nature of 
the reduction itself.
Finally, both Gill and Pratt (1986), and Murray and Jick (1985), in 
referring to conditions of 'slow erosion', utilise the model of 
responses to decline devised by Zammuto and Cameron (1982). This 
model, based on research into the American car industry, defined two 
sources of decline, one a decrease in finances due to reduced demand, 
and the other a shift in the organisation's domain, based on a change 
in demand for types of goods or services offered. They suggest that 
where decline results from a drop in resources, whether this is slow
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erosion or unexpected contraction, the outcome will be an emphasis 
on efficiency. Only where there is a shift in the shape of the 
organisation's environment, such as a change in demand for products 
or services, will the effectiveness option be considered. That 
there was no such environmental shift in the institutions researched 
by Murray and Jick (1985) is clearly stated:
"the sphere of the hospital's environment was not changing.
For example, there was no significant change in the 
characteristics of the population served" (p.117).
In these conditions Zammuto and Cameron (1982) predict efficiency 
responses , irrespective of whether the reductions are continuous 
or unexpected. Thus lack of innovation can be analysed in terms of 
the source of decline, irrespective of whether it was slow erosion or 
unexpected contraction. Innovation, or the effectiveness option, 
will only be considered by organisations when there is a
"qualitative change in the type of performance an organisation 
can engage in" (Zammuto and Cameron: p.250).
The predicted connection therefore between sudden reductions and 
innovatory behaviour still remains open to question. The size of 
the reduction did not form part of Zammuto and Cameron's analysis.
Both Glassberg (1978) and Sizer (1986) consider size of reduction 
as a variable in determining organisational responses, but both 
qualify their analysis by reference to other significant variables. 
Glassberg (1978) suggests that size and permanence of reduction are 
significant in determining responses. He distinguishes between 
incremental reductions (small and temporary) and quantum decreases
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(substantial and permanent). As an example of quantum decreases 
he refers to a 20.8 per cent reduction in the New York City workforce 
between 1975 and 1977. Creative responses and risk-taking are more 
likely with quantum reductions, whereas incremental reductions elicit 
traditional responses, such as cost cutting. However, innovation 
is only likely when organisational leaders have decided that a 
defensive strategy, such as cutting the most popular services, will 
no longer be effective in maintaining their own reputations and 
interests. Thus members' perceptions of the permanence of reductions, 
as well as their size, are significant here.
Sizer (1986), in a survey of nine British universities, links both 
size of reduction and effective leadership to innovatory response.
Thus institutions such as Salford, which experienced large reductions 
came up with significant innovatory responses, such as attracting 
finance and support from industry. On the other hand Bradford, which 
also experienced large cuts, did not innovate to any degree. Most of 
Sizer's sample "felt severely limited in their capacity to innovate" 
(p.3). In this particular case what differentiates institutions in 
respect of innovatory behaviour is, in addition to other factors, 
the style of leadership.
Thus on examination, those who support a refined version of organis­
ational monetarism are found either to qualify this with other 
variables (Sizer: 1986; Glassberg: 1978), to offer the notion as a 
prescription (Whetton: 1981; Staw et al: 1981), or to make contestable 
assumptions both about the definition of size and organisational
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responses to crisis (Murray and Jick: 1985; Gill and Pratt: 1986). 
Thus a direct linkage between size/speed and response is open to 
question. This is not to suggest that the size of reductions is 
insignificant, but rather that this significance is located in 
members' perceptions of size. It is the contention in this thesis 
that size was less significant than organisational factors of sub­
culture and context in determining managerial response.
The Introduction of Reductions
The strategies and justifications reported in the following chapters 
took place within the general context of instructions to the 
Department, from local councillors, to recommend reductions in 
resource consumption, but to continue to provide services despite 
these reductions. Overall, expenditure reductions were presented 
to managers in financial rather than service terms, as a resource- 
led, rather than a service-led process. Specific instructions 
related to money and the percentage by which this was to be reduced; 
references to service delivery were far less specific.
On two occasions the Department was instructed to review its budget, 
and recommend expenditure reductions on a percentage basis. The 
first involved the current budget and the second, the estimated 
budget for the following year. On the first occasion the D.M.T. 
instructed middle, or third-tier, managers to prepare a list of 
reduction recommendations in line with instructions the D.M.T. had 
received. As this information was classified as confidential, there
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was no interdivisional consultation between the organisation's two 
middle management teams. On the second occasion, middle managers 
were again asked to make recommendations. These were presented to 
a meeting of all middle managers. On both occasions, the D.M.T. 
considered recommendations, and made changes or additions before 
forwarding them to councillors. These events took place in the 
second half of 1979.
When the annual budget was approved in April 1980, two-thirds of 
the sum the D.M.T. had recommended to be taken from F.W.'s budget 
was 'added back'. Despite this, the F.W. division had to deal with 
a larger reduction than the R. and D.C. division. In particular 
ten per cent of posts were left vacant, a ('managed vacancy element'), 
compared to 5.6 per cent in R. and D.C.. Members of F.W.M.T. felt 
that they had done badly out of the exercise compared to R. and D.C. , 
though not as badly as had been anticipated. Most members of 
R. and D.C. felt they had 'done well' or 'had not been much affected'.
During this period of decision making, councillors were seen to have 
created uncertainty. First they decided to make reductions; this 
decision was then reversed; and then the decision was reinstated and 
reductions again became Council policy. Similarly the percentage by 
which the budget was to be reduced varied. As one D.M.T. member 
said, it was a
"scenario built on shifting sand: first it was five per cent, 
then seven per cent, then three and a half per cent".
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That is , changes in the anticipated amount of the reduction was a 
major source of uncertainty.
Senior management passed the instructions they had received on to 
middle managers. These were not presented in terms of specific 
service priorities , with low priority areas first in line for 
reductions, but as a percentage reduction in divisional budgets. 
Additional points made by councillors were passed to middle managers:
(a) there would be no redundancies;
(b) there would be no development of service without compensatory 
savings;
(c) councillors would abide by manifesto pledges;
(d) budgets could not be overspent.
In addition, managers were told there were to be 'no sacred cows' 
or automatically protected areas, and were invited to recommend 
reductions in other divisions as well as their own. Beyond this , 
managers were left to their own devices to decide what to recommend 
for reduction.
Although one senior manager said
"Local Government is cushioned from the most dramatic effects 
of cuts as their policy is no redundancies",
managing expenditure reductions was still seen to be problematic.
One aspect of this problem concerned the different realities which 
were seen to be imposed by expenditure reductions and which are 
reflected in the terms used to describe them.
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Terminology in Use
The following terms were used to describe expenditure reductions and 
activities associated with them: 'the cuts'; 'expenditure
allocation'; 'expenditure re-allocation'; 'revenue re-allocation'; 
're-allocation of resources'; 'negative growth'; and 'no growth'.
Of these seven, 'the cuts' was by far the most popular term: it was 
used most frequently by the majority of managers. It was used to 
define a number of activities associated with expenditure reductions 
such as recommending reductions in spending, increasing revenue by, 
for example, implementing charges for services, and managing the 
effects of reductions. The term does not convey specifically what 
was to be cut; it does not focus either on financial resources or 
service delivery. Rather it focusses on the reduction aspect, 
conveying a general impression of a climate of loss in a dramatic 
form, the term 'cuts' having far more impact than 'reductions'.
There was little debate on the usage of this popular term; it has in 
fact, passed into common usage with the public. On one occasion a 
middle manager referred to other terms used to describe expenditure 
reductions as
"the latest organisational euphemism for the cuts".
This suggests that there was a certain amount of conscious
evaluation of terminology amongst some members. The extent to which
the remaining six terms can be classified as euphemisms is examined.
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These six terms were less popular: they were in the main used by 
senior managers rather than other groups. Four of the terms focus 
specifically on financial resources, by reference to 'revenue' or 
'expenditure'. Thus the reality of expenditure reductions is defined 
in financial terms and the 'solution' relies on the manipulation of 
financial resources. These terms ignore the decrease-in-resources 
aspect of the situation and imply a steady-state financial position. 
They also ignore service delivery and the non-financial aspects of 
the management task, both of which are influenced by resource reduct­
ions. Thus defined, the problem becomes restricted to the area of 
financial management alone rather than encompassing wider and more 
sensitive issues such as reduction or withdrawal of service.
The other two terms, 'negative' and 'no growth', could refer either 
to services or expenditure. Using such terms dilutes the negative 
value attached to 'no' and exploits the positive connotations of 
'growth'. Thus 'no growth' conveys a different and less pessimistic 
impression than 'the cuts'. In the same way 'negative growth' is a 
more positive term than 'decline'.
Each of these terms can be used euphemistically where the intention 
is to manipulate the reality of the situation. Certainly, the use 
of all terms except 'the cuts' limits a consideration of the full 
implications of the changes on those affected. On the other hand 
the way in which senior managers were presented by councillors with 
demands for percentage reductions in their budgets did not recognise 
the implications for service delivery. Rather than differing
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motives it is the differing realities presented by the terms which 
are significant: the majority of terms in use define the expendit­
ure reductions task as one of financial management alone.
Summary
In this chapter the literature on organisations and expenditure 
reductions was reviewed. The concept of organisational monetarism 
was highlighted as a link between much of the work in this area. 
Organisational monetarism proposes a positive correlation between 
fewer resources and improved organisational efficiency or effective­
ness .
The economic theory of monetarism was set out, and how it has been 
applied to organisations noted. Organisational monetarism was 
questioned on a number of grounds. The dietary images in use were 
found to contain a number of assumptions. The notion of the 'fat' 
organisation for example was not found to be universally accepted. 
Similarly the assumption of zero-cost was contested. The link 
between size/speed of reductions and positive innovation was 
critically examined.
The instructions on expenditure reductions issued to. managers were 
outlined. The differing realities underlying the terms expenditure 
reductions were described.
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CHAPTER IV
MANAGEMENT SUB-CULTURES
Introduction
This chapter introduces the concept of managerial sub-cultures: it 
examines their maintenance, elaboration, content, and function.
After noting the connection between structure and culture, and 
identifying the limited usage of the term culture amongst managers, 
five levels of typification of management team sub-cultures are 
elaborated. Three dimensions of difference between the two middle 
management teams, R. and D.C. and F.W. are then identified: consult­
ation, speed of decision making, and the significance of formal 
structure. The variety within a group's sub-culture, and the 
external awareness of this variety is then examined. A comparison 
is made between each group's construction of routine and critical 
issues, followed by the effects on cultural maintenance of inter­
action between groups. The process of the middle management teams 
is then differentiated. From these events, the function of sub­
culture is deduced. Finally the sub-culture of the Director's 
management team (D.M.T.) is described.
A sub-cultural perspective aids understanding of stringency manage­
ment because it exposes and partially accounts for differences 
between management groups, and compares these groups in respect of 
behaviour and values. Observable differences in managerial activit­
ies and attitudes to expenditure reductions in part reflect the
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influence of collective 'taken for granted' assumptions of the sub­
cultures of different management groups. Thereby, the analysis of 
managerial response is not solely linked either to characteristics 
(such as size) of the reduction itself, nor to issues of financial 
management which result from classifying the phenomena of resource 
reductions as of 'financial' significance only. Group values were, 
in fact, frequently used by members to analyse or account for their 
own and other managers' behaviour. Thus a sub-cultural explanation 
was of significance to managers in interpreting reduction related 
issues.
The organisation's two middle management teams were the principle 
source of data. The definition of sub-culture used is set out in 
Chapter i: a group's typification or 'taken for granted' ways of 
thinking and working which need to be known as a pre-requisite for 
acceptance as a competent member.
Culture and Structure
Authors such as Jaques (1951) have, in their analyses, separated 
culture and structure. Clark (1974) suggests that these are the 
same phenomena looked at from different perspectives. Though the 
focus of this thesis is culture, that is not to argue that structure 
is unimportant, but rather to locate structure in the context of how 
culture is seen to operate within the organisation. Structure 
defines the formal hierarchy of grades , and divisional organisation 
of tasks, as represented by the organisational chart, and is there­
for relevant in two ways.
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Firstly, management groupings, or teams, were determined by the 
formal organisational structure. Each team was seen to have its 
own sub-culture. Other possible groupings based on factors such 
as age or professional qualifications were not identified by 
managers. The divisional structure of the organisation and the 
ensuing isolation was seen by managers to encourage rather than 
discourage the maintenance of different and distinctive patterns 
between groups.
Secondly, the distinction between structure and culture was 
reflected in the dimensions used by managers to identify particular 
cultural traits. A significant aspect of the 'taken for granted' 
view of both R. and D.C.M.T. and D.M.T. was that structural position 
should determine behaviour and values. In particular, being a third- 
tier manager was constructed to mean accepting the task of managing 
expenditure reductions. Structure was generally perceived to be a 
more significant aspect of the R. and D.C.M.T. sub-culture than of 
the F.W.M.T. sub-culture.
Since sub-cultures are taken for granted, the organisational analyst, 
whether member or researcher, faces the problem of how to become 
aware of the sub-cultures that are current. A group's sub-culture 
is not written down in, for example, the manner of a job description 
or organisational chart.
In this particular organisation there were very occasional references 
to 'value differences' in the minutes of meetings. These were not
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however elaborated. Only two managers actually used the term 
'culture', although throughout the research period managers did 
refer to phenomena, but used other terms.
Culture
A F.W. manager referred to the F.W.M.T.'s culture in the context 
of
"a right and wrong attitude to the cuts. The functional one - 
do it because we're employees - would not get much of a 
positive response at F.W.M.T., because of the group's culture".
Culture here influences the selection of presented attitudes via 
members' knowledge of culturally defined 'right' and 'wrong'. 
Incorrect or wrong attitudes are unlikely to be presented because 
of a negative response. The member was sure the group had a 
culture, which involved unchallenged notions of 'right' and 'wrong' 
attitudes and related action. Culture here provided moral guidance.
For an R. and D.C. manager, culture meant
"a pattern of working together as a team, an approach to 
supervision, accepted and unwritten ways of doing things. 
A leader's style is pre-ordained by the culture of his 
area. They (F.W.M.T.) wouldn't have anyone who did not 
believe in the consultative process".
He went on to say that
"R. and D.C.M.T. don't have a common culture, there's no 
cohesiveness. There's no common interest and therefore 
no common culture. In some parts of the service there 
is cohesion, they think as a group".
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Culture was then apparent for this member, but not in relation to 
his own management team. It comprised of unwritten ways of action 
and attitudes , and was made apparent by group members abiding by 
these - 'thinking as a group'. It was perpetuated through selection.
Nevertheless, this member was able to generalise about his own 
management team, R. and D.C.M.T., in terms of appearance and life­
style, and used the former as a symbol of management style. He 
described his colleagues as 'fuddy duddy' and referred particularly 
to their style of dress (formal suits, collars and ties), their 
age (old), and their home circumstances:
"living in a large house in Buckinghamshire with a large 
car and garden".
For him, a relaxed, informal appearance, such as jeans and long 
hair, symbolised a relaxed or democratic management style. By 
contrast he pointed to his own formal appearance, and identified 
his management style as 'directive': he was a 'democratic dictator'. 
Interestingly, this approach to management was one that he shared 
unknowingly with his R. and D.C. colleagues. Using these dimensions 
he said
"in F.W.M.T. there's one person more like the R. and D.C. lot, 
from his age and image: solid and conformist".
Dress was not generally used by other members to symbolise groups , 
though the data on formality and informality of dress was confirmed 
by observation of management team meetings. Members of each middle
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management team did characterise management styles in terms of 
the directed/democratic dichotomy used above. Though generally 
unacknowledged there was then a connection between appearance and 
attitudes.
Typification
On the basis of members' discussions, it is possible to distinguish 
five levels of specificity in their typification of group sub­
culture. The first level was the least specific, the meaning being 
almost totally taken for granted. The fifth level was the most 
specific, where taken for granted features were exposed.
The first level of least specificity was observed during management 
team meetings of both F.W. and R. and D.C., where the very mention 
of the other team, who were not present, was sufficient to produce 
derisory sniggers or sympathetic nods. This indicated a shared, 
but unstated meaning of the symbols 'F.W.M.T.' and 'R. and D.C.M.T.'.
At the next level of specificity, members sometimes described a 
particular perspective on an issue by reference to a management team 
symbol. Thus reference was made to 'the F.W. view' by members of 
both management teams. That is, group members were seen to hold a 
common view, or 'think as a group' to quote the R. and D.C. manager 
referred to above, though what these 'views' were remained unstated. 
Similarly in describing his attitude to reductions a F.W. manager 
said
"I'm nearer R. and D.C. on this".
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He went on to expand what this meant. Nevertheless, the group was 
symbolised as having a particular attitude, and the symbol 
R. and D.C. was used to describe it.
More specific still were references to different 'philosophies of 
management' and 'different ways of coming at the world' as an 
explanation for responses to reductions. These were used by a 
R. and D.C. manager and a F.W. manager respectively. Minutes of 
a meeting where the two groups discussed their differences , referred 
to 'anxieties about philosophical and management styles' between the 
two groups. Reference was also made to a F.W. manager who
"does not feel her attitudes are shared by R. and D.C.",
and to an R. and D.C. manager remarking that
"there seems to be a different political attitude to the 
cuts".
At this level of specificity group differences were characterised 
in terms of 'philosophical and management.styles and attitudes'.
What these styles and attitudes were, was not usually stated; there 
was a taken for granted acceptance of share, but unstated meaning.
At a fourth level meanings were elaborated to some extent by 
members defining these styles. Thus F.W. managers' generally 
described the style of management prevalent in their division as 
'participative and democratic' and 'participative and consultative'.
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"In F.W., the taken for granted is consensus management".
Similarly the R. and D.C. team described their management style 
as that of a 'benign despot'. With reference to the issue of 
expenditure reductions, an R. and D.C. manager said F.W. managers 
were concerned with the
"philosophical implications. We are more practically 
orientated as individuals and as a group".
Even if individual members did not subscribe to these typifications , 
they were nevertheless aware of their existence. Thus one F.W. 
manager said
"others in F.W.M.T. imply R. and D.C. is less democratic, 
following instructions from a higher level with no 
discussion: it's less open and consultative".
Group typifications were most specific when interactions between 
members of each management team were discussed. Managers identif­
ied a number of dimensions of difference between the two groups: 
the consultation process, the speed of decision making, and the 
significance of formal structure.
F.W. managers believed they were not consulted sufficiently by 
their R. and D.C. colleagues. The following quotation represents 
the F.W. view of the consultative process as it operated both in 
their own division and in R. and D.C. A F.W. manager said he and 
his colleagues felt
"left out of important issues affecting us. R. and D.C. 
is less good at consulting".
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A contrast was made with his own division:
"F.W. operates the other way; consultation takes years, 
it's cumbersome, but everyone is involved".
F.W.'s perceived and expressed culture was, according to another 
manager
"consultative and participative; let everyone have a say; 
circulate documents for comments".
R. and D.C. was said by this member to have staff who were
"passive, accepting and do as they're told".
She contrasted this attitude with that of F.W. staff, who were 
used to 'questioning' and 'expected to participate'. Here we 
have a dimension with consultation and participation at one end, 
and passive acceptance at the other. It was used for both manage­
ment styles and staff expectations by members of F.W.M.T., who 
aligned themselves to the consultative/participative style.
F.W. thus saw itself as consultative and R. and D.C. as directive. 
No F.W. member symbolised F.W. as directive, and R. and D.C. as 
participative.
The R. and D.C. perspective on consultation was that whilst some 
was useful, action was more important. In certain cases action 
had to be taken quickly. Their team leader said
"I believe in organisational democracy but prefer to be a 
despot and take decisions on my own say so. I don't like 
to consult, it takes a long time".
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He referred to R. and D.C.
"having to participate in an ongoing, undirected consultation 
which might bugger up its plans".
Here a distinction was drawn between consultation and direction, 
which is similar to the F.W. dimension referred to above.
Consultation is regarded as dysfunctional, as it results in delays 
and the amending of plans. F.W. required
"consultation on everything .... but you can't consult about 
everything"
as one R. and D.C. manager put it. In the presence of F.W. managers, 
an R. and D.C. member said
"R. and D.C. sometimes get on with it, rather than consult.
Some decisions require immediate action".
Another said
"In some cases if it's a choice between do and talk, we 
do".
Here a distinction was made between consultation/talk and action. 
Consultation was thus not seen as always being an integral and 
useful part of action by R. and D.C.M.T. managers.
The distinction between doing and talking was used by R. and D.C. 
managers to differentiate themselves from F.W. managers. F.W. was 
said by an R. and D.C. manager to use meetings to
"deal with their anxieties. F.W. spend hours analysing and 
acknowledging feelings. We cannot afford the time. We're 
frustrated by meetings, there's too much to do, we have to
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look after the kids (in care). We need more doing in 
this service".
One member suggested F.W. used the consultation process to 'take 
over'. F.W., he said
"want to run it all. They swamp any meeting. However strong 
willed, R. and D.C. is always put upon by F.W.".
As well as the use of numbers, another tactic which was used by 
F.W. managers was to 'broaden the area of considerations so that 
it (a working party) never gets off the ground'. Consultation was 
seen as a way of losing control.
When it came to the speed of decision making F.W. managers felt 
that they often had little or no time to respond to proposals initiat­
ed in R. and D.C. In the presence of R. and D.C. managers, one F.W. 
manager said
"we respect your drive to get things done, it's one feature 
you've sorted out".
He implied that his own team had not done so. In private, and at 
team meetings reservations were expressed on a particular issue 
unrelated to expenditure reductions. One member said
"F.W. is not ready to go at the same pace";
another that
"F.W. needs to discuss items, but there's feeling that 
R. and D.C. are steaming ahead".
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R. and D.C. were said to be showing
"an incredible lack of caution".
For F.W., time was important to
"get it right now or live with the consequences for a long 
time".
A short time scale was
"a strategy that has been used before and I don't like it".
That is, time was deliberately restricted to reduce opportunities 
for opposition or changes to proposals. Whilst F.W. recognised 
that consultation takes time, it was felt that the advantages 
gained were worth the delay.
The R. and D.C. perspective on speed of action is reflected in the 
quotation above on consultation. That is, delay was less acceptable 
as
"some decisions require immediate action".
Speed of action was also important to 
"reduce staff insecurity" 
according to the R. and D.C. team leader.
The two groups varied in the degree of significance they gave to 
formal structure. There was concern amongst F.W. managers that, 
to quote of one of their number, R. and D.C. were
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"more interested in staffing and structure than 
care".
For F.W. managers the specification of the professional aspect of 
the work preceded decisions on structure. In general R. and D.C. 
managers were perceived to be more concerned with structure by 
their colleagues. Thus, a F.W. manager said:
"In R. and D.C. the accent is on structure: formal authority 
not informal, assigned authority. Their reasons for action 
are directions from above".
Structure, and its creation, was significant for R. and D.C. 
managers because it reduced 'the informal.nature of work arrange­
ments'. Structure was not seen to pre-empt professional decisions, 
but rather provide a foundation for them. Firstly, level of post 
and salary offered would determine the type of person applying for 
a post, and the qualifications or experience they would bring. In 
turn such recruits to the organisation would be able to participate 
in the formulation of professional objectives. Unsurprisingly,
R. and D.C. members also felt that structural position was a signif­
icant determinant of managerial behaviour.
Essentially then the groups differed both about the significance of 
structure in determining managerial behaviour, and about what comes 
first in implementing change: task definition, or the creation of 
a structure within which the task is performed.
- 96 -
Internal Variety
Managers were also aware of difference within their own groups , 
which would seem to militate against a claim to a common sub­
culture .
A F.W. manager, in describing R. and D.C. management, provided 
an example of this apparent contradiction:
"It would never occur to me, or my colleagues to say this 
kind of thing, (my staff). It's paternalistic. It 
always makes me laugh when one member of F.W.M.T. uses 
'my' about his staff".
This member could therefore identify a difference within his 
own team yet still talked as if there were in fact none. In 
this instance it is perhaps a question of sample size: as 
only one member expresses an attitude which is out of line with 
the team perspective, it could be dismissed. The examination 
below of internal differences provides additional explanations 
of how they are managed.
The F.W. team leader was able to distinguish between formal or 
controlling, and informal or consultative, styles of management 
amongst F.W. managers. A F.W. manager described his own management 
style as
"formal, on a continuum with at one end an over controlled, 
formal style, and at the other a consensual, feelings style.
I am near the former, but still somewhere near the centre.
I believe in consultation but retain the right to decide.
I'm paid to take responsibility".
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He envied a F.W. colleague whose style was
"to derive managerial influence from deep emotional contact 
with the people under him".
Another F.W. manager said
"the basis of my style is close personal relations with 
people, and sharing. Other managers communicate in 
writing".
Another said his F.W. colleagues were suspicious of his management 
style, which was
"a co-operative model: everyone has an equal say and management 
is bound by the majority decision. In F.W. the commitment 
to open management hides a variety of styles".
Another manager defined F.W. style generally as
"participative, and democratic, with two exceptions; 
they pay lip service to the idea even if they don't 
practise it".
Another defined F.W.'s style as
"generally participative and consultative, though some members 
are into structure, elitism and hierarchy".
Reference to paying lip service, and commitment obscuring variety 
indicate the mechanisms whereby individual differences are 
suppressed in team meetings, thus enabling members to maintain their 
view of a collective attitude. An awareness of differences of 
approach did not lead to individuals who deviated being excluded 
from the group, nor change members' perceptions of their
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sub-culture, as long as these differences did not impinge on the 
group setting.
Another tactic which gave the appearance of a collective view was 
avoidance of issues which were known to be divisive. Thus one F.W.
manager said that, in F.W.M.T. meetings,
"difficult issues are not raised because they would polarise
the group".
The-group's’relationship with R. and D.C. for example was a 'hidden 
problem, not discussed'. Some members laid the responsibility for 
this strategy with their team leader. Thus one member said the team 
leader
"was very denying in not taking issues up. He thinks there 
will be too many negatives around that area, he doesn't 
want to get into it. The real issues are not discussed, but 
old items are".
My observations, and comments from other members, suggest that 
responsibility for avoiding issues can be assigned to both team 
members and their leader. In the following chapter this matter is 
discuss.ed in relation to expenditure reductions. What remains 
questionable is whether avoidance is a general strategy to retain 
what Bennis (1969) terms 'inward (and always fragile) harmony'
(p.29) of the group or a strategy peculiar to F.W.M.T. and thus an 
idiosyncratic aspect of their culture.
An R. 6c D.C. manager suggested the same strategy was apparent in the 
R. 6c D.C. management team:
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"People are not prepared to talk about their problems (in the 
team). They're more likely to be criticised than get a 
sympathetic hearing"
Thus issues were avoided because of the known negative response they 
would generate. Avoidance then is a technique for maintaining 
harmony which is not peculiar to one sub-culture. In defining 
culture, Jaques (1951) refers to
"customary ways of thinking and doing which are shared to a 
greater or lesser degree by all its members" (p.257).
The above indicates the mechanisms whereby differences are 
suppressed in group settings, thus enabling the group to retain a 
collective view of itself.
When 'difficult issues' are raised, as in the case of F.W.M.T. and 
expenditure reductions, the sub-culture of the group is both exposed 
and reassessed, as we shall see in Chapter VI. "Cuts", said a F.W. 
manager
"highlighted rather than created divisions within the 
group"
because members debated, rather than took for granted, what the 
right course of action was. New behaviours, such as competition, 
were observed which were not in line with the group's concept of 
itself.
Stringency was thus what Pettigrew (1979) termed a 'critical event' 
because it exposed differences.
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External Awareness
Members of each management team were aware of how they were 
characterised by members of other teams. Knowledge of sub-cultures 
was thus public rather than being confined to in-group members. For 
example, an R. and D.C. manager said
"F.W. feel Residential is managed with an iron hand. The 
typical managerial relationship is one of bureaucratic 
distance or dictatorship with no consultation or corporate 
way of working. F.W. keep hinting that I don't consult staff, 
and when I do, I dictate to them".
In private, members sometimes qualified the picture they presented 
of the other team's sub-culture by references to 'generalisations' 
and 'stereotypes'. For example, the R. and D.C. team leader said of 
F.W. .
"I try not to do so (stereotype) but do it all the time.
F.W. managers didn't want to lose their political virginity.
They didn't want to get their hands dirty by participating 
in the management of reductions".
An R. and D.C. manager said
"The generalised image R. and D.C. have of them (F.W. managers) 
is long-haired political radicals who are out for all they 
can get".
Awareness of internal group differences was also apparent from 
private communications, between managers, in which group members 
disassociated themselves from their team's perspective. For example 
two members of F.W.M.T. were said to have told an R. and D.C. manager 
that they were at odds with their team's views on expenditure 
reductions. Two members of R. and D.C.M.T. were said to privately
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disagree with their team's view of F.W.M.T. and its relationship to 
R. and D.C.M.T. But knowledge of these differences did not affect 
the way each group symbolised the other, because they were not used 
to qualifying the generalised group image in team meetings. There 
was a tendency instead either to generalise about a group's values 
using the groups's response to particular issues, or to use 
experience with one or two group members to generalise about the 
membership as a whole. Team meetings provided a setting where this 
could be done. They were used as a means of cultural elaboration 
and maintenance, though this was not their official purpose.
The Effect of Team Meetings on Sub-Cultures
Sub-cultures were maintained, and reinforced at team meetings 
through the construction members placed on responses to routine or 
critical issues, and on interactions with the other group. This 
analysis is developed below. The process of collective behaviour 
also served this end except when difficult issues were raised. Team 
meetings were a source of information on the activities of 
non-members which provided, as a contrastive device, support for the 
group's self-image, and confirmed their view of the other group.
Both teams considered as a routine issue a recommendation for the 
adoption of a system of accelerated increments: outstanding members 
of staff could be moved more quickly than usual up the incremental 
scale. R. and D.C. managers adopted it with no discussion after the 
matter was presented by their leader to the group. F.W. managers on
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the other hand, discussed the same matter at length in terms of 
numbers involved, time limits, why the system was being reinstated , 
the unions views and the process involved. They were informed that
"R. and D.C. has recommended two or three people".
Finally they decided not to implement the system. Process 
differences between the two groups will be examined later in this 
chapter. What is examined here is the grounds for this rejection, 
or how the proposal was constructed as being unacceptable.
In discussing the problem, one F.W. manager said the procedure was 
"an invidious method of promotion".
Another said
"Social Services are the only Department where this system 
is seen as objectional. Other Departments are authoritarian, 
hierarchical and accept patronage".
By rejecting the procedure, they rejected the values on which it was 
assumed to be based. They allied themselves with opposite values 
which were in line with the group's self-image. At the same time, 
unacceptable values were used to justify action, that is, why they 
were not prepared to operate the procedure.
In contrast, managers who operated the procedure, in this case 
R. and D.C., did so in support of values which were 'objectionable' 
to F.W. managers. That R. and D.C. managers subscribed to such
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values was consistent with F.W.M.T.'s view of their R. and D.C. 
colleagues.
In referring to the critical issue of expenditure reductions the 
self image of R. and D.C. managers, and their image of F.W. 
managers , was reinforced at a team meeting by their leader. Whilst 
not an agenda item, he made a long speech of which the following is 
an extract:
"I feel there's a value difference between the two groups 
polarised by the cuts issue. There's a clear philosophical 
difference. F.W. say management responsibility for the 
cuts is not theirs, and then oppose them. But area officers 
are managers. R. and D.C. accept cuts and thereby keep 
control over what is done. I think that's a tenable position.
R. and D.C. put forward a legitimate claim: F.W. closed an 
area office".
This interpretation of events involved structural position (being a 
manager) as a determinant of action, and value differences as the 
basis for different responses. It was accepted without question and 
is an example of what Pettigrew (1979) terms the process of 
symbolism. Both he and Geertz (1975) have pointed to the importance 
of this process in the creation and maintenance of culture. For 
Pettigrew symbol construction is the process whereby
"a group represents its situation to itself and to the outside 
world where it emphasises, distorts and ignores" (p.574).
As well as representing its situation to itself, this speech also 
represented the activities of a group of non-members, and 
contrasted the two. During interviews R. and D.C. managers provided 
a far more detailed picture of F.W. activities than is represented
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by the above description, yet this version of events at a less 
specific level of symbolisation was acceptable to the group.
An example of interaction between groups was provided when 
F.W. representatives were involved in consultation with 
R. and D.C.. One gave the following account to the F.W.M.T. of 
this :
"The jargon and way of doing things is so different, it's 
incomprehensible. Papers are circulated too late, using 
the language of function and matrix, a very boring systems 
analysis. There's no discussion of whether this is the best 
way of doing it, its double-Dutch. Take the way they arrive 
at their decisions and settle them. If someone says we need 
five staff, and someone else three, they'll settle for four.
Its a numbers game. The moment I put in a F.W. perspective,
I was shouted down. When I said it (the proposed span of 
supervision) would be out of the question in F.W., I was 
told it was not the same (in Residential). We've got to 
the state of believing the meetings are held for our benefit 
and the work goes on in other forums. They want a geographic­
ally based area structure, but don't know what it is.
They use the same jargon as F.W., but I've discovered it has 
different meanings. Supervision means washing hair (of 
client) not sitting and talking to staff about the job".
The following analysis focusses on the content of this account as a 
means of maintaining the sub-culture of the F.W.M.T. The account 
supports rather than challenges the group's typification of itself 
as having a common perspective on management issues such as span and 
definition of supervision. It also describes methods of analysis 
and decision making to which the F.W. group would not subscribe. 
Differences are so great that terms such as 'incomprehensible' and 
'double-Dutch' are appropriate.
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F.W. managers listened to the description with sympathetic under­
standing, indicating that what was described was not a unique or 
unexpected experience. The group's taken for granted view of 
R. and D.C. managers, their methods of analysis and decision making, 
was not challenged. Just as an alternative 'F.W. perspective' was 
'shouted down' in the forum being described, so in the F.W.M.T. 
there was no suggestion that the decision making method described 
was anything other than misconceived, nor that F.W. managers should 
consider amending their own methods of decision making in the light 
of the alternative approach described.
Working together, sharing superordinate goals such as client 
allocation decisions, does not necessarily overcome differences , as 
authors such as the Sherifs (1953) suggest. In this instance, it 
had quite the reverse effect; it served to highlight group 
differences.
Differentiating Team Processes
Whilst both middle management teams had the traditional 
accoutrements of formal meetings, such as agendas , papers and 
minutes, and had a pre-defined group of individuals who attended, 
the manner in which the task of collective decision making was 
managed was significantly different. These differences provided 
data which supported the perception of R. and D.C.M.T. as action 
orientated, and F.W.M.T. as discussion orientated.
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Each meeting comprised the middle managers in each respective 
division, their team leader and a representative from the 
administrative division. The R. and D.C. group comprised nine 
members, and the F.W. team fifteen. On regular occasions a staff 
representative attended F.W.M.T.; no staff representative attended 
R. and D.C.M.T. F.W. managers thus acknowledged the relevance of 
staff to their deliberations; occasionally the representative made a 
contribution, or presented the views of staff. Such an acknowledge­
ment was not observed in R. and D.C.M.T..
R. and D.C.M.T. meetings were less frequent than F.W.M.T. meetings. 
In March and April R. and D.C.M.T. met twice, whereas F.W.M.T. met
on five occasions. Usually R. and D.C.M.T. meetings lasted for up
to two hours; F.W. meetings took between three and four hours.
R. and D.C covered a larger number of agenda items in the time and
on two occasions they dealt with eleven topics. The largest number 
of items considered by F.W.M.T. was four; three items was more 
usual, and on two occasions they considered only one. R. and 
D.C.M.T. invariably dealt with all items on the agenda whereas 
F.W.M.T. did not and their leader said it was difficult to reach the 
end of agendas.
R. and D.C. meetings were firmly directed by their team leader. He 
likened his role to 'the conductor of an orchestra' Members agreed 
that their meetings were directed:
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"Peter (the team leader) usually tells us what to do, as 
you must have noticed ... Meetings are used in a fairly 
directive way".
Another manager said that there was
"less open discussion than in F.W.M.T. The group works in 
a physical sense, it works through long agendas, compared 
with the agendas of F.W.M.T. We come to decisions, and 
don't have meetings unless there's a full agenda. I've been 
to a few F.W. meetings, with very erudite discussions on the 
social work task. They come across as wordy and indecisive.
In R. and E.C. we move forward".
A F.W. manager said when describing the two management teams
"R. and D.C. deal with day to day issues, with details and 
specifics. R. and D.C. is practical: F.W. theoretical".
Thus in terms of the amount of consideration given to each
issue, and the type of consideration, theoretical or practical, the
teams were seen to differ.
Though the team leader felt 'R. and D.C.M.T. works as a group' and 
said he 'was trying to hand over to them', that is, become less 
directive, I did not observe this, and neither did other members. 
Some felt, to quote one of their number, that whilst the group 
managers worked at an
"administrative management level, it offers no support 
emotionally".
The meeting was seen to serve
"Peter's (the team leader's) needs".
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Another manager referred to lack of trust. Though not all members 
were happy with the way their team operated this was not raised at 
meetings. This is a further example of the strategy'of avoidance 
which was referred to earlier in the chapter. However, there was 
agreement on how meetings operated, that is, in a directed manner.
F.W.M.T. meetings were not directed by their leader. He described 
his style as 'very non-directive' as he was 'finding his feet' and 
as a new member was feeling his way. In his view 'F.W.M.T. meetings 
ramble'. Members of the group agreed with this, and my observations 
supported this view. One member said that the meetings.produced
"few decisions. They are floundering, unsure of where their 
focus is".
The meetings were characterised by another member as
"rambling with off-centre topics which are not immediately 
relevant".
Another remarked that there are
"few decisions: items come and go, with no decisions".
One member explained this as follows:
"F.W.M.T. works at a high level of theory. Its broad 
theoretical approach, with few decisions, may be quite 
right sometimes, except when the specific task is to 
make up its mind. Because of the way it's functioned 
in the past, this is not possible".
In this instance, the group's traditional style was seen as 
inhibiting decision-making.
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An alternative explanation was to blame the team leader. For 
example, one manager said
"John (the team leader) is less directive and likes informal 
leadership. He's pleased if someone else takes a lead".
Other managers described him as 'weak' and 'out of his depth* and 
referred to 'lack of direction from the team leader'. Thus there 
were two explanations of the group's indecisiveness: traditional 
pattern of behaviour,or leadership. In view of members' preference 
for participative management, and the fact that 'direction' in 
R. and D.C. was seen as reprehensible, it is possible that the 
leadership style explanation is an example of transference or 
scape-goating: the group's deficiencies were loaded on to one 
member, their new leader. In addition, the introduction of a 
difficult issue, expenditure reductions, did not facilitate the 
group *s process as it required the group to adopt a new approach 
rather than continue with a traditional one. If the difficult issue 
was to be dealt with effectively, a move from a 'broad theoretical 
approach' to taking action was necessary.
An example of this broad theoretical approach is provided by the 
group's consideration, reported above, of accelerated increments. In 
F.W.M.T. there was an expressed need to agree on criteria for 
selection, which was absent in R. and D.C.M.T. F.W. managers 
expressed concern about the effects of the procedure on their 
relations with staff, and rejected the values on which the procedure 
was seen to be based. For R. and D.C. managers neither of these
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were an issue. F.W. managers decided not to take action to 
implement the procedure, whereas R. and D.C. managers did. In one 
group there was in depth consideration of the matter leading to a 
decision not to implement; in the other the reverse.
The Functions of Sub-Culture
Sub-culture was used both as a descriptive and as an analytical 
device to give order to the activities of groups. It enabled them 
to describe themselves, both internally and to outsiders. They 
could also describe outsiders, using dimensions on which there was 
some degree of collective agreement. It provided an orientation to 
management role performance in two ways. The activities of the 
group were facilitated by a 'taken for granted' collective 
perspective, thus enabling the group to function in general terms 
rather than reconsidering how they would manage an issue on each 
occasion they met. Additionally new issues were made sense of, 
using the 'taken for granted' set of values of the group, rather 
than accepting definitions provided by other sources. Sub-culture 
was used to explain and justify behaviour, by reference to group 
values and previous behavioural patterns. That is, action was 
explained and justified as being in tune with the group's collective 
view of themselves, and the type of action they would typically 
take. It also involved notions of right and wrong, and enabled 
members to evaluate what they saw going on around them. It provided 
an orientation to events rather than a fully explicated and binding 
set of responses. Members could choose whether or not to act in
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terms of their group's culture in group settings. However if they 
did not, these unsanctioned actions, and the values underlying them, 
would become the subject for debate.
D.M.T. Sub-Culture
The D.M.T. is now examined in terms of the sub-culture of that group 
as perceived by members and as observed by the researcher. Group 
members invariably referred to the team leader (the Director) being 
the major factor in determining how the group operated: it operated 
in particular ways because of his personal needs; and because of how
he chose to focus on short term rather than long term issues. The
team shared with R. and D.C. managers a structural construction of 
managerial behaviour and values, and a preoccupation with day to day 
issues. Like F.W.M.T., it was seen to have a lack of purpose,
particularly in the field of long-term planning. The Director
exerted strong control by inhibiting the group from becoming an 
effective decision-making unit, both in the way he chaired the 
meeting, and in the topics that he introduced.
The culture of the D.M.T. reflected and met the Director's need to 
retain control both of the meeting itself, and of the issues 
involved. I was told by a member that
"The Director is not into management by consensus. He says 
that at the end of the day the decisions are up to him".
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Another said
"He prefers dealing with individuals one by one; not at 
meetings because he can manipulate the former. Meetings 
are threatening to him".
Thus collective decision making was threatening because the head of 
the organisation could not retain control over either decisions or 
individuals. An example of this control was given by a relatively 
new member: He said
"when I first started the Director announced items at the 
meeting. Having agenda's in advance was unheard of until 
recently".
A similar point was made by another member:
"we need to have agendas and discussion papers circulated 
before the meeting. Too often the D.M.T. doesn't get 
information in time and one cannot contribute fully to 
a discussion".
Restricting the amount of time members have to consider an issue 
reduces their ability to contribute.
In the Director's opinion
"the team works very well",
but other members disagreed in private; no-one however raised this 
matter in the group setting. The function of team meetings, the 
Director said
"was obvious to a certain extent, though this is easier said 
than done".
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He saw its purpose as twofold: creating a team spirit to present a 
united front to outsiders; and developing departmental policy. It 
did not in fact fulfil its second function because
"its inevitable we consider other matters, nuts and bolts 
issues not policy matters. Often items need a quick decision. 
At the moment it works very well even if many matters are 
irrelevant to social services; sometimes they're totally 
irrelevant".
Whatever the reason, the Director clearly set more store by 
considering nuts and bolts issues, even irrelevant ones, to policy 
matters.
Other members referred to a
"lack of interest in long-term planning".
The meeting was
"often concerned with short-term decisions and cannot 
consider long-term policy implications".
One member expressed a preference for
"corporate planning: thats the way I'd like to see it going; 
it's impossible and impractical that it doesn't happen.
I'm often unsure of what the meeting's (D.M.T.) purpose is; 
for example, the discussion of the use of portakabins.
Often we get bogged down in detail. We don't discuss 
general policy matters, which we should do".
Another said
"the Department's like a ship which works well, but has no 
set course, it goes where the wind blows it. The D.M.T. 
discuss whether to give the sailors a tot of rum on 
Christmas Day. The D.M.T. is criticised in the Department 
for never reaching a decision":
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that i s , the D.M.T. is concerned with minor issues, whilst ignoring 
the major ones, especially that of providing the Department with 
direction.
Lack of interest in Departmental strategy or long-term plans was 
laid at the Director’s door. Thus one member said the leader was
"old, tired and had seen it all before. He's not interested 
in forward planning as he's convinced there will be no change 
in the end".
Another said the Director
"prefers to put things off - he believes problems will go away 
or a solution will be found; sometimes this works. He's 
responsive not directive. He doesn't go out of his way to 
look for problem areas; he gives few initiatives. He feels 
the Department's running O.K.".
Another said the Department's senior management was like
"a doughnut with nothing in the middle".
There was
"lack of guidance and direction from the centre".
This lack of guidance and direction was on occasions linked to the 
Director's management of the political interface: thus one senior 
manager said
"the Director won't make a decision until he knows how members 
(councillors) feel".
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The Director himself referred to 'political nouse", that is, 
knowing when to introduce an item to politicians , what the current
political climate was and how this would influence its acceptability.
A team member said the Director was
"a good political survivor; always at the back of his mind is 
what the political reaction will be. He's not like some 
chief officers who pride themselves on going against 
members".
The Director said he would not put an item up to politicians unless 
he knew that the response would be positive because
"it's useless to fly in the face of resistance".
He then qualified this by referring to
"situations where you have to have on record you've drawn 
the matter to members attention even if they don't proceed 
with it".
The Director's focus then was external, towards politicians, rather 
than internal, towards providing direction and formulating long­
term plans. Lack of such plans facilitated the former focus by 
allowing the Director room to manoevre in the fluid environment of 
the political system.
In addition to considering irrelevant and minor items the Director 
maintained control by disrupting the process of team meetings.
One member said
"meetings are badly organised, discussions ramble on for 
too long. The D.M.T. doesn't like making decisions".
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The Director was said by another member to be
"not a strong chairman; he lets people ramble".
My impress ions . as an observer, supported this view. I also noted 
a number of strategies used by the Director to disrupt meetings : 
physical withdrawal by leaving the room; inability to deal with 
discussion papers conveyed by remarks such as
"which paper are we on?", "I've not seen that";
and apologetic interventions such as
"I'm not trying to be difficult but...", "I don't want to
complicate matters but...", and "I don't want to make a
meal of this, I am just genuinely asking".
One member suggested that it suited the Director's purpose to let 
people ramble because
"they don't reach a decision. After a time people are 
exhausted and will agree to anything".
Thus undirected discussions prevented decision making, or enabled 
the Director to impose his will indirectly by a process of attrit­
ion. Another member suggested the Director was looking for dialogue:
"He's not verbally articulate and uses things others have said.
I've heard phrases I've used when he's been arguing the same 
case".
From my observations the Director certainly did not appear 
particularly comfortable in D.M.T. meetings. But a dysfunctional
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process is functional if it serves someone's purposes, in this 
case, the Director's. Thus on items where he did not know the 
political response, the process introduced delay, and the Director 
retained the ultimate power of decision making. On items which 
would be put to politicians, rambling discussions provided a 
rehearsal for the type of discussion he might expect to have with 
councillors.
The culture of this group involved discussion postponement with a 
focus on short-term matters, and an avoidance of long-term, strategic 
issues, using a process of confusion whereby the Director maintained 
control.
Summary
As a means of understanding differing managerial responses to the 
management of stringency, the dimension of management group sub­
culture was introduced. This dimension both reflects members' 
explanations, and broadens the area of enquiry from one confined 
either to characteristics of the reductions themselves, or to 
issues of financial management.
The data suggests that there was a strong awareness of management 
group culture, though the term 'culture' was used very infrequently. 
There was an expressed awareness of management groups holding 
certain values in common, and behaving in certain distinguishable 
ways. Thus F.W. managers saw themselves as valuing consultation
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and participation in performing their management tasks. Conversely,
R. and D.C. managers described themselves as 'benign despots' and 
were described as directive. The D.M.T. was seen to be directed 
by its leader, but did not provide strategic direction to middle 
managers because it did not value long-term planning.
It seems that, as well as an explanatory and descriptive device, 
the dimension of sub-culture provides a guide to action and attitudes. 
This guide includes evaluations of right and wrong. Though sub­
culture was not totally deterministic, in that members could choose 
whether or not to act in support of their group's taken for granted 
assumptions, it nevertheless provided a significant device for 
understanding different managerial responses to decline. These 
responses are considered in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER V
MANAGERIAL RESPONSES TO EXPENDITURE REDUCTIONS
CHAPTER V
MANAGERIAL RESPONSES TO EXPENDITURE REDUCTIONS
Introduction
This chapter explores the plurality of managerial responses to 
expenditure reductions and their justifications. References to 
rationality and defensive reaction in the literature on decline 
management are examined in the light of the data. Responses of 
avoidance, co-operation, overt resistance and withdrawal are 
described. The differing responses and rationalities of the 
D.M.T., R. and D.C.M.T. and F.W.M.T. are considered below.
Two analytical frameworks utilise the concept of rationality to 
describe and analyse managers' responses to stringency. One, as 
was seen in Chapter III, focusses on movement from the political 
to the rational, or on an increase in rationality. Decision making 
becomes based to a greater extent on analytical and budgetary 
procedures which take account of demand, expenditure and policy. 
Greenwood et al (1980) identify this response, which is a major 
tenet of organisational monetarism.
Political and rational are categories used by Jick and Murray 
(1982). Following Levine (1978), they analyse decline by contrast­
ing the 'political' and 'rational', both as sources of decline, and 
as categories of response strategies that managers adopt. 'Rational' 
decline stems from an
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"appraisal of costs and benefits, efficiency and effectiveness" 
(p.147),
on the part of the funding source. With 'political' decline, that 
source aims
"to protect or increase its power or status, or respond to the 
irrational whim of more powerful others" (p.147).
'Rational' responses, which are similar to those suggested by 
Greenwood et al above (1980), result from 'rational' decline; 
'political' responses, such as making reductions which cause the 
most pressure, stem from 'political' decline. Whilst the authors 
are rightly concerned with members' subjective interpretation, 
their categories do not represent the variety of rationalities 
evident in this data. Nor does their causal link between a 
response account for different responses to the same source of 
of decline.
The alternative framework suggests the antithesis between 'political' 
and 'rational' is unhelpful (Self: 1980; Wright: 1980). Instead, a 
multiplicity of competing rationalities operate in decline 
(Glennester 1980). That a variety of rationalities operate in any 
social setting is argued by a number of authors. Weber (1968) 
points to a number of rationalities, termed substantive, that can be 
used in addition to that of formal rationality. Garfinkel (1975) 
identifies fourteen different types. Eldridge (1968), and Martin 
and Fryer (1970) , refer to different rationalities in use during 
redundancy management. Jick and Murray (1982), stress the importance
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of members' interpretation in determining responses to reductions.
Rose (1980) , and Schick (1980) , support this approach. Schick 
states
"Scarcity is both a matter of attitude and circumstances"
(p.114).
It i s , he says, determined by perceptions, not according to some 
objective standards. Rose (1980), refers to the
"multiple meaning of the cuts" (p.204).
Glennester (1980), presents a stimulating hypothesis by identifying 
four competing rationalities which operate with expenditure reductions: 
strategic, political, professional and consumer. Strategic rational­
ity has the same meaning as 'rationality' in Greenwood et al (1980).
For Glennester, rationality means action which is logical to a 
group in pursuit of its own interests.
By applying this model within an organisation, the hypothesis is 
confirmed and elaborated as follows. Firstly bureaucratic and 
administrative rationalities are isolated from professional rational­
ity, whereas Glennester deals with the three together. Secondly, 
a particular rationality is not identified only with a particular 
group. Managers can, for example, act in terms of political 
rationality. Thirdly, management groups can behave in terms of a
number of different rationalities: there are competing rationalities
within, as well as between, groups. Glennester implies that a role 
group only acts in terms of its own rationality. Fourthly,
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rationalities additional to those of Glennester are identified.
The definition used here of rationality as 'logics for action' 
is wider than that of Glennester, in that it includes the values 
(Weber: 1968) as well as the interests of group members. It is 
based on members' accounts of their strategies for action and 
their reasons, or justifications.
Writing about defensive reactions, Bion (1961) divides defense 
mechanisms in groups into fight and flight: with fight, there is 
a move towards the source of conflict; with flight a move away.
Fink et al (1971) regard defensive retreat as the response to 
crisis, which follows initial 'shock' or panic and disorganisation. 
Defensive retreat involves an attempt to maintain the status quo 
to avoid reality and change. Defensive retreat of flight is thus 
an initial coping strategy. In the absence of planning, Hirschhorn 
(1983:a) sees fight or flight as the only response available to 
managers. Both of these were observed responses to expenditure 
reductions in the organisation studied.
Director's Management Team
The team produced its recommendations for reductions by a process 
which did not accord with strategic rationality, but rather with 
administrative and bureaucratic rationality. There was an absence 
of long-term plans in respect of demand, policy, and expenditure. 
Decisions were taken in the light of recommendations received, 
papers produced by the non-executive member responsible for finance
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and as one team member put it, on the basis of
"gut level, hearsay evidence".
One senior manager described the D.M.T.'s recommendations for 
reductions as follows:
"the cake was sliced horizontally not vertically".
Limited resources were taken from a number of work areas , rather 
than one area being totally removed. Levine (1978 and 1979), 
terms this decrementalism, and Glassberg (1978) calls it incremental 
decreases, that is, using and preserving current budget heads as a 
framework for determining reductions. Most literature on budget 
reductions focusses on this method, which Glassberg suggests will 
reduce the likelihood of innovation because it restricts decision 
making to existing categories. This method is also referred to as 
the 'efficiency option' (Gill and Pratt: 1986; Whetton: 1981).
Spending was reduced by introducing what was termed a 'managed 
vacancy element': posts were kept vacant to save money. This is an 
example of administrative rationality. In effect the decision as 
to what services to withhold was passed down the organisational 
hierarchy to those who had the responsibility for managing the 
client contact level of service delivery. In theory, they could 
decide whether or not to reallocate all, or part of , the work­
load of posts which became vacant.
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This was the interpretation placed on the D.M.T. 's strategy by 
F.W.M.T. members. It was indeed the intention as confirmed in a 
document which the F.W.M.T. leader presented to his team. This 
document, which had been approved by D.M.T., was the only detailed 
written statement which addressed the issue of managing reductions 
produced by any organisational manager. It contained the following 
point of principle:
"I do not believe that it is possible to detail to any great 
extent the priorities that should be adopted across the 
division. In order to maintain flexibility these decisions 
should be made as close to the situation as possible” .
Only two priorities were referred to subsequently in the paper: 
keeping spending within the budget, and protecting services to 
clients. The latter was distinguished from activities, such as 
working parties, which did 'not impinge on service delivery'.
This strategy broadly accords with Glennester (1980) that:
"it makes sense for administrators simply to squeeze the 
budgets and staffing complements that professional workers 
have available to them and let them do the rationing".
(p.377).
Such administrative rationality, or in layman's language 'passing 
the buck', where the provision of some services is dependent on 
factors such as employees finding other jobs, or not, is the 
antithesis of strategic rationality.
- 125 -
Team members operated in teams of bureaucratic rationality by 
unquestioningly accepting and following instructions from above.
As one senior manager put it:
"Officers can voice their professional opinions but ultimately 
they have to carry out Council policy. Officers should work 
within the guidelines set down by members".
A distinction is drawn here between 'professional opinions' and 
'carrying out orders', the latter being given pre-eminence. This 
distinction and the significance accorded to each of the two 
categories, points up the nature of bureaucratic rationality.
There was no evidence that team members questioned their instructions, 
or even contemplated doing so. As the director said:
"It's best to manage with what we have".
They got on with the job, within councillors' guidelines.
Whilst some team members argued for strategic rationality in the form 
of planning and prioritising, the Director questioned the extent to 
which this was necessary, could be effective, or was within the 
team's task domain. The matter was not pursued.
The team used two priorities in their discussions of expenditure 
reduction recommendations. The first was termed 'members idiosyn­
crasies', that is, councillors' preferences. Councillors, said the 
senior managers were
"obsessed with certain areas"
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which could not
"be touched.... You accept this as part of the work in local 
government".
There was no suggestion that this priority arose at a time of 
reductions nor that it was any less important then, but rather 
that it Was a constant feature of 'work in local government'.
The second priority was described by a member as
"protecting R. and D.C. from the worst effects of the cuts".
This priority was justified as follows:
"F.W. received a larger share of the cake in the past, so it's 
only fair that they should have a higher percentage cut".
Reference was also made to Council policy, agreed prior to 
reductions, to upgrade R. and D.C. by providing more resources for 
that division. Thus a priority was justified in terms of past 
resource allocation patterns and Council policy, rather than in 
terms of a department-wide strategy. It resulted in one division 
being protected (R. and D.C.) at the expense of another (F.W.).
Within these parameters various steps were taken to increase 
revenue by, for example, instituting charges for services such as 
home-helps. A review of high-spending areas, such as transport 
was instituted but progress was slow. The group thus aimed to 
deal with resource reductions by increasing income from other 
sources, and by a scrutiny of high spending areas of work.
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A research proposal which would, it was claimed, put the team's 
strategic decision making on some sort of 'rational' basis was 
rejected. Interestingly, the focus of the research was members' 
values in relation to the various services provided by the 
organisation, and data would be generated to rank those services 
into a hierarchy of priorities. In contrast it was suggested by the 
Director, during the discussion of this issue, that priority for 
service delivery should be on a 'first come, first serve' basis, 
that is, a 'chronological basis'. Whilst the research proposal 
related to services , the latter concerned a prioritisation of 
clients.
The argument for some form of strategic rationality was based on 
members' recent experience, which they constructed as being less 
than ideal. The expressed need, both privately, and in the forum of 
team meetings, was for prioritisation and planning.
The absence of any preparation for reduction was noted. One member 
said
"It was known in January/February that there would be an 
expenditure review. Why didn't the Department take action 
then?".
He went on to say that
"long term planning is a management job. One needs to be 
able to relate to something planned. They (councillors) 
may not stick to it, and we will have to accommodate this.
In the past Social Services grew by grabbing money from the 
pot as it came up, which was appropriate, but now, with no 
money we need formal planning".
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Another member said
"I'm going to get the D.M.T. to prioritise as a priority".
The reductions exercise had been
"fraught with prejudice, and based on gut level, hearsay evidence. 
The Department cannot go through it again".
What was needed was
"formalised procedures to assist the Department in its long­
term aims by formulating clearer criteria for decisions ...
It would be wrong ... to pretend there were no reductions and 
no effects".
Another member said that a serious consideration of expenditure 
reductions should have involved a
"realistic assessment of priorities".
Long-term planning, criteria setting and prioritisation were seen 
as necessary to manage reductions, and by some of its members to 
be the responsibility of the team. They might not be acceptable 
to councillors but that was no reason for inaction. Finally it 
was 'wrong' to deny the reduced circumstances and their effect on 
organisational members.
Long-term planning and criteria setting was rejected by the team 
leader on a number of grounds. He said:
"Things are not as bad as they're made out ... there's still 
money round the margins. It's a question of how to move 
money from A to B",
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that is, from one budget head to another. He believed
"members (councillors) should establish priorities. Our 
attempts are useless: it's a political decision at the 
end of the day".
He dismissed 'sophisticated criteria setting used in other author­
ities ' as less than useful as
"their (councillors) highest priority might be our lowest 
one, because of the different priorities of staff and 
council. We're at the mercy of members".
Councillors would
"not stick their necks out",
they preferred
"leaving decisions until the last minute".
These were often taken on the grounds of 'political expediency' 
rather than on the basis of what was best for the service. This was 
especially true of reductions which were a 'political' issue where 
councillors could not agree amongst themselves.
He thus minimised or denied the seriousness of the Department's 
financial situation, assigned the job of prioritising to councillors, 
denied that the D.M.T. had any power, and pointed up an opposition 
between long-term planning, and the decision making process of 
politicians. Yet he was happy for the job of prioritising to be 
assigned to middle managers, as noted above. What emerges from this
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is that he did not see the task to be that of the D.M.T. , and 
wished to avoid it.
He took this position even though he predicted that
"things (financial stringency) will get worse",
and despite recognising that reductions
"drove staff to distraction".
He said staff
"needed help and talking through"
the experience. There was however no evidence that this was put 
into practice, despite the F.W.M.T. team requesting guidance from 
the D.M.T. on a number of occasions. For example, minutes of a 
F.W.M.T. meeting record:
"concern was expressed that little or no guidance had been 
given to (team) members on how these cuts should be achieved.
It was therefore agreed to urge the D.M.T. to issue 
guidelines".
Thus even where there is both internal and external pressure on a 
senior management team to adopt some form of strategic rationality, 
such pressure can be, and is, resisted if those in control see no 
benefit in the adoption of such an approach. There is no automatic 
adoption of strategic rationality in response to expenditure 
reductions, as the concept of organisational monetarism predicts.
In fact, as we saw in Chapter IV, long-term strategic planning was
- 131 -
not regarded by members as being an aspect of the D.M.T.'s group 
culture. Rather it is suggested that a group's culture, that is the 
constructs whereby they attach meaning, will be of great 
significance in determining responses to expenditure reductions.
The connection between group culture and managerial responses to 
expenditure reductions is further explored in Chapters VI and VIII.
The D.M.T. was in a position of some uncertainty, both in terms of 
knowing how much was to be reduced, and what councillors would 
accept, because the latter changed their minds. For example, 
increased charges for some services were initially unacceptable but 
later became acceptable. This uncertainty was exacerbated by 
another aspect of the group's culture; it did not put items up to 
politicians unless they knew there would be a positive response. No 
attempt was made however to reduce this uncertainty by instituting 
some form of strategic planning, and the guidance offered to middle 
managers when expenditure was being reviewed was very broad.
It follows from the above that services were not prioritised. 
F.W.M.T. minutes record that the following points were made in 
relation to the preparation of reduction recommendations: no more 
overspending; all spending areas, not just the F.W., were open to 
their scrutiny; there should be no 'sacred cows', that is, 
automatically protected areas; reductions should have the minimum 
effect on service; priority should be given to life-supporting, 
rather than life-enhancing, services.
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Though the last point may appear a priority, the distinction was not 
referred to in D.M.T. discussions. It was not put to R. 6c D.C.M.T. 
nor was it accepted by F.W.M.T. In fact the D.M.T. did not consider 
that they had provided any priorities of service.
R. 6c D.C.M.T. was told, according to one of their members to 
"make cutbacks that could be best absorbed by the service" 
and
"to consider major policy changes such as closing homes; 
minor ftems which added together.would produce a large 
amount; and reduction options for other divisions".
Both sets of instructions can be seen to widen the area each group 
considered, by the invitation to consider divisions other than their 
own, and in F.W.M.T.'s case, the inclusion of 'sacred cows'. They 
assume a detailed knowledge of departmental activities, skill in 
budgeting, a willingness to participate, and a willingness to reduce 
previously protected areas. The extent to which these assumptions 
were correct is apparent from data presented below.
The only guidance on managing the effects of reductions was the 
document referred to above for the F.W.M.T. Essentially, it 
proposed an administrative system, but was vague on purposes. In 
particular it suggested the creation of a panel of F.W. managers who 
would decide which, if any, of the managed'vacancies , (posts left 
vacant to save money) should be filled but there was no broad 
guidance on these decisions. The pattern of recommendations that
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emerged from the document is generally in line with the observations 
and predictions of works on response to crisis and decline, such as 
Hamblin (1958), Cazalis (1979) and Woods (1980): centralisation, 
more monitoring, more information, and greater scrutiny. For 
example the document recommended that
"up-to-date information about commitments and consequent 
financial forecasts should be available on a monthly basis".
There should be
"central oversight of budget heads ... all requests for agency 
placements should therefore come to the A.D. (team leader) or 
manager in charge who will have oversight of the whole 
(financial) situation, and who will give approval or not 
depending on the situation at the time".
The principal recommendation contained in the document concerned 
controls on, and monitoring of, spending, together with an 
administrative procedure for choosing which vacancies to fill. 
Prioritisation of services was left open, and was not made the 
subject of greater control. This suggests that studies which 
predict or recommend greater control as a response to reductions 
could usefully be qualified by reference to those areas where 
control is introduced or increased, and those areas where it is not.
Finally the D.M.T. had no strategy for dealing with non-co-operation. 
In response to F.W.M.T.'s refusal to recommend reductions in the 
'correct' way, D.M.T. did it for them, and criticised F.W.M.T.'s 
activities. F.W.'s opposition was dealt with initially by filling 
two F.W. posts which became the focus of resistance through
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industrial action. Subsequently, when the question of resistance 
was raised, the possibility of disciplinary action was mentioned, 
but senior managers were unsure what they could
"legitimately ask staff to do".
The Director pointed out that
"other divisions are managing, so should F.W. They should at 
least try".
This was also the view of the D.M.T. Thus both middle management 
teams were seen to be operating in similar circumstances except 
that F.W.M.T. was regarded as just not trying. In fact it was 
apparent from what was said to me that some senior managers were 
aware of differences, but these were denied in public, as became 
clear from the intervention analysed in Chapter VII.
The D.M.T. operated in terms of administrative and bureaucratic 
rationality, and rejected strategic rationality, through a process 
of denial or defensive retreat. This applied to the seriousness of 
the financial situation; their influence with councillors; their 
responsibility for prioritising; and the different circumstances 
their middle management teams. They avoided long-term planning 
despite being in agreement that, as one member put it, reductions 
would be
"around for some time".
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Residential and Day Care Management Team
This team was perceived by non-members, and saw itself, as having 
co-operated in the expenditure reductions process : they accepted-, or 
did not question, the need for reductions and their own role in the 
process. They came up with the required amounts on request and 
accepted the outcomes, according to members' accounts. The group 
operated in terms of bureaucratic rationality by following orders. 
They did this in terms of political rationality by recommending some 
unacceptable reductions, and in terms of professional rationality by 
a concern for service protection. They also briefly adopted a fight 
strategy in relation to the F.W.M.T.
A member of R. and D.C.M.T. pointed out that
"we don't like the cuts but do it anyway".
All of them believed it was their job to participate. This response 
was defined by one member as
"the classic local government approach: follow instructions 
and don't get involved in the issue".
That is, 'following instructions' was the significant factor in 
determining action; "the issue" to which the orders related was 
n o t .
The budgetary strategy adopted was a mixture of decrementalism and 
zero-based budgeting, that is , base spending in particular areas.
The latter strategy was used primarily 'for effect' rather than with
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any expectation that action would be taken. Two examples of this 
strategy were reported which paradoxically involved ’offering up' 
unacceptable reductions. The first was in fact termed 'unacceptable 
reductions' and the second 'making a case'. Glennester (1980) 
refers to this strategy as 'sore thumbs' (p.372): offering up 
projects that would cause most political embarrassment, as an 
example of political rationality. In this instance though, and in 
contrast to Glennester's example, the strategists were 
administrators not politicians. They took action in terms of 
political rationality to obtain or retain resources, rather than in 
pursuit of a party political goal.
Unacceptable reductions involved offering up items 'for effect' as 
one member put it, in the certain knowledge that finance for the 
area concerned would not be reduced. For example, one R. and D.C. 
manager said
"I suggested closing Prestwick House (an old people's home).
I knew they never would - they wouldn't touch the elderly".
Another said
"I was asked to prioritise, which I did, from shutting 
my section down to various other options. I knew members 
(councillors) wouldn't close me down, because I deal with 
the elderly. Our socialist employers have a weak spot for 
the elderly".
Another R. and D.C. manager said
"Our concern was to prepare our case".
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This manager recommended a reduction - closing a children's home - 
then
"built up a case to make it impossible to do so. I got case 
histories of clients, referring to them being settled in 
schools and the cost of movement".
That is, he detailed the effect on clients of closure. As a result
"There was no way that home could close".
Thus a recommendation to save money by closure was qualified by 
information which was seen to make the recommended act impossible.
Professional rationality, or a concern with determining what 
services should be protected, was evident by members' attempts to 
retain control over what areas were reduced, and what were 
preserved. There is an example above of this: closing a children's 
home was unacceptable in professional terms, and this was made 
apparent by supplying professional, as well as financial, 
information on costs.
"If we don't make the decisions, someone else will"
said one manager, and so participating was seen as a way of exerting 
some control over the decision making process. The direction of 
this control was signified by this member, who described his 
strategy as follows
"offer up something as one way to protect the rest: cut 
non-essentials like garden maintenance".
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What was thus protected were service areas which were considered 
essential, not in political, but in professional terms.
The group also recommended reductions in F.W. division which was 
perceived as a fight strategy and was explained by an R. and D.C. 
manager as follows : at an interdivisional management meeting on 
reductions
MR. and D.C. were made to look like lemons, with no opinions; 
we said nothing".
"F.W. dominated the meeting and suggested closing a home and 
other cuts in R. & D.C.".
"We felt under attack and decided to hit back".
This was based on two reactions :
"If they do it to us, we'll do it to them - its not very adult 
but",
and
"we do it or get shafted".
Additionally there was some irritation with F.W. managers because 
they were disinclined to reduce expenditure in their own division.
As an R. and D.C. manager interpreted it
"it's OK to cut us, but not them, they're so important".
This F.W. attack was seen to 'promote a corporate style' in
R. and D.C.M.T., which was usually absent. At a second meeting with
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F.W. managers' 'each R. and D.C. manager took a subject and spoke 
to it'. They came up with and presented 'a list of cuts in F.W'. At 
the same time F.W. management strategies were criticised by R. and 
D.C. managers; one member for example said that
"as council managers we should act in a management way".
R. and D.C. managers used this meeting to reinforce a construction 
of their strategies in relation to reductions as co-operative, to 
defend bureaucratic rationality or 'acting as managers', and to 
attack F.W.'s resources and their rationalities.
The management of reduction outcomes was unproblematic for most 
members of the R. and D.C.M.T. The principal reason given was that 
their financial position had not been much affected.
"I've come out well from the cuts"
was how one R. and D.C. manager summarised his position. This 
represented the view of the majority of R. and D.C.M.T. members. 
Whilst one member said
"any idiot can see I've fewer resources than last year",
few management problems associated with this loss were identified.
Thus R. and D.C. managers responded to reductions in terms of 
bureaucratic, political and professional rationalities, and utilised 
a fight strategy reactively and as a protective measure. The 
co-operative response of this team reflects aspects of the group's
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sub-culture, identified in the previous chapter, such as orientation 
towards action, and a willingness to follow orders.
Field Work Management Team
The F.W.M.T. presented themselves, and were perceived by non-team 
members, as adopting a strategy of resistance to expenditure 
reductions. The majority of F.W. managers rejected some of the
rationalities presented previously in this chapter, in that they did
not pass reduction decisions further down the hierarchy (administ­
rative), they did not generally follow orders (bureaucratic) and 
they rejected a planning role (strategic). Instead they based their 
rationalities on professional, ideological, and political grounds 
taking account of task definition and industrial relations. Their 
defensive responses of resistance and withdrawal were justified on 
these grounds.
Differences of opinion on strategy within the F.W.M.T. ranged from 
total opposition to co-operation;
"I'm totally opposed to the cuts";
"I'm nearer R. and D.C. on this: try to influence and
manage cuts".
The latter though represented a minority view and some members were 
unsure; one manager for example said
"I find it difficult. Politically and philosophically I'm 
opposed to the cuts but the reality is there's less 
money".
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Another said
"On cuts, I feel confused and torn. If I say no, I won't 
participate on cuts decisions, others will make them who 
may be ignorant of the service. If I say no they may get 
through anyway. If I change my mind and participate, it 
gives legitimacy to the activity. I've not resolved this 
at all".
Another manager said
"I'm torn between hiding the cost of the cuts and keeping 
an adequate service going".
Despite these internal differences, the group's corporate stance, 
and image, was one of resistance as a means of exerting control to 
protect their areas of work.
In response to the first budgetary review, F.W. managers recommended 
reductions below the required level in their own division, and red­
uctions in R. and D.C.. On the second occasion they recommended a 
percentage reduction in all their division's services. They refused 
to prioritise, unlike their senior management team leader, who 
presented an alternative paper, which identified priorities. They 
refused to accept information on reduction recommendations because 
it was confidential and they could not share it with their staff.
They voiced their opposition to reductions to senior management,
R. and D.C. management, staff and politicians. They were critical of 
the process whereby the expenditure reviews were effected, and of 
the stance of co-operation. They requested and obtained a meeting
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with the councillor in charge of Social Services to air their 
grievances, and referred clients to this individual when an area 
office was closed by industrial action. They lobbied politicians. 
There were allegations, from senior management and politicians that 
F.W.M.T. leaked information to the press on reduction recommend­
ations. They also supplied councillors who sat on the Social 
Services Committee with a report on the effects of proposed 
reductions.
Services were withdrawn twice ('blacking') in line with the union 
(N.A.L.G.O.) policy of refusing to do the work of posts which were 
left vacant to save money (the managed vacancy element). On one 
occasion an area office was temporarily closed because a supervisory 
post was vacant. On another occasion and in a different office, a 
vacant filing clerk's post resulted in files not being removed from 
the cabinets.
After the budget was known, F.W. managers continued to voice 
opposition and rejected a managing role in relation to the effects 
of reductions. Though it was clearly an issue, they discussed 
expenditure reductions management on only one occasion in response 
to the paper referred to above. They also refused an offer from 
their team leader of responsibility for financial control.
Thus whilst within the team there was some uncertainty as to whether 
to co-operate and participate,or resist and withdraw, the majority 
of strategies members adopted were classified as examples of
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resistance and withdrawal. As such they reflect the independent 
non-directed nature of this group's sub-culture.
A professional rationality was apparent as most members defined 
themselves in terms of the social work profession, whose task was 
the identification of, and provision for, unmet needs. Reductions 
were perceived as being in direct conflict with this. Thus one 
member described reductions as a
"dismantling of the service",
and another as
"a suppression of need".
Managers had a duty to oppose a further reduction in the circum­
stance of their client group, the disadvantaged. As they were at 
the sharp end of the community, they were aware of increased need 
due to the current employment situation. Reductions would limit 
their ability to provide help and they would become apologists for 
the system's lack of provision.
The majority of F.W. managers did not define their management task 
to include the management of expenditures reduction. In discussing 
their team leader's document on managing the effects of reductions, 
the responsibility for establishing priorities was raised.
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A number of comments suggested that establishing priorities was 
essential for the management of reductions. Thus members made the 
following points :
"It begs the question of priorities (for example) how to balance 
an assistant social worker with a home-help; these need to be 
looked at";
"We need some mechanism to sort cases out";
"It seems fairly complacent about how we make decisions: 
there’s no prioritisation of work".
There was however disagreement about whether prioritisation was 
appropriate or not, and whether it was possible at a time of 
reductions. One F.W. manager made the point that
"social services are too soft in dealing with other 
department's problems. We can't always say yes: 
we need to say no".
As an example, he instanced marital problems as an area his team no 
longer dealt with; other members said that they prioritised in a 
"crude way". I was told privately for example that work with 
children had a higher priority than work with the elderly or 
handicapped. There was no direct link to expenditure reductions 
here though; informal prioritising had taken place before their 
advent. One member, whilst agreeing that he prioritised already, 
said that this should and could not be done to any greater extent. 
Whilst some members felt that 'a review of the service would be 
useful' it would be impossible 'in the climate of the cuts'. An
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alternative, and more popular view is represented by the statement 
that
"Prioritisation is against everything I stand for. We're 
not in the business of rationing or refusing services".
And the team did not prioritise services.
The team rejected this aspect of managing reductions and assigned it 
to the D.M.T. as the following quotations from F.W. managers 
indicate.
"It's appalling there is no guidance from the top";
"that bloody director and his useless management team 
provided no corporate plan or priorities";
"the D.M.T. should prioritise, should set out objectives;
I don't think they've done any work, they're not motivated.
They say its important but there's no evidence in terms of 
work on departmental priorities between community and 
residential care".
F.W. managers did not consider they had had any guidance from, or 
had priorities established 'from the top'. They were highly 
critical of this , and attempted to rectify it by requests to the 
D.M.T. for guidance as indicated earlier in this chapter.
Thus whilst the relevance of strategic rationality was recognised as 
important by some members if reductions were to be 'managed ' , the 
majority F.W.M.T. view rejected strategic planning as a task for 
middle management. The D.M.T.'s use of administrative rationality 
was recognised and rejected. One member referred to
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"the Director's strategy: push the 'agro' down to the 
third tier (middle management) level".
It was the F.W.M.T.'s view that the D.M.T. should set priorities, 
and thus decide what was not to be provided.
Yet F.W. managers reported that they continued to manage the 
provision of service and 'deal with the effect of reductions daily'. 
They did not reject their management task in total. They rejected 
those aspects which were formally introduced as changes to their 
task as a result of reductions. Thus they were not prepared 
formally, that is, as a management team, to consider and agree a 
corporate strategy on priorities , or reductions management 
generally. Similarly they rejected the formal offer of financial 
control of areas for which they had the spending responsibility.
Ideological rationality was based on opposition to the Conservative 
Government's strategy of reducing public expenditure. This approach 
was summarised by one F.W.M.T. member who said
"we fundamentally disagree with government policy on 
public services. We see no justification to reduce them or 
any moral defence. The policy is wrong-headed and inhuman".
Thus resistance at the local level was based on ideological 
opposition to the Government. Similarly, another member saw 
resistance as providing support for those local politicians who were 
themselves resisting reductions.
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'Following the union line' and 'protecting jobs' were both offered 
as reasons for resistance by F.W. managers. The former involved the 
withdrawals of service referred to earlier. It was also said, by 
some F.W. managers, to involve the avoidance of any team discussions 
of the issue of managing reductions. Apart from one occasion the 
subject was not discussed.
Privately though, a number of members expressed a need to discuss 
the management of reductions. The following points were made in 
support of this:
"the situation is desperate: we're sitting on a volcano";
"some prescriptions for action are needed";
"It's all happening in an implicit way with no discussion".
It was also one of the two most popular items to emerge from an 
agenda setting exercise by the team. Other members, however, stated 
that union instructions precluded any such discussions. Managers' 
relations with staff would be adversely affected they felt if the 
latter perceived the team as not following the union directive.
In terms of job protection, one member said that managed vacancies 
were 'the thin edge of the wedge'. If the division continued to 
work as usual, with a higher pecentage of vacancies, temporary 
vacancies would become permanent ones. There was therefore a need 
to be seen not to manage , in the view of one member. The majority
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of members supported the union line however, both in terms of their 
own position as union members, and as managers.
Political rationality defined as recommending reductions which 
cannot be accepted because they are too politically sensitive was 
referred to above when describing R. and D.C.M.T.'s budgetary 
strategy. F.W.M.T. were also keen for reductions to be seen as 
unacceptable, by detailing their effects. They thus provided 
councillors with information on the predicted effects of reductions 
on the range of the division's services, after the Department, 
(through the D.M.T.), had made its recommendations but before 
councillors had reached a decision. Unlike R. and D.C.M.T., they 
did not recommend specific politically sensitive reductions.
Additionally resistance was used by some members as a means of 
spotlighting the predicted effects, invariably negative, of 
reductions. To behave as instructed, to recommend reductions and to 
manage 'with the least effect on the service' was described by F.W. 
managers in the following terms: 'to mask', 'to minimise', 'to hide'
the effect and the reality of reductions.
"A little here and a little there, there is nothing large 
to grab hold of"
was how one manager described the strategy of reductions , which 
accords with the senior management description provided earlier 
in this chapter. Reductions and their effects should not be hidden, 
but should be 'maximised', 'highlighted', and 'dramatised'. Not
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managing as instructed was a way of doing this. As one F.W. manager 
put it
"F.W.Ts idea was not to manage cuts, or hide them away by 
trimming here and there".
Unlike their R. and D.C. colleagues, F.W. managers chose means other 
than budgetary or organisational to do this.
Whilst the majority of managers described their budgetary strategies 
in terms of political rationality - exerting control by presenting 
the unacceptable - a minority of managers suggested that the team 
had used bureaucratic rationality initially, in recommending some 
reductions in their own, and other, divisions.
"There was little time - we followed orders"
was how one manager described their response. In this instance, 
initial shock (Fink et a l : 1971) resulted in the group following 
orders. This response was found to be unacceptable when they had 
time to consider the implications of the instruction to recommend 
reductions.
Whilst a number of F.W. activities during the pre-budget period, 
such as closing an area office, fall into the fight category of 
defensive action (Bion: 1961) a number of managers described the 
post-budget strategy of not discussing reductions management in terms 
of denial, or defensive retreat.
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For example, one manager said
"people close their eyes, they want to forget and are 
complacent about the cuts to come and the detailed 
implication of those already made. The whole area is 
difficult to grapple with, and there's a tendency to 
'leave well alone'".
Another said
"If we keep quiet the whole thing might go away".
Yet another described his colleagues as operating a 
"massive denial".
Given the complexity of the matter, the differences of opinion and
t
the variety of rationalities at work, it is perhaps not surprising 
that they did not grapple with the problem. Another member said 
simply, that they were
"sick of the subject"
(of reductions).
Another aspect of denial was evidenced by members who said they did 
not know what to do. One said
"perhaps in some situations there's nothing you can do".
Another said
"previously we were in a growth paradigm: I know the 
constituents and how to operate it. I felt comfortable 
with it. I had prescriptions for action. Now fundamental 
changes have occurred. We are in a different situation
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but I still have the same prescriptions for action.
I don't know what to do".
Because reductions dramatically altered the management situation, 
traditional prescriptions for action were irrelevant. Managers were 
unsure how to behave in the absence of new prescriptions to deal 
with the change.
A number of authors support the view that decline management is 
significantly different from growth management. Levine (1978) 
states that
"organisations cannot be cut back merely by reversing the 
sequence of activities and resource allocation by which their 
parts were originally assembled. Decline forces us to set 
some of our logic for structuring organisations on its 
head and upside down" (p.317).
Much the same point is made by Glassberg (1978) and Mitnick (1978). 
Scott (1974), Green (1974), and Boulding (1975) regard, decline as 
necessitating new skills and new arrangements in areas of financial 
and general management.
The D.M.T. argued that F.W. managers should do as R. and D.C. 
managers did: manage and co-operate. But F.W. managers were in a 
different, and more difficult position. Further discussion of these 
differences will be presented in subsequent chapters and in 
particular Chapter VIII.
Two final points emerge from this explication of strategies and the 
rationalities underpinning them. The first concerns members'
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construction of an organisational history whereby various strategies 
of each middle management team were categorised as either 
co-operating or resisting. The second concerns the nature of 
resistance and withdrawal as revealed by this data, compared to the 
coverage of the subject in the literature on decline;.
There were aspects of F.W.M.T.'s response that do not immediately 
seem to qualify as resistance activities, such as recommending some 
reductions , managing on a daily basis , and providing information on 
the effects of reductions. Similarly R. and D.C.M.T. resisted 
reductions by various budgetary strategies. Two factors seem to 
have influenced the discounting of disconfirming information: one 
relates to the focus of strategies; the other to the use of 
pre-existing perceptions of group cultures , or how a group was 
'expected' to behave.
R. and D.C.M.T. used the budgetary system and resisted within its 
confines unlike their F.W. colleagues. Thus whilst both groups acted 
in terms of political rationality, the focus of the resulting 
strategies determined the construction of responses as co-operating 
and resisting. The perceived culture of each group prior to 
reductions supported this construction. R. and D.C.M.T. was seen as 
bureaucratic, and F.W.M.T. as independent and questioning. 
Constructions of reduction strategies conformed to these pre­
conceptions .
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Resistance as a response is infrequently examined in the literature 
on decline. When acknowledged it is usually presented as 
predictable, short-lived and based on self-interest. Thus Levine 
(1978) states
"no organisation faces cuts with enthusiasm and will find 
ways to resist them" (p.320).
Biller (1976) and Behn (1976) make the same point. For Hall and 
Mansfield (1971) resistance is
"the early stage of coping with stress" (p.534).
Levine (1978) predicts disaster resulting from long-term resistance. 
Biller (1980) and Greenhalgh and McKersie (1980) make the same point 
as Caiden (1980):
"where their own sphere of action is concerned they 
(politicians and officials) will fiercely resist cuts 
and seek to protect their own positions" (p.154).
This presentation of resistance is unsatisfactory on a number of 
grounds. Different management groups responded differently: there 
was no monolithic response. Nor was resistance an automatic 
response; there was no question of the R. and D.C.M.T. 'fiercely' 
resisting for example. Though the authors do not specify a time 
limit, it is assumed they mean a shorter period than the twelve 
months that the F.W.M.T. resisted. Resistance for F.W.M.T. achieved 
some positive results: two posts were filled rather than being left 
vacant; and two-thirds of the original recommended reduction was 
added back to their budget. Finally justifications other than 
self interest were evident.
- 154 -
This last point is recognised by a minority of authors. Thus 
Glennester (1980) refers to 'values and professional standards '
(p.377) as causing defensive response. Wilburn and Worman (1980) 
remark:
"managers who have spent careers developing policies and 
programmes will, or course, fiercely resist major changes 
to their programmes" (p.612).
In fact it is clear from the data presented above that there are a 
number of reasons why managers did or did not resist reductions.
Hirschman (1970) identifies resistance as a useful and legitimate 
strategy, which he terms 'voice': it is
"any attempt at all to change, rather than escape from 
an objectionable state of affairs" (p.30).
Escaping, that is, leaving the organisation, he terms 'exit'.
'Voice' is likely to occur when members are attached to the 
organisations goals and it can lead to change and performance 
maintenance. It is not a strategy though that can be pursued 
indefinitely. Recognising that resistance is a legitimate strategy 
forms a more useful basis for its analysis, rather than in dismiss­
ing it as being expected, as short-lived, as based on self-interest 
alone, and as having negative outcomes if pursued for any period. 
Similarly Hirschman (1970) is one of the few authors writing on 
decline who recognise some form of management withdrawal as a 
response to decline. He uses the term boycott to describe a 
withdrawal of labour. In the organisation under consideration
- 155 -
members of F.W.M.T. rejected or withdrew from tasks associated with 
expenditure reductions, but did not totally withdrawing from the 
organisation. The data thus expands the work of Hirschman by 
identifying a further category of response: withdrawal from a task 
area.
In addition to the data already presented, withdrawal behaviour was 
noted on the part of F.W. managers at a general level. Thus the 
F.W. team leader said
"Traditionally F.W. wants to be involved in everything;
R. and D.C. don't. Now R. and D.C. is more involved than 
F.W.".
Similarly, the R. and D.C. team leader said
"F.W. is less keen to participate in a cost conscious 
atmosphere".
Two authors writing on organisations in crisis refer to withdrawal 
and to control being handed over to superiors , either to avoid 
stress (Hermann: 1963) or to cope with uncertainty (Billings et a l : 
1980). Withdrawal was perceived as a response to stress - a 
'difficult' area - and uncertainty - 'I don't know what to do'. 
Additionally it was seen by some F.W. managers as a strategy both to 
reduce the possibility of reductions and to expose their effects. 
Prescriptions for managing decline clearly then need to take into 
account the possibility that managers may withdraw from reduction 
related tasks in the ways described above.
- 156 -
Summary
This chapter outlines the different strategies adopted by the 
organisation's three management teams in response to expenditure 
reductions and presents the variety of rationalities underpinning 
them. The data does not support the view that expenditure 
reductions automatically lead to strategic rationality, as predicted 
by organisational monetarism. The significant influence of a 
group's culture on the management of decline was noted, and examples 
of defensive reactions such as avoidance, overt resistance and 
withdrawal, were provided. The literature on resistance to decline 
was examined, and found to be incomplete in that resistance was 
invariably described only as the initial, short-term response based 
on self interest. Finally, Hirschman's (1970) concept of withdrawal 
was expanded to include partial withdrawal as exemplified by F.W. 
managers' refusal to carry out reduction related tasks.
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CHAPTER VI
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MANAGERIAL ROLE IN EXPENDITURE REDUCTIONS
CHAPTER VI
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MANAGERIAL ROLE IN EXPENDITURE REDUCTIONS 
Introduction
This chapter considers managers 1 interpretations of their roles in 
expenditure reductions; and organisational changes which resulted from 
the introduction of expenditure reductions.
In discussing responses to reductions, managers generalised these 
into two broad categories: co-operation and resistance. Managers' 
descriptions used a number of concepts which provided a means of 
analysing different intepretations of the managerial role. The ways 
in which these concepts - realism, responsibility, v a l u e s , maturity, 
caring, emotionalism and participation - were defined and applied 
indicated that the managerial role may be interpreted in 
significantly different ways. These interpretations accorded with 
the sub-culture of each group. The use of these concepts to 
describe and evaluate managerial action is considered below, 
together with the degree to which managers were certain their 
actions were appropriate.
Managers performed their tasks within a number of fora in the 
organisation: their own area of responsibility, their management 
team, and their division. Less frequently they were involved in 
cross divisional meetings of middle managers and departmental 
meetings of both middle and senior managers. Interaction in each of
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these was seen to change adversely with stringency. These changes 
are examined below.
Initially all managers' responded negatively on an emotional level. 
Intra and inter group conflict increased. In addition F.W.managers' 
perceived their authority with staff undermined, the control they 
were subject to increased, and their division devalued. The advent 
of reductions produced a number of organisational changes which were 
not predicted by the concept of organisational monetarism.
Differing Realities or Myths
Realistic was a term used by some co-operators to define their 
activities, which one R. and D.C. manager said
"showed the ability of R. and D.C. to grasp the reality of the 
situation rather than the philosophical implications".
Reality here was defined as 'the practical implications' of the 
situation. Another member described reality as follows:
"they (the cuts) were not going to go away".
They were 'inevitable' said a third. Those who resisted 
involvement, who 'took no part' were 'burying their heads in the 
sand' and were 'ostrich-like' Thus realism involved accepting, 
rather than ignoring, the practical implications of expenditure 
reductions, and putting the philosophical implications to one side.
Whilst recognising the 'reality' of reductions, and the element of 
withdrawal in their own behaviour, F.W. managers did not describe
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themselves as unrealistic. They regarded their own actions as both 
a means of changing and exposing reality. One F.W. manager said, 
for example, that
"resources are not given, like the weather; they can be 
changed by action".
As we saw in the previous chapter, not managing was regarded as 
a way of highlighting the reality of reductions, and their effects, 
rather than hiding these, as a co-operative stance was seen to do.
In addition, F.W. managers laid claim to a stronger reality base for 
their actions derived from their position at the interface with the 
client community.
In fact each group attempted to exert influence towards change, an 
influence based on their own definitions of the reality of 
expenditure reductions. The primary focus of reality for R. and 
D.C.M.T. was the instruction to recommend reductions which would 
have least effect on the service. Their reality was that defined by 
the senior management and councillors, which focussed on the 
financial management task and relied heavily on the parameters of 
the budgetary process. Reality for F.W.M.T. involved definitions 
additional to those supplied by senior management and as a result 
reality was more complex and problematic.
For example, the F.W. division was heavily unionised at both staff 
and management level. N.A.L.G.O.'s policy as indicated in 
Chapter V, was one of non-co-operation with the management of
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reductions. Thus one aspect of F.W. managers' reality was the 
negative attitude of staff to reductions management. As one F.W. 
manager said,
"the notion of management is not based on the reality of the 
union attitude. You can prioritise all you like, but if 
there's no co-operation, no system is operable".
That this was a factor influencing F.W.'s reality was recognised by 
R. and D.C. managers. It was not a factor with R. and D.C. 
managers , as their staff were not unionised ; reality for each group 
was perceived differently.
Reality was more complex for F.W. managers because a number of 
constituents, in addition to their senior management team, were 
involved in defining the situation, and defining what was appropr­
iate action. These additional constituents included staff, the 
union, and managers themselves both as individuals and as a group. 
Reality was problematic because there was no unity between constit­
uents, particularly between senior management, and the others.
"Who do I listen to, my staff or senior management"
was how one F.W. manager put it, reflecting on his boundary role. 
Clearly the fundamental issue under consideration was who defined 
reality and the extent to which superiors' reality was the basis for 
managerial action. In particular the degree to which superiors ' 
definition were accepted or not, largely determined whether 
particular situations were perceived as capable of being changed.
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Differing realities also appeared significant in the attempt by 
senior management to undermine the resistor's reality, by pointing 
to the illusory nature of their objections. If they had operated in 
the past under similar circumstances, why should the present 
situation be so objectionable. Thus R. and D.C.M.T.'s leader 
pointed out that in the past
"F.W. has underspent on salaries, so why all the fuss?"
The F.W.M.T.'s leader made a similar point to his own team: the 
division had in the past worked with a similar vacancy element to 
that which they were experiencing with reductions. It was implied 
that their current situation was not so different, and therefore not 
so difficult, as managers believed it was.
This example provides an interesting variation on what Gouldner 
(1954) terms the Rebecca Myth, where current reality is defined by 
reference to a past golden age. Here the present is defined as 
being no worse than the past.
Responsibility
The terms 'responsible' and 'responsibility' were used by members of 
both groups to describe their activities as either responsibility 
for a task or responsibility for a significant reference group.
How managers' defined their expenditure reductions task has been 
considered in Chapter V. Briefly R. and D.C. managers accepted the 
task definition supplied by senior management:
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"Managers do what they're told from above".
Their F.W. colleagues did not:
"It's not our job to recommend cuts; higher management should 
decide that".
Management groups had different task definitions. Whilst R. and 
D.C. managers were certain that their definition was appropriate, 
their F.W. colleagues were far less certain.
A minority of F.W. managers, and in particular their team leader, 
felt their colleagues were responsible for taking action other than 
resistance and withdrawal. Their team leader, referring to the 
closure of an area office said
"It's dramatic but certain things have to be done; other 
responsibilities have to be taken into account".
The document he presented on managing reduction began and finished 
with reference to 'responsible': his assumption was
"that all members of F.W.M.T. will exercise their 
responsibilities in relation to the management of their 
respective areas"
and his support could be expected
"as long as decisions have been responsibly made".
'Responsibilities' indicated managing reductions whilst continuing 
to provide a service. Some members referred to their 'management 
responsibilities' when describing reduction related tasks, which
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suggests that rejection of these tasks was not complete; there was 
some uncertainty. Another team member said that though his F.W. 
colleagues
"stopped that type of activity (recommending reductions) 
they were responsible to do something";
rather than withdrawing, they were 'duty bound' to take some 
managerial action.
Levine (1978) states that
"no responsible manager wants to be faced with the prospect 
of being unable to control where cuts will take place"
(p.320).
He does not define responsibility further but in the organisation 
under study a manager's responsibility was not invariably seen to 
include reductions related tasks; some F.W. managers defined their 
responsibility to include resisting expenditure reductions as a 
means of protecting the social work service.
'Responsibility' also concerned the significant reference group to 
whom middle managers were responsible. Members of R. and D.C.M.T., 
for example, made the following points:
"My responsibility is to the department who pay my 
salary. In a company, you do a job, or get the 
sack. Why is it different here?";
"An employee has an obligation to do the job. If they 
disagree, they should change their job. We carried out 
instructions" ;
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"F.W. managers should implement cuts or resign".
The co-operators saw themselves as having a prime responsibility to 
their superiors by 'carrying out instructions'. The only alternat­
ive was resignation or what Hirschman (1970) terms 'exit'.
Reference amongst this group to other responsibilities , such as to 
staff, were infreqently made. Thus the Director said F.W. managers 
should
"take a third tier management view, not the view of 
other ranks".
A middle management view should be paramount. It's opposition to a 
staff view of reductions was recognised. An R. and D.C. manager 
said to F.W. managers
"You cross the fence when you become manager and cease to 
be a social worker. You're trying to run with the hare 
and the hounds".
A manager has no business taking into account a professional social 
work view, which was seen to be in opposition to the management pers­
pective, that is, following orders. This latter quotation represents 
an extreme position, but it is nevertheless useful as indicating the 
way this group interpreted their role. Whilst professional values 
were a factor, this was overriden by a paramount responsibility 
towards senior management. The majority of F.W. managers perceived 
themselves as having responsibilities to a wider group than did 
their R. and D.C. colleagues. A F.W. manager said
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"F.W. take a wider view and don't necessarily follow 
instructions".
Another manager said
"a problem with cuts was the difficulty of reconciling 
management responsibilities and personal values; 
the union position and political views".
A third said
"I feel my management responsibilities and my union 
responsibilities are difficult to reconcile".
There was then more than one significant reference group to which 
F.W. managers saw themselves responsible. In general though, they 
did not view their responsibility to senior management as 
outweighing other responsibilities.
Value Bases of Rationalities
In the previous chapter, the variety of rationalities in use were 
discussed. These are now explored further. An explanation offered 
for F.W. manager activities was the unacceptable influence of what 
were variously described by the co-operators as personal values, 
social values, political values and philosophical values. In effect 
these were values that were not in accord with those of senior 
management. R. and D.C. managers generally presented themselves as 
being free of any such unsanctioned influences. For example, one 
R. and D.C. manager said
"Perhaps I'm old-fashioned. I divide my job and my 
political values. I'm just doing a job. I leave 
my personal values at the door of the workplace...
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Privately I may agree (with opposition to the cuts) 
but as an officer, I do as I'm instructed".
Thus the employer has the prerogative of determining values in use 
at the workplace. -
This claim to be uninfluenced by personal values at work is, 
however, in itself a value. As an approach to defining the 
manager's role, it side-steps the issue of conflicting values. That 
the same approach did not apply to F.W. managers was recognised; a 
member of R. and D.C.M.T. remarked
"Some people in F.W. had a hell of a job reconciling their 
political and social values and their job".
Value conflict was an issue for F.W. managers, the majority of whom 
usually operated in tune with values other than those of their 
senior management. One F.W. manager said, for example,
"Attitudes to cuts are seen as representing a world view, 
an approach to .life, but that's the way I approach things 
generally: I relate them to my values and political beliefs":
That is to say, personal values were brought into the workplace and 
rationalised.
That the R. and D.C.M.T. stance was seen as value-free, but not 
approved of, was supported by the F.W. manager who described the 
former as
"Following orders, like Eichmann".
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An interesting example of the assumed match between workplace and 
personal values was provided by an R. and D.C. manager. He reported 
the surprised reaction of a F.W. manager when they met at a Labour 
Party meeting. The latter did not expect to see the former there 
because of his managerial response to reductions:
"He (the F.W. manager) assumed because of my action that I'd 
vote Tory and march with the National Front".
In fact, some members of R. and D.C.M.T. did use values other than 
those of senior management in evaluating reductions, and their own 
involvement in them. A minority said that if things got too bad, 
that is unacceptable in terms of their own values, they would do 
something. For example, one said
"If they closed all homes, then I'd do something. I didn't 
think the proposals were particularly drastic , not enough 
to warrant F.W.'s response".
This member had assessed the situation and found it acceptable in 
terms of his own values, compromising perhaps along the way.
R. and D.C. managers referred to the use of political values by 
their F.W. colleagues; political here being used to refer to action 
based on political ideology. Political action was defined as action 
which attempted to influence politicians and which was outside the 
normal channels of communication. An example of a normal channel 
was the budgetary process. The co-operators regarded the use of 
other channels as unacceptable in a manager; the resistors as part 
of their management reality. Thus an!R. and D.C. manager said
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MF.W. has a highly political view of their job, unlike 
R. and D.C. who keep well out of it".
It was
"the council's job to tell the Government where to go on cuts, 
not the staff's".
Another said
"F.W. managers used their political muscle to fight the council, 
they lobbied councillors".
Closing an area office was defined as a 'politial demonstration'.
As we have seen, the integration of ideological values into 
workplace action was regarded as acceptable by F.W. managers.
In fact one member of R. and D.C.M.T. did refer to ideological 
values in reductions. He said
"The Conservatives have the right idea .... What's the 
alternative to cuts? I'd like to see Mrs Thatcher ask her 
opponents that".
This, though, was a minority view and generally R. and D.C.M.T.'s 
attitude was to 'keep well out of it'.
The difference between resistors and co-operators was then about who 
defines values in use in the workplace. For the co-operators it was 
principally their superiors. In some instances there was an element 
of value convergence. For the resistors other values were also 
significant in determining action. Divergence between these and
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those of senior management led to dissonance which was resolved by 
taking action on their own rather than their superiors' values.
The question of managers' values about whether it is ethical to 
manage decline or not, is infrequently addressed in the literature. 
Levine (1979) notes the effect on clients and employees of reduced 
finances , but he does not elaborate. The general assumption appears 
to be that managers will manage decline, whatever their beliefs.
The rightness or wrongness of the issue, or how one moves from one 
to the other, has not commanded attention. Personal values, whether 
political, professional or social are seldom referred to. Those 
values which are considered concern the continued operation of the 
organisation in decline, by the imposition, or inculcation of new 
values, such as those of financial management (Cyert: 1975, 1978) or 
non-material rewards (Scott: 1976). On the whole the literature 
seems more concerned with identifying values which will facilitate 
decline management, rather than identifying and dealing with 
existing, pre-decline values, which may or may not facilitate the 
management of reductions.
A number of authors writing in the industrial relations field refer 
to value clashes. Flanders (1964) suggests that value clashes are 
the least susceptible to settlement by compromise. Eldridge (1968) 
points to the value base of competing rationalities in use by 
different groups in conditions of redundancy. He suggests that a 
plurality of values is a normal feature of industrial life, as does
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Fox (1969). In the organisations studied, plurality of values was 
not inevitably accepted as normal, yet pre-decline values which, at 
a collective level were evidence of a group's sub-culture, were seen to 
inhibit or facilitate the management of reductions.
Caring, Maturity and Strikes
Resistance was seen by R. and D.C. managers as indicating a 
non-caring attitude towards clients on the part of F.W. For 
example, one R. and D.C. manager said
"cuts strikes indicate the way social workers feel for
clients. If they really cared for clients, they'd sign out 
cases themselves",
that is, they would by-pass normal administrative procedures. The 
R. and D.C. team leader said
"Their (F.W. managers) action implies the service is more 
for them (F.W.) than clients. They strike>yet prophesy 
death and destruction if they're cut. Closing an area 
office only pressurises clients. What about the client in 
the F.W. strategy of freezing the work of vacant posts?".
Similarly resistance was seen as childish. Thus one R. and D.C.
manager likened F.W.'s attitude to "a spoilt child - that's what I
must have". Another R. and D.C. manager said
"we realised there would be cuts whatever, and were more 
mature".
Their team leader said
"R. and D.C.M.T. handled cuts in a calm and adult way... 
they did not behave like retarded adolescents".
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Thus for R. and D.C. managers, managing indicated a caring and 
mature attitude; resisting indicated the reverse.
F.W. managers did not interpret behaviour in quite the same way for 
managing was an example of 'complacency' and an uncaring attitude to 
staff and clients. Their own 'strikes' were presented as being part 
of a strategy which would ultimately help clients, by challenging 
the present need for reductions.
Members of both groups felt that 'caring' was an acceptable aspect 
of the management role; differences were based on what action 
reflected this attribution. The mature-immature dimension was not 
used by F.W. managers either to describe their own or others ' 
behaviour.
Emotional or Rational Responses
Both resistors and co-operators recognised emotions as having an 
unproductive influence on the management of expenditure reductions. 
Resistance and withdrawal were described as emotional responses 
which inhibited the F.W.M.T.'s effectiveness.
For example, one F.W. manager described his team's discussions of 
expenditure reductions as
"clouded with emotionalism and hot air".
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Another said
"Reductions ... was an emotional issue which blocked off other 
work. We talked about emotion values, politics, but not the 
practical implications of the cuts".
Another manager, who wished the team would consider reductions 
management, suggested members 'sit on their feelings', that is, 
control their emotions and thereby allow rational discussions to 
take place. Emotions inhibited a consideration of practical 
implications; the two were perceived to be in opposition.
No one argued for emotions as a prime determinant of action, and no 
one described R. and D.C. managers as emotional. Whilst the 
majority of managers reported that reductions produced an initial 
negative response, as we shall see later in the chapter, the extent 
to which these emotions were seen to influence management behaviour 
was the subject of criticism. There was general agreement that 
managers should not allow emotions to interfere with the tasks.
Participation or Control
Managers differed on whether they should control information or 
consult and involve subordinates.
F.W. managers generally interpreted their role to include 
information-sharing with staff. This was termed 'open government'. 
Members objected to a diminution of their ability to be open by the 
classification of information as confidential. One member said
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"with the cuts, the doors of openness seem to be closing".
As we saw in Chapter V, the team refused confidential information 
because it could not be shared with subordinates. Another member 
said
"cuts is a time of secrets, lots of secrets. You feel you 
don't really know what's going on".
That i s , there was a lack of information on reductions which 
resulted from it being withheld or classified as confidential.
F.W. Managers criticised their R. and D.C. colleagues because the 
latter did not
"inform their staff (of reduction proposals) because it would 
create insecurity. It's patronising and takes away the 
right to argue and advocate for oneself".
Another F.W. manager said
"R. and D.C. measures were terrible. They talked of staff 
redeployment with no consultation. Their team leader argued 
that it was no good stirring up trouble with tentative 
proposals".
This justification was supported by one R. and D.C. manager:
"I was told by John (the team leader) not to consult staff as 
it would worry them".
Another said
"I didn't consult staff as there was no time".
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One member of R. and D.C.M.T. did share information with her 
immediate subordinates, in confidence, but the information itself 
was not subject to debate. In general, as we saw in Chapter V, R. 
and D.C. managers saw consultation as being in oppositon to action. 
They did not construct their role in such a way that it was seen as 
a 'right' for staff. For F.W. managers, consultation was an 
integral part of the management task. As one F.W. manager said
"R. and D.C. managers tend to see decisions as management 
ones rather than as the result of consultation as we 
do in F.W.".
In this instance, consultation was seen by one group as enabling 
staff to argue their case; it was seen by the other as resulting in 
unnecessary insecurity or worry. One group considered consultation 
to be a staff right: the other did not. This data supports the 
point made earlier that F.W. managers were more concerned than their 
R. and D.C. colleagues to take account of their staff's views.
At the senior management level, the control of information was 
infrequently seen to have a negative effect. One such effect was 
noted by the F.W. team leader. He said the D.M.T.'s priority of 
protecting R. and D.C. should have been made public at the time as 
F.W. felt 'done in' and 'ripped off' and in his view information on 
this priority would have reduced their reaction. Later in this 
chapter, F.W. managers 'explanations' of their relatively adverse 
treatment is considered.
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Within the literature there are observations of, or prescription 
for, both less and more participation or organisational democracy in 
times of reductions. Levine (1979) refers to the participation 
paradox as one of the problems peculiar to organisations in decline: 
participative decision-making may result in a protective behaviour 
on the part of those most affected. Cazalis (1979) doubts whether 
democratic procedures will be helpful in managing organisational 
austerity, for they are in opposition to the goals of output, 
performance, and productivity. Whetton (1980 :b) identifies the 
tendency of decision makers to reduce the amount of consultation in 
times of crisis and Bogue (1972) points out that the more 
consultation there is, the more open conflict there is.
Cyert (1975) on the other hand recommends participation and the 
sharing of information because it is through this process that
"the goal (of increased productivity) is incorporated into their 
own (staff's) goal structure" (p.12)
and greater organisational unity will result. Berger (1982) found, 
on the basis of studying fifty-three school districts which were 
experiencing decline, that
"generally participation will lead to greater commitment 
and less resistance" (p.338).
Gill and Pratt (1986) suggest that participative, decentralised 
allocation discussions in conditions of declining resources are 
advantageous as they stimulate creativity and the production of 
information. The actual allocation decision may however have to be
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made by an authority figure. Hirschhorn (1983 :a) suggests that it 
is
"better to disclose information" (p.28),
to
"reveal bad news to the staff" (p.24)
in order to reduce uncertainty, and he makes much the same point in 
a discussion of the negative effects of rumour in decline 
(Hirschhorn: 1983:c).
The advisability and practicality of participative decision-making 
in respect of expenditure reductions is arguable (for example: 
Levine: 1978). The significant point which emerges from this case 
however, is that staff participation, or lack of it, was regarded as 
important by only one management group. This seemed to depend on 
whether or not participation and consultation were an aspect of a 
particular management group's sub-culture and thus whether 
participation was a taken for granted aspect of managerial activity. 
The conditions imposed by senior management (secrecy and non­
consultation) were inimical to the F.W. managers' normal method of 
managing. Conversely, these conditions matched those already in 
existence in R. and D.C.M.T. because management by directive was a 
normal aspect of their sub-culture. Thus for F.W.M.T. managing 
expenditure reduction involved not only task issues , such as 
deciding what, to reduce, but also process issues of how this task
was carried out; whether should they accept or reject a new, non- 
participative, style of management.
Managers' Evaluations of 'Right' and 'Wrong'
It will have become clear that different responses to reductions were 
explicitly evaluated as right and wrong. Firstly, a F.W. manager 
said responses became 'a way of judging people in the organisation', 
that is , different responses provided data on which an evaluation of 
members could legitimately be made. Secondly, a number of managers 
pointed out that justifications for alternative responses involved a 
'holier than thou' attitude, that is, one particular response was 
not only different but better than another. One R. and D.C. manager 
said that both his own team, and F.W. managers adopted this 
attitude. Thus different responses were presented and perceived in 
terms of right and wrong, rather than as equally valid, but 
different, management responses.
Managerial Role Interpretations
Different interpretations of the middle management role revolved 
around who defined reality, management values and task, and the 
limits of participation. For R. and D.C. managers, their superiors 
were seen to have the prerogative in this process. For F.W. managers, 
other groups were seen as legitimately influential in addition to 
senior management. As they provided conflicting definitions, both 
conflict and confusion resulted.
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The co-operative response was described by its adherents as 
indicating maturity, and both groups claimed their actions indicated 
a caring attitude towards clients; neither espoused emotions as a 
legitimate influencing factor. Both groups evaluated their own 
responses as right, and the alternative as wrong, though amongst 
F.W. managers there was far less certainty.
In terms of the action which resulted from these interpretations,
R. and D.C. managers 'followed orders', that is, managed reductions 
within the definition provided by senior management. F.W. managers 
rejected this definition and challenged the assumption that their
f
superiors had the prerogative to define and change the management 
role.
Role interpretation can be seen to reflect taken for granted rules 
of managing. At the collective level, the espousal of similar rules 
reflects the sub-culture of a particular management group.
Different role interpretations broadly match differences between 
managerial sub-cultures, in, for example, a preference for 
participative, or directive relations with staff. It was apparent 
that role problems resulted from the dissonance between the role as 
defined in terms of a group's sub-culture, and the role as defined 
by senior management in respect of managing expenditure reductions. 
Thus members of R. and D.C.M.T. saw their role as unproblematic 
because no significant change from their normal, pre-reductions way 
of managing was required: there was fit between what senior 
management required, and how R. and D.C. managers usually
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interpreted and performed their role. F.W. managers, on the other 
hand, regarded the degree of dissonance between their usual 
management performance and the new one demanded by senior management 
as problematic, for it challenged their taken for granted managerial 
activity which, until the advent,of reductions, was regarded as 
successful.
Leaving aside ’exit' (Hirschman: 1970), there appeared to be four 
alternatives open to F.W. managers to reduce this dissonance, three 
of which they specified:
1) accept a re-defined management role in terms of senior 
management's instructions;
2) ignore disconfirming information (senior management 
instructions) and therefore the need to adapt one's role;
3) attempt to change the situation and redefine the role.
Of these three, the first was used temporarily at the beginning of 
the reduction process and subsequently was not seriously considered 
by the majority of F.W. managers. A mixture of the second and third 
alternatives were adopted, though neither of these were cost or 
problem free. The fourth alternative, managerial pragmatism or 
contingency management - the notion that managers can carry out 
their role in different w a y s , depending on the particular 
circumstances to be managed - was not one that found much, if any, 
support amongst F.W. managers, or for that matter, managers 
generally in the organisation. Rather, the interpretation of the 
manager's role was by mutually exclusive, either/or categories: for
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example, managers either invariably supported participation by staff 
or they were invariably directive towards staff; they were not 
particularly flexible.
A further source of unease for F.W. managers were the changes in 
behaviour caused by the move away from their preferred ideal, which 
were noted in F.W.M.T. meetings where the group's culture was 
defined and redefined. Managers linked these changes causally to 
the advent of expenditure reductions and this is described below.
Organisational Changes
F.W. managers perceived, changes to the fora within which they 
performed their tasks, as a result of expenditure reductions. They 
identified change in their management team, their individual areas, 
and the department as a whole. Problems identified were: an 
increase in intra and intergroup conflict and competition; an under­
mining of managers' authority with staff; increased central control; 
and the negative interpretation placed on differential reductions. 
For R. and D.C.M.T. and D.M.T. the main outcomes of resource 
reductions were the short-term distractions of producing recommend­
ations, and the longer term conflict with F.W.M.T. Additionally, as 
we saw in Chapter V, the D.M.T. experienced internal disagreement 
about strategic planning.
These differences indicate that the nature or extent of change which 
expenditure reductions was designed to impose was not uniformly
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perceived by management groups. The greater the change involved, 
the greater difficulty the group had in managing change.
Organisational Climate and Group Cohesiveness
On one matter there was general agreement amongst managers at senior 
and middle levels; namely that reductions occasioned negative rather 
than positive feelings. Even the manager who supported reductions 
ideologically confessed to having a 'few sleepless nights'. It was 
said to be an 'emotional and depressing time*. Another R. and D.C. 
manager said it was a time of
"Tension, anxiety and low morale".
Another referred to
"uncertainty and insecurity".
Similarly a F.W. manager said
"cuts were terrible. I can't remember the details. I've 
blocked them off".
Another said
"Oh God what a mess ... It was very stressful ... with a 
great air of despondency. The organisation paid the price in 
terms of morale".
Even the Director recognised that reductions were 'difficult and 
traumatic for staff', though he qualified this by saying 
"some people see disaster before it comes".
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No-one said it was a time of harmony, high morale or new opportun­
ities .
The exception was an initial fighting spirit and cohesion which 
brought in-group members together in the face of an external enemy, 
a feature noted by both F.W. and R. and D.C. management team 
members. Thus some F.W. managers referred to a 'Battle of Britain 
Spirit' and 'a feeling of going to war' which was apparent when the 
group was initially involved. Similarly as we saw in Chapter V,
R. and D.C.M.T. organised themselves into cohesive groups in 
response to the threat from F.W.M.T. Increased group solidarity is 
noted by Coser (1956) as a positive function of social conflict. 
Similarly Staw et al (1981) predict an increase in intra group 
cohesiveness in the face of a threat ("impending loss or cost to the 
entity" (p.503)). This though will be short-lived if the group 
fails to meet the challenge. Social Services managers noted this 
fighting spirit was dissipated with time. The F.W.M.T. became 
competitive, untrusting and divided, as members competed for 
resources and disagreed about their joint strategy to deal with 
reductions. R. and D.C.M.T. 'became sick of it, it was silly', and 
cohesiveness was reduced by lack of interest.
Cohesiveness was reduced in F.W.M.T. by dissension about how to deal 
with the threat, rather than an experience of failure. Strategy to 
deal with threat, which Staw et al (1981) treat as unproblematic, 
can itself be a divisive issue. Similarly, R. and D.C.M.T.'s 
cohesiveness resulted from their agreement on strategy to meet the
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threat. Though this strategy was successful, cohesion was 
short-lived due to members' lack of interest. This contradicts Staw 
et al's predictions that, with success, cohesion is likely to be 
longer lived, and at a higher level; a threat response strategy can 
be a significant factor in increasing or decreasing group 
cohesiveness. This apparently flows from the extent to which there 
is agreement on how to meet the outside challenge, rather than, as 
Staw et al suggest, the ultimate success or failure of the strategy.
Intragroup Competition
Members of the F.W.M.T. drew a distinction between approaches to 
resource allocation which focussed on corporate or divisional needs 
and that which focussed on individualistic or area needs. They 
perceived an opposition between these two approaches, and stated a 
preference for the former. Corporateness was a group value, an 
aspect of sub-culture. This value was challenged by the reductions 
task, and its behavioural utility was abandoned in practice. Some 
members were unsure how to construct their role in this respect:
"I'm torn between my area needs and the corporate management 
of resources";
"I'm torn between what's good for the F.W.M.T. and what's 
good for my own area";
"It's more difficult to be corporate with scarce resources".
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The majority of team members saw a move towards individualism and 
away from the preferred corporate approach. This was linked to an 
increase in competition between members. As one manager said
"It's easy to have goodwill if there's plenty of 
resources: now relations are strained: its the law 
of the jungle".
This was supported by fellow team members, who made the following 
remarks: each member was
"rooting for their own area".
"The management team is breaking up with competition for 
resources
"fighting over scarce resources is adversely influencing the 
F.W.M.T.".
One member who supported the ideal of a corporate approach said
"At the moment, I'm frantically advertising posts as they 
come up. I feel its every man for himself and I'm sure 
others do to. I've no intention of being a lamb to the 
slaughter by holding my vacancies open while others fill 
theirs".
This suggests that when resources are reduced, consumption goes up, 
at least until the money runs out, because individual consumers do 
not wish to lose resources to their colleagues. This 'every man for 
himself' approach assumes that colleagues are responding in much the 
same way. Financial restraint is equated with sacrifice, and may 
ultimately lead to unfilled vacancies for managers who adopt that 
approach. Corporate management values were superceded in practice
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as members competed for resources on an individual basis and the 
sub-culture of the group was challenged by reductions management.
Thus resource reductions led to increased competition. No one 
approached suggested that reductions presented new opportunities for 
a consideration of the most effective and/or efficient use of 
resources. Changes were noted, but towards individualism and 
competition. This suggests that corporate management may be very 
difficult to maintain in times of resource scarcity; and that 
changes in the group's sub-culture behaviour were precipitated by 
the introduction of reductions. A decrease in trust within the team 
was also noted, and this too was linked to competition as the 
following quotations indicate:
"The F.W. group is more competitive; there's a lack of trust in 
the management team";
"It's easy to be open whilst the service is developing. It's 
difficult with cuts".
The team became divided:
"cuts brought out the cracks in group solidarity and 
highlighted division. F.W.M.T. has divided into small 
groups. It feels like a shambles now"
was how one member put it. Another said
"F.W.M.T. is less cohesive; there's been a polarisation from 
defensiveness, it's less cohesive. In stress situations 
people tend to adopt extreme positions rather than being 
somewhere in the middle. It's everyone for themselves and 
their allies".
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They had splintered because the issues of reductions management and 
resource competition highlighted pre-existing divisions.
The leader's relations with the F.W.M.T. were affected by these 
internal divisions for, as one member put it,
"cuts opened up our differences with David (the F.W.M.T. 
leader) .... He was more accepting of the Director's and 
D.M.T.'s way to play it".
That is, he wanted his team to manage reductions; the majority of 
members wished to avoid this and the group was thus separated from 
its leader and vice versa.
Intragroup competition was not a feature of expenditure reductions 
noted by R. and D.C. managers. Internal unanimity was in fact 
increased temporarily in response to a threat from F.W.M.T. Thus 
the advent of expenditure reductions does not inevitably lead to 
intragroup competition and conflict. R. and D.C. managers were 
brought closer to their team leader because they shared the super­
ordinate goal (the Sherifs: 1953) of managing expenditure reductions 
as instructed.
Intergroup Conflict
At the inter-divisional level, members of all three management teams 
noted an increase in conflict between F.W.M.T. and R. and D.C.M.T.. 
As one senior manager put it
"cuts have produced a nadir in inter-divisional relationships".
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Similarly the relations between F.W.M.T. and the D.M.T. moved 
towards conflict. A F.W. manager said
"Before (reductions) we always worked in co-operation with 
senior management. Now I see it getting more conflictual".
The F.W. team leader suggested that this was because
"differences are thrown into relief by the cuts issue 
because the positions taken, the attitudes adopted, are 
more trenchant; day-to-day working shows up differences 
less starkly".
The contrasting of reductions as an issue with "day-to-day workings" 
indicates that the former can be classified as what Pettigrew (1979) 
terms a 'social drama 1 and also confirms Hermann's (1963) hypothesis 
that
"a crisis will tend to intensify any conflict existing 
prior to the crisis" (p.68).
In addition though, reductions as an issue created conflict by 
introducing a new element to the management role about which there 
was strong disagreement.
Within the literature there is some consensus that conflict 
increases with resource scarcity. A number of authors , such as 
Levine (1978 and 1979) and Scott (1974) base their explanation of 
this on Cyert and March's (1963) concept of slack resources which are 
used to buy organisatonal consensus and increased conflict therefore 
results from decreased resources. Some authors focus on the use to 
which resources are put, or goals. Gill (1981), in the case of
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Higher Educational organisations, uses Cyert and March's (1963) 
notion of organisations having poorly defined goals. With scarcity, 
strategic goals become the subject of debate and conflict is 
generated.
In this instance though, reductions introduced a new and additional 
set of conflicting goals. At an intragroup level, competition for 
resources promoted disharmony in the F.W.M.T. In addition, 
differences on how to respond to reductions promoted conflict and 
it was the intergroup level which was the main topic of conversation 
amongst managers. Goal differences principally related to those who 
accepted involvement in reductions as a legitimate goal, and those 
who did not. Thus analyses which focus only on resources, and the 
purpose for which these are used, do not fully explain managers' 
responses.
Intergroup conflict is not though the inevitable outcome of 
stringency. There was no conflict between R. and D.C.M.T. and the 
D.M.T. because they shared a superordinate goal (the Sherifs: 1953): 
that of managing expenditure reductions. In this instance harmony 
rather than conflict resulted from the imposition of resource 
reductions.
Managerial Authority
The instruction to manage reductions was seen by some F.W. managers 
to undermine their ability to exert influence over staff. The
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attitude of their staff to reductions was, as we have seen, a 
significant factor for F.W. managers in determining their own 
responses. Managers also saw these attitudes as directly influenc­
ing their ability to manage staff. One manager said
"the strength of my credibility depends on my reaction to 
cuts".
Another termed this
"the limit of authority".
He went on to explain
"in the office I feel under surveillance to see'if I'm conforming 
with the union line. Managers need to retain the co-operation of 
their area teams. You can't work in isolation from the team. If 
there's any further action on management's part, we cannot count 
on the staff".
Credibility and authority were thus seen to depend on boycotting 
reductions; the latter manager referring to this as an 'impossible 
restraint'. Managers could either become alienated from staff by 
managing, or alienated from senior management and their R. and D.C. 
colleague, by resisting reductions. Though they chose the latter 
they were still 'under surveillance', that is a lack of trust had 
developed within area teams which made the management task less easy 
to perform.
Strengthening of Managerial Control
A number of F.W. managers noted the increased control exerted by the 
D.M.T. and the Director in reductions whilst R. and D.C. managers
- 190 -
did not refer to it. In addition to control of information F.W. 
managers made the following points:
"The D.M.T. is more involved in the day-to-day running of 
the organisation: we put more things up (for approval) 
and lose more than previously: third-tier management has 
less autonomy";
"the cuts gave him (the Director) a reason to come into his 
own, to stop any project: money".
"The Director is now more powerful than anyone else".
Fewer resources were thus seen to decrease middle management 
autonomy because more items needed the approval of senior management 
than previously and this increased the Director's power.
F.W.’s team leader attempted to increase his own, and his team's, 
management control by recommending they adopt a number of financial 
control measures, including a regular review of spending, both 
centrally by the team leader, and by the team. Details of these 
proposals are found in Chapter V.
Within the literature, increase in control is considered by Hamblin 
(1958) who states that crisis provides organisational leaders with 
an opportunity to centralise control. Pfeffer and Leblebici (1973) 
point out that organisations respond to external pressure by calling 
for more and better management. Cazalis (1979) suggests increased 
control as a means of increasing productivity. Cyert (1978) 
recommends strong leadership to deal with decline and Levine et al
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(1981) discovered that management of decline is more effective with 
'more centralised control' (p.620). Thus stronger control is either 
observed, predicted or recommended as a means of managing decline, 
stress and crisis.
It may appear paradoxical that members who offered up control by 
withdrawal, as noted earlier, should object to control being taken 
away. Billings et al (1980) suggest that centralisation is 
facilitated by subordinates relinquishing control. In fact, and 
again as noted earlier, it was the task of managing reductions, and, 
in particular, prioritising services that was unwanted, not 
management control more generally. Thus despite withdrawing, some 
F.W. managers felt unhappy about what they saw as control in general 
being taken away; they wanted it both ways.
Differential Reductions
The F.W. division experienced greater reductions than the R. and D.C. 
division. This was interpreted by members of F.W.M.T. as represent­
ing a negative evaluation of their w o r k , of them as individuals, and 
of past behaviour.
As an introduction to interpretations placed upon differential 
reductions, the following quotation from a F.W. manager is 
instructive:
"As cuts were across the board (that is, they were applied to 
all departments) they are not regarded by the Director as a 
personal attack on him, his department or his status".
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This provides an insight into how reductions that were not applied 
across the board could be interpreted.
One F.W. member said reductions represented the
"Council's turn-around in its attitude to Social Services".
That is , reductions represented a negative evaluation of the work 
area affected. Another said
"the Director is not keen on the profession of social work"
as an interpretation of why F.W. had been reduced more than 
R. and D.C.
The individuals involved in obtaining resources were evaluated by 
subordinates in terms of the amount they obtained or retained. As 
one F.W. manager put it
"the resources I get determine my status in the area".
Fewer resources therefore meant reduced status , and another F.W. 
manager made a similar point in relation to their team leader:
"The AD was on show. If he's good, we'll get less cuts than 
them (R. and D.C.), if not we get more".
Because they got more cuts, their leader was defined as less good. 
Conversely, the fact that R. and D.C. had 'done well' was seen to 
reflect the competence of their leader.
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Some members saw greater reductions in their division as a sanction 
against past bad behaviour. A F.W. manager said the extent of 
reductions were
"seen to be a sanction for incompetence: you've done badly, so 
you get less , as a punishment for not towing the line or for 
stepping out of line"
with regard to reductions management. Because F.W.M.T. resisted 
involvement they were financially penalised. Conversely, fewer 
cuts were seen as a reward for correct behaviour.
Reductions were also seen by some managers as retribution on the 
Director's part for the behaviour of the previous leader of F.W.M.T. 
who undermined the Director's power position by consulting directly 
with councillors. The team's new leader was seen as less powerful. 
With the advent of reductions the Director was said by one F.W. 
manager to be
"glad to do F.W. down as their power is no longer in 
evidence".
Additionally, this previous team leader was said, by a number of 
F.W. managers, to be
"an incrementalist, who grabbed resources in any way he 
could".
Some felt he had, as one member put it 
"ripped the department off".
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Fewer resources for F.W. was seen as a 'settling of old scores'. 
One manager said
"F.W. assumed that they would be ripped off - it's rough 
justice because of the past".
This past was also used to explain the response by non-members to 
reductions in F.W.
"Perhaps people feel F.W.'s done O.K. in the last few years 
and they deserve everything they got".
Unsurprisingly no F.W. manager gave a positive interpretation of 
their greater resource loss.
This data is interesting on a number of grounds. Principally it 
presents the F.W. managers' interpretation of their greater loss: 
they were 'ripped off'. This term strongly implies an element of 
being cheated of what was rightfully theirs and is based on past 
experience of resource allocation. The interpretation of this 
greater loss relies on a perceived negative evaluation of some 
aspects of the F.W. division.
F.W. managers felt that they had suffered a loss of status, that 
the Director of the organisation was motivated by dislike of the 
F.W. division, and that their divisional leader was incompetent. 
These interpretations on the part of F.W. managers offer a further 
insight into the increased conflict with their leader, senior 
management, and R. and D.C.
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Additionally the data shows that members will construct a number of 
explanations in the absence of a known priority, to explain an 
unacceptable situation and cope by rationalising it.
Summary
Managers interpreted their roles in expenditure reductions 
differently. These differences reflected particular management 
group sub-cultures. The terms-in-use for describing the management 
role were realism, responsibility, values , maturity, caring, 
emotionalism, and participation. Whilst those who co-operated 
were sure that their stance was right, those who resisted involve­
ment were less sure. This uncertainty resulted from the number of 
constituents who were seen to influence management behaviour and the 
conflict between these. The co-operators were most influenced by 
senior management.
All managers reported an initial negative reaction to reductions , 
and an increase in intergroup conflict. Additionally F.W. managers 
noted changes:in their management team towards competition and 
disagreement; in their relationship with staff; in a move towards 
conflict with senior management; in an increase in senior 
management's control; and in a negative evaluation of various 
aspects of the F.W. division. Such changes were not noted by their 
R. and D.C. colleagues. The data on changes to management team 
practice is particularly notable because it indicates the two-way 
influence between reductions and group culture. Sub-culture
- 196 -
influences responses to and interpretations of reductions; 
reductions can precipitate changes to this same culture, partic­
ularly when traditional values no longer guide behaviour, because 
these values no longer have utility.
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CHAPTER VII
DIAGNOSIS THROUGH ACTION: IMPROVING INTERGROUP RELATIONS
CHAPTER VII
DIAGNOSIS THROUGH ACTION: IMPROVING INTERGROUP RELATIONS 
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyse an 
intervention and to evaluate it as a diagnostic tool. Whilst the 
intervention was designed to improve relations between two man­
agement groups - F.W.M.T. and R. and D.C.M.T. - which had worsened 
during stringency, it also provided useful diagnostic data about the 
differential effect of hard times on managerial sub-groups.
Firstly the role change from researcher to consultant is considered 
and then problem and strategy selection is examined. The stages of 
the intervention are noted, and the final intergroup meeting is 
considered in some detail. Data from this source is used 
diagnostically, to investigate the source of conflict, its effects 
on expenditure reductions, and to gain understanding of managerial 
sub-groups.
Role Change from Researcher to Consultant
Presenting, negotiating and conducting an intervention involves the 
practitioner in a change of presented role emphasis. The change is 
from one of eliciting or absorbing information, to actively 
initiating change in relation to a specific problem area. For the 
intervention to proceed, organisational members had to try to accept 
the legitimacy of this change despite the inherent ambiguities.
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This was facilitated in three ways: creating an expectation of role 
change during data collection; members' evaluations of the conduct 
of data collection; and the commitment to the selected problem and
action strategy. The first involved references to possible action
outcomes whilst distancing myself from research outcomes on which 
action is less likely such as reports. In respect of the second as 
Brown (1972) points out
"the subject of the investigator's study is simultaneously 
studying the investigator, and making decisions on the 
quantity and quality of the information he (or she) will 
provide" (p.698).
The process of data collection provides members with an evaluative 
measure of the researcher which is applied to any action recommended 
by that researcher. As the Deputy Director said
"we wouldn't have let you (conduct in intervention) if we
thought you'd bugger it up".
Finally the selected problem and solution strategy were acceptable. 
The F.W.M.T. leader said it was
"an excellent idea which hopefully will identify the real areas 
to concentrate on over the next six months".
The R. and D.C. leader was also agreeable, as he wanted
"a good working relationship with F.W.. It can't make 
matters worse".
Problem and Strategy Selection
Two major and connected problems were identified by managers: the 
hostile relationship between R. and D.C. and F.W. management teams
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in general, and, in particular, each group's management of 
expenditure reductions. The latter was seen to have influenced the 
former, producing what one senior manager observed as an 'all time 
low in interdivisional relations ' . Both matters generated conflict 
but the former, whilst including reductions management, seemed to 
pose less of an initial threat to members, and was thus anticipated 
as less likely to produce the defensive reaction of rejection. Both 
topics were raised at individual, team and inter-team settings, but 
the problem of intergroup relations pre-dated that of reductions. 
The significance of good working relations, both for clients and for 
the organisation's non-service delivery activities, was acknowledged 
as was the fact that expenditure reductions had made intergroup 
relations worse.
The problem was processional rather than structural: intergroup 
contact as illustrated in Chapter IV was being used by each group to 
reinforce and update information on the deficiencies of the other.
It was also a forum for surfacing negative evaluations of one team 
by the other which impeded discussion of substantive matters. 
Structural change seemed an unlikely option in the short term due to 
resource scarcity, the recent restructuring of the R. and D.C. 
division, and the Director's reported opposition to structural 
change. The task was therefore to facilitate the workings of the 
existing structure.
An appropriate intervention would, it was believed, be one which 
exposed these processes, acknowledged them as a legitimate area for
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action, and enabled members to work through and find solutions to 
the problems. Though both expenditure reductions management and 
intergroup relations were areas of conflict, the latter seemed more 
likely to generate agreement on action between the parties. The 
Sherif's (1953) term this type of agreement, the discovery of a 
superordinate goal.
However, the advisability of addressing intergroup conflict is 
discussed in the literature on organisational development (O.D.)and if 
conflict is intense Bennis (1969: p.45) regards attempts at 
resolution as inadvisable. He does not, however, define 'intense'. 
Earlier though, he refers to conflict resolution as an example of 
O.D. practice. Conflict in this case involved 'stereotyping and 
mutual distrust, if not downright hostility' (p.4). Henley (1975) 
suggests that action is inappropriate on issues which have a high 
salience for members, that is, where there is open conflict. 
Significance then, is attached to the level of conflict.
Conversely, Schein (1985) states that
"much of the work of organisational development practitioners 
deals with the knitting together of diverse and warring 
sub-cultures" (p.285).
Beckhard (1969) states that an operational goal of O.D. is to create 
conditions 'where conflict is brought out and managed' rather than 
trying to 'work around, or avoid, or cover up conflicts' (p.14).
Intergroup conflict resolution is a major concern for both theorists 
and practitioners and the work of the Sherifs (1953) has made a
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major contribution to this field. They reviewed methods of reducing 
conflict between groups, from the use of rules or laws to regulate 
behaviour to the dissemination of information aimed at reducing 
stereotyping. Their experimental work with children identified the 
significance of superordinate goals, or mutually desired ends, as a 
means of fostering co-operation. They created competition between 
groups, then transformed this relationship to one of co-operation, 
through the introduction of a superordinate goals. To achieve the 
desired goal, competing groups had to co-operate and for the 
Sherifs , homogeneity of purpose was thus the key to intergroup 
co-operation.
In circumstances of conflict then, the consultant's job is to help 
the client identify areas where agreement on end states exists and 
help him use these to tackle conflict. Thus in determining whether 
action to resolve conflict is possible, it is important to identify 
possible superordinate goals.
The intervention focussed on intergroup issues, as these were more 
easily and directly addressed than the management of stringency. In 
relation to the former, the parties were agreed that intergroup 
relations were poor and that conflict needed reducing. This was the 
superordinate goal, whereas in contrast, expenditure reductions were 
difficult to address as there was little agreement on either their 
nature or a clear end state. There was no easily identified 
superordinate goals.
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An approach to improving intergroup relations is suggested by 
writers such as Blake et al (1964), Lorsch and Lawrence (1965),
Merry and Allerhand (1977), Schein (1969), and Beckhard (1969).
They use the conflict itself as the focus of intergroup discussions 
aimed at reducing it. This process is usually structured in the 
following way: the intragroup generation and intergroup sharing, of 
stereotyped data by each group of the other leads to an 
identification and discussion of differences. Cross groups, 
comprising members of each group then consider solutions and the 
views elicited may be either perceptual (Blake et a l : 1964; Schein: 
1969) or evaluative ((Fordyce and Weil: 1971; Merry and Allerhand: 
1977). These studies indicated that interventions which address 
conflict can be productive. The intervention described here used 
the structure outlined above, and, following Blake et al and Schein, 
focussed on the exchange of group perceptions in three categories: 
namely the group's view of itself, it's view of the other group, and 
a prediction of the other group's view of it.
The intervention took place over a three-month period which provided 
flexibility by allowing more time to those management teams less 
familiar with such activities (R. and D.C.). Further, whilst 
F.W.M.T. took an hour to discuss the issue of their participating 
and to generate perceptions, R. and D.C.M.T. devoted four hours at 
two meetings to the task. This strategy also utilised the existing 
group and intergroup timetables of meetings, thus enabling the 
action to proceed without extra resources. Finally it seemed likely 
that any change would be more easily transferable to normal working
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life, if the intervention was perceived as 'work' rather than 
' training '.
Implementation
The intervention involved a presentation to each management team 
leader, and then their respective teams. Each group produced it's 
lists and these were then shared, discussed and clarified. Though 
it is not my purpose to analyse these perspectives , they do provide 
a flavour of the intervention, and the basis for it. They are 
therefore set out in Appendix One. Specific problems on intergroup 
relations were identified at the first intergroup meeting, and in 
particular different responses to the management of expenditure 
reductions. Issues associated were considered at the second, and 
final intergroup meeting.
Member responses to the first intergroup meeting were in the main 
positive and although one manager referred to the intervention as a 
'love-in' in a perjorative manner, comments such as 'good',
'useful', and 'thank you' were also made. Members expressed views 
to the group that: a trusting environment had been created; a 
climate of sharing was developing; that it was good going from ideas 
to practice; and that it was the first time such matters had been 
articulated.
On the basis of this development, it was agreed that a further 
meeting would be useful, to continue discussing intergroup problems
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and solutions. The most significant of these, expenditure reductions 
management, would be the focus. Though the community acknowledged 
that the action was incomplete, the second meeting resulted in a 
halt to the intervention and agreement to discuss the matter further 
was not acted on. Lack of time was given as a reason at one stage 
and apart from a brief meeting with the Deputy Director and request 
for a report some time later, (see Appendix Two), no further action 
was requested or taken on the matter.
The second meeting is analysed in detail, in respect of the 
perspective it provides on both the management of expenditure 
reductions, and on conflict.
The analysis of this falls into two parts; the first involved 
exchanges between F.W. and R. and D.C. managers; and the second, 
exchanges between F.W. managers and the senior manager who was both 
team leader of R. and D.C.M.T. and Deputy Director of the 
organisation. The analysis focusses on members' contributions, and 
interprets them with reference to the aim and immediate outcome of 
the intervention.
Part One
From the views expressed in the first part of the meeting, the 
nature of F.W. managers' problems with reductions management was 
highlighted, as was the degree of mutual understanding and concern. 
Conversely little was said in support, or condemnation, of the
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manager as bureaucrat - managers manage whatever the circumstances. 
The sympathetic acceptance of diversity in managerial circumstances, 
on the part of R. and D.C. managers, represented a success in terms 
of the goal of intergroup harmony. But this acceptance was also 
seen as a threat and as such was attacked in the second part of the 
meeting.
The terms in which F.W. managers' expressed their problems 
represented a significant change in emphasis succinctly expressed by 
a F.W. manager
"Senior management say we won't (manage expenditure reductions): 
we say we can't".
A value base and an operational base for action were identified and 
contrasted. Whereas prior to the intervention F.W. managers usually 
emphasised a value base in explaining their activities, during the 
interventions they emphasised an operational base. Thus one said
"I've no prescription for action; no one says what we've 
not got to provide",
whilst another said
"I've no solution".
Reference was made to value based opposition to reductions management 
- that is, the 'will not' approach - but the bulk of F.W. managers' 
contributions concerned the operational - the 'cannot' approach - 
and the difficulties they experienced. For example, they referred 
to contextual features such as pressure from opposing groups; the
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manager's need for the goodwill of his staff; and their union's 
unrealistic instruction not to manage.
One F.W. manager anticipated a discussion of expenditure reductions 
problems 'might provide mutual support and understanding'. In 
response to F.W. managers' exploration of their problems, generally 
supportive statements were provided by R. and D.C. managers, such as
"we care what happens to F.W."
and this was in contrast to an attitude of indifference,
"O.K., F.W.'s down the Swannee";
an attitude which was for the most part rejected. Similarly a F.W. 
manager was concerned to protect the level of resources available to 
R. & D.C. managers
"We are equally committed to no cuts in R. and D.C.".
Mutual concern was the predominant feeling rather than indifference 
or competition.
The type of problems identified by F.W. managers were acknowledged 
by some of their R. & D.C. colleagues to be different and more 
difficult than those they faced managing expenditure reductions.
For example, one R. & D.C. manager said that, unlike F.W.
"R. 6c D.C. hasn't experienced the sharp end of expenditure 
reductions No posts have been lost".
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There was, then, some acceptance that the management of reductions 
was adversely affected by the severity of the reductions being 
managed and that this applied to F.W. managers particularly because 
they were experiencing the 'sharp end' in comparison with their 
R. and D.C. colleagues. The R. and D.C. manager mentioned above 
went on to say
"We have it to go through",
'it' being the 'sharp end' and loss of posts. One R. and D.C. 
manager also anticipated that he and his colleagues would in the 
future be presented with the type of management problems which F.W. 
managers were currently experiencing and describing.
Another response which in effect gave support to F.W. managers' 
definition of their problems, rather than dismissing or ignoring 
them, was by identification, or understanding, based on similarity 
of experience. One R. and D.C. manager acknowledged that she could 
identify with the issues raised by F.W. managers because she too had 
experienced some difficulty with reductions management. She 
perceived, for example, the beginnings of 'a split with senior 
management'; had experienced conflicts with her staff; and had felt 
'isolated' both from those above and those below. She had also 
wondered 'what to do: ignore or follow F.W.', for to follow F.W. 
meant resisting reductions; in the event she obeyed instructions.
Her contribution was thus made in the light of an understanding 
gained from the experience of similar problems and from 
acknowledging rather than denying their reality.
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Finally, F.W. managers were encouraged rather than discouraged 
to share their problems and "to tell you how I feel", as one 
F.W. manager said, by supportive, rather than undermining remarks 
from their R. and D.C. colleagues. For example,
"It's useful to share the muddle".
"It's the first time it's been shared at divisional level", 
and
"it's good sitting here hearing you feel sick".
One R. and D.C. manager however, said that
"managers' should manage",
that i s , managers' should operate as managers, whatever the 
circumstances. Interestingly, this statement reflected the 
perception of the management task by all R. and D.C.M.T. members 
when interviewed previously.
Attitudes on the part of the majority of R. and D.C. managers' by 
this time changed from a general condemnation of F.W. managers' 
activities , to one which was understanding of the effects of 
different circumstances. There was also an identification with 
similar experiences and an expressed sympathy for, and interest in, 
those in a worse position. Similarly F.W. managers expressed 
concern for the resources available to their R. and D.C. colleagues, 
couched their contributions in terms of operational difficulties,
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and refrained from condemning the alternative management strategy of 
their R. and D.C. colleagues. The extent of the change can be 
measured by comparing the comments reported here, with the interview 
data interpreting their roles as managers as set out in Chapter VI.
Why these changes in attitude occurred is difficult to analyse, 
because of the potentially large number of influencing variables.
In part they stem from F.W. managers' greater experience managing 
reductions, and, in the case of R. and D.C. managers, with the 
anticipation of more reductions to come. The atmosphere of trust 
built up during the first exercise assisted in the discussion of 
these changes and the second meeting of the intervention provided a 
forum within which these altered views could be legitimately 
expressed.
Different responses to expenditure reductions can inhibit rather 
than encourage intergroup co-operation especially, for example, 
meetings to recommend specific reductions. The intervention 
demonstrated that this tendency may be reduced where after some 
catharsis, views can be expressed in terms of managerial problem­
solving terms.
Part Two
In Part Two of the meeting the direction and tone of the discussion 
were changed, by the senior manager in charge of R. and D.C.M.T., in 
a largely successful attempt to reverse the understanding generated
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earlier. He did this by rejecting F.W. managers' definitions of 
their problems using a two-pronged attack: that their contributions 
had been 'dishonest' and 'value-based'; and that they had on another 
recent occasion 'acted in bad faith' on the issue of reductions 
management.
Part Two of the meeting began when the management team leaders were 
asked to contribute, and whilst the F.W. team leader said nothing, 
the R. and D.C. team leader said:
"masturbation is not a spectator sport".
This led to heated, acrimonious and lengthy exchange between the 
latter and some F.W. managers about their contribution to the 
session and their involvement of the union in negotiations to manage 
reductions. In respect of the latter issue, subsequent exchanges 
revealed that some F.W. managers may have agreed with some senior 
managers on means of managing reductions and that this agreement had 
been rescinded by the F.W. managers' union. The focus of the meeting 
changed from a horizontal relationship between the two middle manage­
ment teams, to a hierarchical one between F.W. managers and senior 
management. From being reasonably open and constructive, contribut­
ions became competitive.
The R. and D.C. team leader subsequently accepted his role in re­
directing the focus of the meeting; he
"threw the meeting off course; it was one of the few occasions 
when I allowed myself the luxury of saying what I thought.
The subject was around and would have come out, whatever".
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It is doubtful if this was so, for the subject of F.W. managers' 
bad faith 'came out' because he introduced it and the attacking 
style in which he spoke ensured defensive responses. The subject 
was referred to indirectly at the beginning of the meeting:
"something has happened which F.W. is still coming to 
terms with".
What this something was, was not however pursued.
It was re-introduced only after the exchanges in Part One of the 
meeting had taken place; that is, after members of the R. and D.C.M.T. 
expressed understanding of, and sympathy for, their F.W. colleagues' 
predicament. All this partially explains the R. and D.C. team 
leader's re-introduction of the subject in such a dramatic fashion. 
His contribution was designed to be inflammatory and attacking from 
his style of delivery, the terms used, the volume of his voice, and 
the content. His behaviour was unusual in comparison with that in 
other settings where he operated in a calm but directing fashion, 
but on this occasion he allowed himself not only the luxury of 
saying what he thought, but also the luxury of saying this in a 
provocative manner. This combination of content and style increased 
the likelihood of defensive responses from F.W. managers.
The options open to him at the end of Part One of the intervention 
are as follows. He could, for example, have remained silent, as did 
his peer senior manager (the F.W.M.T. leader), though this would not
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have been 'in character'; he could have followed his team members in 
expressing understanding of F.W. managers' more difficult position; 
or he could have focussed on particular problems raised and 
suggested solutions. In the event he condemned F.W. managers' 
contributions to the meeting, and their activities generally. An 
attempt to explain this behaviour now follows.
The status of the contributor, and the nature of his contribution, 
both in its dramatic form and content, encouraged an observing role 
by those managers not directly involved in the discussion between 
F.W. managers and senior managers. Perhaps they preferred not to be 
involved in overt conflict, thus not attracting to themselves the 
anger that was present at the meeting.
My role reverted to that of the observer for my initial surprise was 
replaced by a consideration of alternative actions. None however 
seemed appropriate. I concluded that the spell had been broken, 
that the work on intergroup harmony had been nullified, and that I 
had lost control of the intervention. Nevertheless there was some 
interest in the group in pursuing this new topic and I had an 
objective in collecting further data.
Those managers who were directly involved wished to resolve matters 
and the senior manager clearly felt angry about what he perceived 
had happened. F.W. managers responded to, rather than ignored, his 
attack, being variously concerned to clarify what had happened, to 
distance themselves from it, or to justify their action. They also
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defended their contribution to Part One of the meeting. For a 
variety of reasons then, both parties to the exchange had an 
interest in pursuing the issue once it had been raised.
The senior manager had another concern resulting from Part One of 
the meeting. He perceived the outcomes as a threat to the 
bureaucratic nature of the middle manager's job. This view of the 
manager's role which was shared by other senior managers had 
received scant attention or support until he spoke. In contrast, a 
statement which articulated different and more difficult 
circumstances had received an understanding and sympathetic response 
from his own management team. He undoubtedly noted that some of his 
managers would, as one of them implied, have difficulties managing, 
when experiencing the 'sharp end' of reductions. They would not in 
these circumstances necessarily act as they had done in the past, 
that is 'follow orders', but might instead 'follow F.W'.
He therefore vigorously defended his position, as he had in the 
past, and attempted to re-impose it on the group. He did this by 
denying the validity of an approach which took into account 
differences in the severity of reductions and related managerial 
circumstances, rather than pointing to any solution that had been 
arrived at during his discussion with F.W. managers. At the same time 
he used pre-meeting events as a justification for rejecting the 
validity of F.W. managers' contributions which were, he stated, both 
self-indulgent and dishonest. By denying the operational reality of 
what F.W. managers' were saying, he also undermined the
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understanding response they had received from members of his own
management team.
The effect of his intervention was an avoidance of the problems and 
solutions associated with the F.W. managers' task, and instead this 
group were re-cast in the role of managerial villains. Conversely 
the heroes were those who continued to respond in a 'managerial 
manner' to the issue of financial reductions. A clear message was 
thus given to his own management team to either continue to manage 
or be cast as a villain.
The postive outcomes of the intervention were dissipated and 
conflict between the two teams encouraged, for rather than accepting 
diversity between the two middle management teams, uniformity was 
re-asserted as the only legitimate reality and an indication given 
of the strength of opposition which deviance would attract. 
Consideration is now given to the source and results of the conflict 
evident in this event.
Conflict Resolution and Superordinate Goals
Earlier in this chapter the literature was examined to ascertain 
appropriate responses to organisational conflict. It now seems that 
significance needs to be attached to the discovering superordinate 
goals, which determine how far a response is likely to succeed in 
resolving the conflict. There was agreement between both parties - 
R. and D.C.M.T. and F.W.M.T. - that the conflict between them needed
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to be resolved and relationships improved. On the basis of this 
superordinate goal the intervention proceeded successfully which 
suggests that it is the existence of such goals rather than the 
level of conflict itself that is most significant in forecasting the 
effectiveness of an intervention. Overt conflict for example, where 
matched by a high level of agreement on superordinate goals , can be 
effectively resolved.
Action should not be ruled out though, where agreement is at a low 
level, or superordinate goals are elusive, as appeared to be the 
case with F.W. managers and senior management. The intervention 
strategy in these circumstances is best focussed on delineating 
areas of disagreement, and defining mechanisms for reaching 
compromise, such as role negotiation. This was recommended in my 
report to the organisation (see Appendix Two).
The intervention was not intended to improve relations between 
senior management and F.W. managers, though the need for this was 
revealed in the course of the work. The extent to which these two 
groups shared a superordinate goal in respect of expenditure 
reductions is not known. That they met to discuss the issue 
suggests some measure of agreement on the need to manage expendit­
ure reductions, and indeed one party to the meeting believed 
agreement had been reached. In view of his contribution it seems 
the developments between the two middle management teams were 
perceived as a threat by the senior manager who took steps to 
reverse them. The nature of this threat is explored in the follow­
ing section.
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Rationales for Management Action
The basis of the conflict about managing expenditure reductions 
revealed by contributions made during the intervention reported 
above was the differing perceptions of the rationale for manager­
ial action. These differences are represented diagramatically 
along two axes:
Axis 1: Value rationale for action
'will' ^ ------------ :------------------------ ► 'will n o t 1
Action reflects personal, professional or 
political values.
Axis 2: Operational rationale for action
'can' ^ -------------------------------------- ►  'cannot'
Action depends on contextual features.
The nature of these features and the extent to which they are 
present determines how far management decisions about reductions 
can be operationalised. Combining these two axes produces 
Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3 
PERCEPTIONS OF ACTION
Value rationale for action
will will not
(A) (B)can
Operational
rationale
for action
(C)
cannot T
Points A, B and C above represent the following positions:
Point A:
Managers are able and willing to act, whatever the circumstances: 
the 'managers should manage' view. This ideal was, and remained 
the view held by senior management, and by R. and D.C. managers 
until the intervention.
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Point B:
Managers 'can' manage, but 'will not'. This remained the senior 
management perspective on F.W. Managers 1 behaviour. It was the *  
initial view of F.W. managers by their R. and D.C. colleagues 
and by F.W. managers of themselves.
Point C:
Managers are willing to act, and put aside their values to some 
extent, were it not for unresolved operational problems. This 
perspective was emphasised by F.W. Managers during the inter- K  
vention, and was one which R. and D.C. managers subscribed to, 
in contrast to their team leader.
The changes in perceptions can be analysed as follows..
There was a retreat from strong, value-based perceptions and a 
movement towards an emphasis on expedient action by both manage­
ment teams. There^was*also movement towards some measure of 
agreement between the groups. Neither of these changes applied 
to the senior manager whose views went unchallenged by his 
fellow senior manager and whose contribution to the intervention 
was examined above.
The substance of the conflict, and the extent of the differences 
between F.W. managers and senior management is apparent in 
that the former argued in terms of operating, the latter in 
terms of values. They were thus not in dispute about degrees
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of difference on the same matter, but about two different interpret­
ative schemes.
At the senior management level, value differences were an acceptable 
explanation of different responses, whilst differences in contextual 
features were not. With this view of reality, little difference is 
perceived between the circumstances of different management teams 
other than those of values. Whilst values were used to interpret 
the behaviour of others, their use as a basis for action by these 
others is dismissed as being in some way self-indulgent and inapprop­
riate. On the other hand, any acknowledgement of operational 
difficulties raises more serious issues, such as the way a manager 
deals with opposition from his or her staff. Such issues require a 
more sophisticated problem definition and solution strategy to take 
into account and deal with differences in contextual features.
There were clear value differences between the management teams, but 
an explanation based on value differences alone represents an in­
complete definition of their problems when facing hard decisions on 
cutbacks.
During the course of data collection operational difficulties were 
infrequently identified as the basis of differing managerial 
behaviour. The intervention revealed the significance of such 
operational difficulties, and thus shifted the emphasis away from 
a value-based rationale for action.
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Summary
An account of the consulting intervention is provided in this 
chapter, and the data produced from it analysed as a diagnostic 
device to help understand aspects of the management of stringency. 
The significance of agreement on superordinate goals rather than 
the overall level of conflict was found to be important in 
predicting the success of intergroup interventions. In the 
particular instance outlined above, movement towards horizontal 
intergroup harmony was facilitated, though this harmony was 
perceived as a threat and attacked as such by senior management.
Two rationales for management action, 'value' and 'operational', 
were distinguished, and conflicts between them examined. Whilst 
values were an acceptable and easily dismissable explanation of 
behaviour, operational difficulties were not. A solely value- 
based explanation of managerial decision-making represents an 
incomplete analysis. A move from a value to an operationally 
based explanation of reductions management was detailed. The 
significance of sub-culture and context in the effective manage­
ment of stringency is examined in more detail in the following 
chapter.
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CHAPTER VIII
ORGANISATIONAL MONETARISM IN PRACTICE 
l
Introduction
This chapter analyses the concept of organisational monetarism 
introduced in Chapter III, and examines three of the five 
assumptions on which it is based, using data derived from the 
organisation's middle management teams. These three assumptions 
are: an interest in financial management and cost effectiveness; the 
ability to specify, and thereby quantify, task and outcomes; and the 
causal link between financial stringency and innovative behaviour 
which leads to enhanced organisational effectiveness.
The concept is shown to be deficient as a predictive device because 
it does not take into account group sub-cultures and contextual 
features such as stage of development and unionateness. These are 
features peculiar to the internal environment in which different 
groups operate. These features pre-date the advent of stringency 
and influence members' responses to expenditure reductions. These 
influences are more powerful than a behavioural imperative towards 
innovation which is inherent in the concept of organisational monet­
arism. Pre-existing features of managers’ situations are more sign­
ificant because they influence the extent to which managers can 
manage reductions; that is, they determine the ease or difficulty 
with which the values and practice associated with reductions are 
assimilated by the group.
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A number of authors refer to the significance of pre-existing 
organisational features in determining responses to expenditure 
reductions. Thus Whetton (1981) refers to
"deeply entrenched organisational dynamics" (p.91)
in educational institutions; Jick and Murray (1982) identify 
personality, environmental information networks and internal design 
as significant in determining
"preparedness for potential crisis events such as funding 
cut-backs" (p.163).
Rubin (1980) identifies strong leadership and budget flexibility 
as essential, otherwise
"retrenchment cannot be carried out" (p.175).
Nottenburg and Fedor (1983) focus on an organisation's pre-existing 
myth system as a means of interpreting responses to reductions. The 
following analysis introduces some additional features which affect 
reductions management, and examines these at group rather than 
organisational level. This focus on pre-existing organisational 
features as a means of analysing responses to expenditure reductions 
suggests that these be added to the model 'of basic elements in the 
response to organisational decline' which Murray and Jick (1985: 
p.113) propose.
The analysis of members' responses is focussed on 'being able to' 
as well as 'wanting to' manage reductions, using distinctions made by
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Scott (1976) which were reflected in the intervention described in 
Chapter VII. Rather than relying primarily on personal and 
political values of group sub-culture as an explanation, the 
analysis is widened to include the influence of other features , 
especially the extent to which financial control was seen as a 
significant factor in group sub-culture.
The Significance of Finance
Much of the work on expenditure reductions often assumes that the 
problem is essentially financial, although this is not always 
apparent in practice. Finance is defined here as a concern with and 
commitment to budgetary control. A focus on financial matters at 
the time of reductions was apparent to organisational managers. The 
F.W. team leader, who had just begun work with the department when 
stringency became an issue, said
"since I joined, I've been pre-occupied with the financial 
side of things".
A number of F.W. managers remarked, with little enthusiasm, that 
finance was necessarily beginning to play a larger part in 
organisational life. The terms in which expenditure reductions were 
presented to managers (Chapters III and V) were those of budgetary 
and financial control, and the solution to financial stringency 
appeared to lie in financial measures.
Reactions to reductions appear to be, in part, a result of a group's 
response to this financial emphasis and the extent to which the 
group's sub-culture includes the values and practices of financial
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management and control. R and D.C.M.T. had methods for and 
experience of financial management, whilst F.W.M.T. did not.
Financial Practice
Unlike their R. and D.C. colleagues, F.W. managers did not keep a 
regular check of spending during the year. Their team leader 
explained this as follows:
"Monthly spending figures and projections have gone to 
pot in the current crisis. The normal methods of financial 
management became irrelevant".
A team member said they had "never done so", and the F.W.M.T. 
leader's recommendation to his team to keep a regular check of 
spending supports the latter version of F.W. managerial practice. 
Control measures already in existence in R. and D.C.M.T. were thus 
introduced. In R. and D.C.M.T. financial control was a matter of 
course. As one member said
"we try to'pick up the resource position before it's too 
late"
to keep abreast of consumption to prevent overspending. F.W.M.T. 
did not consider spending patterns at any of their meetings. One 
group thus had a tradition of financial management, a system of 
budgetary control and experience of operating it, whereas the other 
did not.
F.W. managers in contrast to R. and D.C. managers experienced 
difficulty allocating resources internally. When one R. and D.C.
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manager overspent by five thousand pounds, another manager found the 
sum from his own budget. Because they found it difficult to agree, 
F.W.M.T. spent some time deciding how home-help, and overtime hours 
were to be divided amongst them, and referred to these protracted 
discussions as indicating a lack of expertise in resource allocation. 
Unlike their R. and D.C. colleagues, individual F.W. managers did 
not have separate budgets for some spending areas, for example, 
fostering. Budgets were joint ones between team members so there 
was a corporate approach to consumption, and agreement and trust 
were important in ensuring an acceptable and fair distribution of 
jointly held resources. All R. and D.C. managers were responsible 
for budgetary control in their sub-units , whereas in F.W. the team 
leader had the responsibility for budgetary control of all members 
of his group.
Different Group Attitudes to Financial Management
The two middle management teams were seen to have different attit­
udes to finance. A senior manager said
MR. and D.C.M.T. have a more positive attitude to finance 
and budget control whereas some F.W. managers think it's 
irrelevant".
There was, said their leader, and in contrast to F.W.M.T.
"a bigger financial component in R. and D.C.M.T."
in relation to the management task. An R. and D.C. middle manager 
said that 'budgetary control' was an area where R. and D.C. differed 
from F.W.; he suggested this was because
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"R. and D.C. have an enormous one (budget to control), F.W. 
don't even have buildings".
F.W. managers ' attitude to financial management was noted by their 
leader when he speculated about devolving responsibility for financ­
ial control to team members. He expected a negative response and 
remarked to his D.M.T. colleagues that F.W.M.T. "will lynch me". 
Though he was not lynched, his offer was not accepted by team 
members on the grounds of lack of manpower, lack of skills, lack of 
interest, timing (it was said by one member to be 'a funny time' to 
introduce the issue), and a perception of the management role which 
excluded financial management.
Lack of Skill
F.W.M.T. perceived themselves as financially unskilled for,as one 
member put it, they were
"naive about money; until recently I had no idea of cost".
Another referred to their 'innocence' in this respect. Yet another 
felt that
"if we take on the job, there'll be more emphasis on and we'll 
be more closely involved in money and finance. We need 
training in budgetary control",
and he referred to 'complex new skills' which
"are more difficult to learn-as-we-go in a time of stringency 
as there's little room for manoeuvre".
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These views were expressed at a team meeting and were supported by 
comments made privately. For example, one member said the group 
was
"financially weak and incompetent"
and in view of their lack of skill the group would have difficulty 
in managing tasks with a financial component competently. A number 
of authors recognise that the extent to which a group can deal with 
the requirements of a new situation depends in part on their skills 
in relation to these requirements. Thus, in writing of reductions 
management in educational institutions, Yarmolinksy (1975) remarked 
that
"faculty are spectacularly lacking in the analytic tools 
necessary to work out major programme changes" (p.63).
Cyert (1975) agrees, and recommends training in the
"underlying discipline of resource allocation skills"
(p.11). '
Differences in Interest in Financial Management
There were various views on the relevance of finance within the 
F.W.M.T. but the majority of members did not appear to be very 
interested. An extreme view was that
"finance and estimates are the last thing I'm interested in",
whilst another manager said
"finance is not given much weight, I try to remember but I 
forget".
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Initially it may appear that a psychological model, utilising 
concepts such as denial and avoidance, or Fink et al's (1971) 
notion of defensive retreat, would be useful in analysing this 
data. Such concepts would help to explain the above attitudes 
as avoidance mechanisms for coping with the unacceptable. However, 
a more productive analysis may be derived from two alternative 
concepts: experience and opposition. Lack of interest and/or 
competence was firstly linked to the groups' past experience of 
resource plenty, and secondly to an opposition which was drawn 
between professionally and financially based decisions.
Past Experience of Resource Management
In the past F.W.M.T. enjoyed an abundance of resources; they 'had 
massive resources'. A senior manager remarked that until recently 
F.W.M.T. had enjoyed the 'lions share' and 'endless' departmental 
resources; on the other hand R. and D.C. were the 'poor relations'; 
they were 'starved of resources'. There was no external control 
from councillors and one F.W. manager said
"the message in the past has been spend as much as you like; 
to hell with limits; the Council will pay up".
Another said
"for some time there have been few limits, there's been a lot 
of money around. It was easy to get a video and a reel to 
reel tape. I'd said I wanted one or the other but they said 
there's enough for both. The Council encouraged overspending, 
307o, 407.; there were no complaints, overspending was regarded 
as a success".
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Overspending was justified on the basis of Council policy:
"some areas have always been overspent because of the 
Council's policy on waiting lists",
and
"fostering and agency placements have never been subject 
to control".
Budgetary control was then a foreign concept to F.W. managers who 
had had the experience of resource abundance; few, or no controls 
on overspending; and the expectation of more money if they did.
As their team leader put it
"F.W.M.T. is used to making difficult decisions with individual 
cases not with resources".
The influence of the past is used by a number of authors, for example
Scott (1974), Green (1974), Boulding (1975), Whetton (1980:a and b),
and Jick and Murray (1982), to account for the absence of a theory 
and practice of managing resource stringency. For example, Whetton 
(1980:a) makes a point that
"organisational theories and research accurately reflect 
prevailing organisational reality" (p.579).
There has been organisational decline during the period of general 
growth, which Glassberg (1978) refers to as the
"generally rising pattern of public expenditure" (p.325).
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but as Scott (1976) and Levine (1978) point out, this has been 
regarded as anomalous or as periods of consolidation. Decline 
management has not permeated the mainstream of organisational 
theory and practice.
Because research has been carried out in organisations that were 
expanding and this was the norm, the problems highlighted were 
those which related to, or resulted from growth. Boulding (1975) 
believes that
"at a practical level our institutions and ways of thinking 
have survived because they were adapted to an age of rapid 
growth" (p.8).
As a corollary to this , some authors point out that the theory 
and practice which developed during this period is inappropriate 
to standstill or decline. For example Perry (1972) and Scott
(1974) suggest systems theory, which ascribes decline to old age 
or malfunctioning, is unable to explain decline due to financial 
stringency. Perhaps the most serious problem
"is that many skills that were highly desirable during the 
last thirty years may well not be needed in the next thirty 
years" (Boulding: 1975: p.8).
Similarly a number of authors refer to organisational development 
techniques, particularly those which concern managing change and 
fostering co-operation, as being predicated on the availability of 
slack resources. In the absence of slack resources, such practices 
it is argued, (for example Levine: 1978, and Whetton: 1980:a and b) 
become less relevant, and consensus building solutions of the win/
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Awin variety which are feasible in abundant times, are often no 
longer possible in stringency, when one organisational group can 
only win at the expense of another. This, though, is not invariably 
the case, as the intervention described in the previous chapter 
indicates. Generally, the literature suggests that previous experience 
of management growth cannot simply be reversed in decline but that 
new skills are needed.
Conflict between 'Financial' or 'Professional* Decisions
F.W. managers' views of financial management are also revealed by 
the perceived conflict between decisions based on professional as 
opposed to financial criteria. F.W. managers said
"people in the area should not be guided by costs, but what 
is best for the kids";
"Professional judgements cannot be related to money but how 
it feels";
"Money and efficiency terms are not appropriate from some 
decisions".
Another F.W. manager drew a distinction between 'professional 
decisions' and 'the rules of finance and accounting', from which 
it appeared that a professional decision was one which excluded any 
financial element. This nicely illustrates the difference between 
formal and substantive rationalities noted by Weber (1968): the 
latter, substantive rationality, may consider the
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"purely formal rationality of calculating in monetary terms 
as of quite secondary importance or even as fundamentally 
inimicable to their respective ultimate ends" (p.86).
The distinction between professional and financial values is also 
noted by Webb (1979):
"Professional values have allowed and do allow many field- 
workers to divorce 'professional' decisions from consider­
ations of resource allocation. The commitment to meet 
needs does not readily recognise resource questions as 
pertinent or legitimate" (p.102).
There was also present an unstated fear that the financial element 
might become the overriding criteria for decisions on client care. 
One F.W. manager complained that with stringency,
"we're constantly justifying decisions in financial terms".
This fear is noted by a number of authors including Cheit (1971). 
Wilburn and Worman (1980) term this efficiency mongering: to save 
money regardless of the effects on performance.
F.W. managers were not alone in being uninterested and unfamiliar 
with financial management matters, or in perceiving conflict between 
professionally based and financially based decisions. Some authors 
recognise that their prescriptions for managing reductions may not 
meet with an enthusiastic welcome, because of the unfamiliarity of 
the concepts which-underlie their prescriptions and the way in which 
such concepts are valued. Concepts such as 'finance' and 'product­
ivity' are often seen as being in opposition to professional goals. 
For example Cyert (1978) in relation to managing universities of 
constant or decreasing size maintains that
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"in addition, financial criteria must be given a heavy weight — 
in developing criteria for eliminating activities, and such 
an emphasis is contrary to academic thinking" (p.344).
Cazalis (1979) , in the context of managing austerity in the 
university sector, qualifies his suggestion of introducing cost 
control and productivity concepts by pointing out that these are 
foreign and suspect and seen as irrelevant by the teaching 
profession :
"They seem to be taboo, on bhe grounds that productivity, for 
example, conflicts with quality and creativity" (p.41),
The hardest job, he suggests, will be the introduction of these 
concepts and convincing others of their relevance, but he does not 
offer solutions. Judge (1978) too points out that
"efficiency has not been the most familiar concept in the 
vocabulary of personal social services in recent years"
(p.153).
and Cheit (1973) makes a similar point, believing that concepts such 
as budget plans and control devices were regarded as
"satisfying some remote bureaucratic requirement" (p.60).
Yet both Schatz (1975) and Schick (1978) point to the importance of 
financial management concepts being 'accepted' or 'internalised' if 
they are to be effective, and Schatz (1975) reports that
"failure to seek acceptance (from those involved) often 
leads to failure of financial management devices" (p.130).
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Changes in technique need the approval of those affected, and 
this has to be actively pursued, rather than assumed. For Schick, 
(1978) internalisation
’’where doing it (financial control) the proper way is accepted 
as a routine matter" (p.515)
is significant for the practice of financial control. A major 
stumbling block to the adoption of ^ organisational monetarism is 
the level of familiarity and legitimacy which such concepts are 
seen to have within the worlds to which they are introduced.
In the case of R. and D.C.M.T., for example, financial control was 
already part of their group's sub-culture, whereas F.W.M.T. 
regarded financial management as uninteresting, interfering with 
their professional practice, and (based on their experience in more 
plentiful times) of no concern to them.
The less familiar such concepts are, the less they are regarded as 
relevant, and the less likely they are to be accepted or acted upon. 
Unfamiliarity results in perceived irrelevance, in disinclination 
and rejection. This suggests that responses to stringency are 
based on grounds additional to personal and political values, such as 
how the group views and manages the financial element in the manager's 
role. The assumption of organisational monetarism, that financial 
management is familiar and legitimate, was not supported by the 
behaviour of the F.W.M.T.
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Pattern of Spending
Some managers linked the ease or difficulty with which reductions 
were managed by the two middle management teams to the type of 
resource managed by each team. For example, the R. and D.C. team 
leader maintained that reductions were
"emotional in F.W. as it's mainly people: most money goes on 
salaries and to save money you have to leave these vacancies 
open".
Hill (1979) confirms this by maintaining that social work 'time' 
is the main resource controlled by F.W. R. and D.C. on the other 
hand, as an establishment based service, spend money on the upkeep 
of these establishments. An R. and D.C. manager recommended 
reductions in for example, garden maintenance, something which he 
referred to as non-essential. It was suggested by F.W. Managers -). 
that it is easier to reduce spending which does not involve staff 
who deliver a professional service.
Size of Reductions
Given the significance placed on the size of reductions in analysing 
managerial responses at the macro-organisational level, (Murray and 
Jick: 1985; Gill and Pratt: 1986) the relevance of this variable in 
relation to the managers at the micro-level is considered. Size in 
the abstract, divorced from managers' meanings was not significant, 
whereas size of reductions as an evaluative and comparative device 
w a s .
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Size of reductions was used by a minority of managers who co-operated 
to justify their actions, and criticise the response of F.W. 
colleagues. Reference was made to the level of reductions not being 
high enough to warrant resistance activity: these managers made a 
judgment about the level of cuts above which they would cease to 
co-operate. Chapters VI and VII made clear that current reductions 
were not seen to have breached the limit, which was not specified 
in monetary terms, but in terms of their effects, such as closing 
homes. When this limit was reached it was implicit that action, 
such as resistance in various forms, would be considered.
Interestingly, R. and D.C. managers followed instructions to draw 
up recommendations in their division over and above the minimum 
required by the Council, and did so without difficulty. One manager 
proposed closing his section down altogether. Given this group's 
management role was largely defined by supervisors, it seems likely 
they would have co-operated with reductions of significantly 
increased size and would only consider forms of resistance if 
reductions were major and led, for example, to all homes being closed. 
For an establishment based division such a result would clearly 
involve radical restructuring.
F.W. managers, on the other hand, objected to the instructions to 
recommend reductions and manage their effects. It was the reduct­
ions of expenditure rather than the size of these, that was signific­
ant, and opposition was expressed in these terms. F.W.M.T. continued 
to oppose reductions, though in a different form, even after
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councillors had increased their resources; thus an increase in 
resources did not lead to co-operation but continued opposition 
in the form of withdrawal. It is not therefore possible to 
causally connect size of reduction with managerial response.
The effect of differential reductions is now considered.
In Chapter VI we saw that F.W. managers interpreted 'losing more' 
resources as reflecting a negative evaluation of their work 
behaviour by decision makers. This resulted in a negative evaluat­
ion of the managers' skill in obtaining resources through 'blaming' 
and 'scapegoating'.
Size of reductions was used to compare the resultant task of 
managers who received more or less resources; there was a recognition 
during the intervention described in the previous chapter that 
greater cuts resulted in a more difficult management task. Greater 
reductions as a spur to innovation was not raised at any point.
The size of reductions was referred to indirectly and comparatively 
- 'more' and 'less', 'better' and 'worse' - rather than by reference 
to specific sums, such as percentages of total spending. Comparisons 
were made publicly and privately with the past when there was an 
absence of stringency, with future expectations, and with the 
allocation of the other division. Indeed it appears that the 
absolute size of cuts stated in particular sums and percentages were 
less significant to members than comparative amounts between 
divisions.
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Thus size reduction was interpreted as an evaluative device. 
Differential reductions resulted in a more or less difficult 
management task, and were referred to in comparative not absolute 
terms. Size of reductions was infrequently referred to as a 
rationale for action.
Differences in Team Tasks and Effects of Behaviour
A minority of managers mentioned the extent to which divisional 
tasks were specifiable and tangible, and the effect this had on 
the management of stringency. In this case there was some support 
for the view that there were differences between F.W. and R. and D.C. 
in respect of environmental pressures and task outcome specificity. 
F.W. operated a community based, generic and universal service, 
whilst R. and D.C. was establishment based, providing primarily 
physical care services to specific, selected and restricted client 
groups. Aspects of these differences are considered below.
Differences in Environmental Control
The F.W. M.T. were less favourably positioned to control their 
environment than their R. and D.C. colleagues as F.W. occupied a 
boundary position with the client environment: what Hill (1979) 
termed the 'Social Services Department's front line' (p.116).
They dealt primarily with client-presented problems and in addition, 
performed a client filtering service for R. and D.C.. Clients made 
initial contact with the F.W. divison, and were then passed on to 
R. and D.C. if the matter could not be resolved. Whilst neither
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group could predict the number of clients requiring help, a limited 
number of places in establishments were available and limits were 
imposed by R. and D.C.. F.W. were not able to define such limits 
so readily,and accordingly R. and D.C. had a less ambiguous and 
more easily defined task.
Differences Between Groups in Task Specificity
F.W. were less easily able and committed than R. and D.C. to specify­
ing their goals and usually defined them in very general terms such 
as meeting unmet needs. They showed a distinct lack of enthusiasm 
for defining the task in any detail, and the mention of goal setting 
provoked a majority response of 'Oh God, not that'. R. and D.C.'s 
task of providing physical care to specific client groups was 
necessarily less diffuse. As an R. and D.C. manager said
"For F.W. it is difficult to point to what they're doing 
whereas R. and D.C. have bodies (clients in care) and 
bricks and mortar (establishments). If it's a choice 
between a higher vacancy element in F.W. or closing a 
home, I know which they (councillors) would choose".
Because one group could point to tangible and easily quantifiable 
evidence of their activities they were better protected from the 
imposition of reductions by managers who had to decide between the 
tangible and the intangible. The F.W. team leader suggested that 
a vague task was ripe for reductions ('community work: a vague 
area - ideal for cuts'). In this way members linked task clarity 
and justification of resources: the more tangible a task was, the 
more justifiable it became and the less vulnerable to cuts.
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F.W. could less easily point to the results of their activities in 
relation to resource consumption than R. and D.C.. R. and D.C. 
could refer to 'bodies' or people in care, as a visible and 
quantifiable result or outcome. They could, for example, point 
to the buildings themselves as a product of their work, and did so 
by regularly showing councillors round them. On the other hand, 
the clients of F.W. were out in the community and 'results' were 
less easy to specify, particularly in supportive and preventative 
work. For example, that a social work intervention prevented a 
non-accidental injury (child battering) is difficult to substantiate 
or quantify. This might account for F.W. managers' reaction to the 
quantification of results. In the words of their team leader
"F.W. has no review, no criteria, no success measurement.
Any questioning of these areas (fostering, community work), 
provokes an almost Pavlovian response: it's seen as an 
attack. There's no question, the attitude is it's here, 
it's good and it stays".
Judge (1978) makes the same point
"any attempt to measure, define or even comment on it's 
(social work) effectiveness is usually open to everything 
from cautious qualification to instant hostility" (p.175)
but, as he also points out, such a process of definition and 
measurement is necessary to
"demonstrate productive efficiency" (p.175).
The nature of social work was ill defined as professional social 
work skills such as counselling and support are difficult to 
quantify and present in terms which readily demonstrate their 
effectiveness.
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Additionally R. and D.C. could justifiably claim to be working to 
capacity should their establishments be full, but no similar limit 
could so easily be placed on the number of clients F.W. could be 
expected to deal with. Accepting the benefits of F.W.'s activities 
involved a greater element of trust on the part of decision makers 
than was the case with R. and D.C.' s work.
The ability to specify criteria and show results from divisional 
tasks is of assistance in managing reductions for it facilitates 
decision making by managers who have to make hard choices , and 
provides justification for spending and protection of an area of 
work. Conversely, it seems that the less easy to specify tasks and 
outcomes are, the more vulnerable they are to reductions.
Ease of Measurement
One of the assumptions of organisational monetarism with its 
emphasis on financial management is that quantification and 
measurement is unproblematic and objective. Authors such as Bogue 
(1972), Balderstone (1972), Cyert (1975 and 1978), Self (1980), and 
Sizer (1981) have all stressed the importance of developing 
performance measures of tasks in stringent times. However, they 
recognise that there are difficulties. So for example, Cyert
(1975), whilst stressing the importance of quantifiable methods of 
evaluating sub-units , confesses that
"the difficulty lies in defining quality of performance"
(p. 9).
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Hamblin and Adams (1983) attempted to develop criteria of supervis­
ory effectiveness in the public and private sector; they concluded
"there was little or no agreement amongst managers and 
supervisors on how (if at all) supervisory effectiveness 
could be assessed" (p.31).
They point to the
"difficulty inherent in trying to define and measure what 
is meant by the terms effectiveness and efficiency" (p.21).
Balderstone (1972) too raises the many serious problems of measuring 
and interpreting the quality and quantity of educational input and, 
as he says
"not much progress has been made in measuring educational 
output or educational quality" (p.24).
This stems from the difficulty mentioned by authors such as Frances 
and Stone (1956), Bogue (1972), Ginsberg (1975), Mitnick (1978), 
Starbuck et al (1978), and Bozeman and Slusher (1979), that it is 
less easy to quantify information which is variously characterised 
as subtle, diffuse, subjective, less tangible, qualitative or 
indirect, and such information may therefore be ignored. For example 
Gill (1981) suggests that
"easily quantifiable goals may become primary goals and those 
which are more difficult to specify may become secondary" (p.8),
and Ullman (1975) states that
"we can count bodies but we cannot readily measure the 
quality of what they know" (p.145).
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Thus, whilst performance measures are necessary in stringent times, 
the difficulty inherent in measuring qualitative tasks results in an 
emphasis on those which are more readily quantifiable.
Having examined how the two management groups were differentially 
affected by the sub-cultural feature of financial management, and 
the contextual features of environmental control, task visibility 
and measurement, two further contextual features are now considered: 
stage of professional development, and unionateness.
Stage of Professional Development
F.W. was recognised as being at a more advanced stage of 
professional development than R. and D.C. in that they had a longer 
professional history and more expertise. A function of development 
is the creation of awareness of what should be provided, and how 
this should be achieved. This awareness will be higher within a 
developed service. Reducing such a service in stringency will 
present a greater problem for managers as there will be expectations 
of further development and growth. A group which is more 
professionally developed will experience greater difficulty in 
reconciling professional standards with resource reductions.
Unionateness
F.W. and R. and D.C. were also differentiated by unionateness. F.W. 
was highly unionised, whilst R. and D.C. was not. Management of 
reductions was more difficult for F.W. managers because union
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instructions operated in the F.W. division in three respects. 
Managers were faced with managing a resistant and cohesive workforce 
who, for example, refused to cover work left undone when vacancies 
were left unfilled. Managers were union members themselves, and 
were bound by union instructions , though the nature of these was 
disputed; in effect these instructions inhibited their involvement 
in the reductions management delegated by senior management.
Finally staff loyalty and co-operation, and managers' legitimacy in 
the eyes of staff was seen to depend on managers following the union 
line. (These matters were referred to in detail in Chapter VI).
For R. and D.C. none of this applied: levels of unionateness amongst 
staff and managers were low, and thus the union's instructions had 
no significant effect.
The inhibiting effect of union activity is noted by Levine et al 
(1981). They identify 'public service unions' (p 626), as one of 
three institutional actors in the management of local government 
resource decline and point to the level of union activity, which 
they term politicisation, as being one of the two significant 
features in assisting or inhibiting decline management. The other 
feature is centralised control. Union activity, they tell us, 
inhibits cutback management by reducing the administrator's power to 
act. McTighe (1979) also refers to the union as being an influential 
actor in the management of decline.
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Task Operationalisation
Not all managers then were able to operationalise the reductions 
task with the same degree of ease. Because of the differential 
effects of the organisational factors outlined above, some managers 
found the tasks of reductions more problematic. A number of 
managers said that if R. and D.C.M.T. can do it (manage reductions) 
why cannot F.W.M.T.. This implied that both groups were in the same 
position and that F.W.M.T. could manage reductions if it wanted to, 
but was not motivated to do so.
Scott (1976) makes the same distinction between 'wanting to' and 
'being able to', and asks rhetorically
"Can management deal with decline .... of course it can. The 
issue is not being unable to deal with decline, but wanting to 
deal with it" (p.56).
This chapter and the previous one has made clear that certain pract­
ical factors are influential in determining participation in or 
ability to manage stringency and these are over and above personal 
and political values.
Though personal and political values were the more popular explan­
ation of management behaviour, it is suggested that F.W.M.T. would 
have to undergo radical change in comparison to their R. and D.C. 
colleagues to learn and adopt financial control skills; to define 
the social work task; and to manage their staff.
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In an attempt to integrate conceptually the elements of the decline 
process, Murray and Jick (1985) suggest a framework of four 
elements: problem definition process; substantive decisions; implem­
entation process; and outcomes. The model is iterative as the 
authors are interested in the insights which accrue from linking 
rather than isolating these components. The significance of 
contextual and sub-cultural features in the decline process was 
addressed above and this component may with advantage be added to 
the Murray and Jick (1985) framework, thus increasing it's utility.
Stringency Induced Innovation
The concept of organisational monetarism would be expected to 
predict that stringency would encourage positive innovation even if 
only in accepting the job of managing expenditure reductions, and 
defining the social work task in this context.
Managers did not regard resource reductions as stimulating innovat­
ion for, although changes'were noted, members' involvement in 
reductions was generally regarded as having few of the positive 
outcomes predicted by organisational monetarism. Differences of 
opinion on the matter were more concerned with differing degrees of 
negative impact felt by members. Chapter VI contained details of 
conflictual changes at various levels in the organisation, noted 
particularly by F.W. managers. The way managers regarded the future 
is now considered.
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Pessimistic Views of the Future
The future was not regarded with optimism for anticipated 
innovations were expressed in terms of halting or slowing down 
developments, either on a general, or on a specific level. Even the 
Director, who adopted a fairly complacent stance, said that
"things would get worse",
and his view was supported by middle managers. For example, one 
F.W. manager said reductions
"means a total block on new initiatives. It will be worse 
next year",
and another said
"Its the beginning of the end for Social Services".
A less extreme, and generalised view was presented by another F.W. 
manager
"I don't see my role as justifying a cut in services and I see 
more conflictual relations with senior management especially 
with our team leader; we're not talking about dismantling of the 
service; it's a change in ethos".
F.W. managers believed their jobs were becoming less innovative and 
developmental and more maintenance orientated, with, as one of their 
number put i t ,
"a growing expenditure of energy on trying to cope with the 
effects of cuts".
R. and D.C.M.T. felt the same for as one said
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"cuts have had little professional impact at the moment, but 
if there's another round, it's bound to affect and alter 
practice. We were beginning to pull together a professional 
strategy. Now professional growth has been stunted, its been 
slowed down".
Even the member who was in favour of reductions mentioned their 
negative effect on the physical conditions in which he and his 
section worked;
"no heat in the building and stone floors",
and these would not be improved, he said, because of the reductions 
in expenditure. No one offered a positive view along the lines 
suggested by those theorists quoted in Chapter III who support 
organisational monetrism.
These theorists identified a causal connection between financial 
stringency and innovation, but were not concerned with managers' 
perceptions of such a connection. Absence of such perceptions on 
the part of managers in the organisation studied casts doubt on how 
far the theory of organisational monetarism is rooted in practice. 
This absence suggests that causation is more complex and less direct 
than predicted , and that intervening variables of sub-culture and 
context need to be taken into account in order to understand 
managerial responses to stringency.
Summary
Three assumptions of organisational monetarism were examined: a 
facility for financial management; quantifiability of task;
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and positive innovation induced by fewer resources. The behaviour 
of one organisation's middle management teams was compared. The 
sub-cultural feature of financial management experience, and the 
contextual features of pattern of spending, task arrangements, stage 
of professional development, and unionateness were considered.
These features influenced the extent to which reductions management 
was acceptable at both a theoretical and practical level. The 
acceptance of the financial management task depended on the 
perceived familiarity and relevance it enjoyed in a group, whilst 
the feasibility of justifying and quantifying activities depended on 
the specificity of the activity. Less specific activities were more 
at risk from decision makers who were obliged to choose between the 
less and the more tangible. Pattern of spending,stage of profess­
ional development and degree of unionateness also influenced the 
ease or difficulty with which the reductions task could be managed.
Managers had negative perceptions of the innovations which resulted 
from reductions, and the assumptions inherent in the concept of 
organisational monetarism were therefore found to be open to 
question. The concepts of efficiency and cost effectiveness were 
not automatically accepted as relevant or even identified as an 
effect of financial stringency. This suggests that organisational 
monetarism does not provide an adequate means of understanding 
managerial responses to stringency. An alternative explanation, 
which focusses on the influence of features of sub-culture and 
context as they differentially affect management teams, provides a 
more useful means of analysing the variety of management responses.
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CHAPTER IX 
THE MANAGEMENT OF DECLINE: A CONCLUSION
CHAPTER IX
THE MANAGEMENT OF DECLINE: A CONCLUSION
Introduction
This concluding chapter reviews the contribution to knowledge, 
identifies areas for further research, and outlines the limitation 
of this work.
After setting out the major contributions the thesis makes , and 
indicating limitations, a model of managerial responses to expendit­
ure is presented. This model provides a structure for the rest of 
the chapter as elements of it are elaborated by reference to organis­
ational data. These are used to examine relevant theories critically 
and as a basis for indicating further research.
Explanations of managerial responses which focus on characteristics 
of reductions as a threat from the environment are examined and 
found to be inadequate. As an example, the concept of organisational 
monetarism, and the assumptions on which it is based, is elaborated. 
The task of recommending reductions is briefly described. Two sets 
of organisational factors , sub-cultures and contextual features , 
are then identified as they apply to specific management teams.
The significance of these factors in providing managers with a means 
of managing the reductions task is then described. The degree of 
fit between the organisational factors and the reductions task is
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explored in terms of the extent of threat to established practices 
and values. The utility of rationality as an explanatory device 
is then examined.
The extent to which threat was routinised or resisted is apparent 
from the different responses that managers exhibited. These are 
described by reference to the two sets of organisational factors.
The results of managerial responses to stringency are then presented 
as costs and benefits to the organisation. In particular, cost, 
conflict, control, and innovation, are examined. Finally the 
management of diversity, a significant managerial task in times of 
stringency, is considered, using data from an intervention designed 
to resolve intergroup conflict.
The major contribution is to the theory of managing expenditure 
reductions. Within this broad theme the influence of management 
sub-cultures is considered. Field data was obtained from three 
management teams in one Social Services Department: senior 
management (the Director's Management Team or D.M.T.) and midddle 
management (Field Work Management Team or F.W.M.T. and Residential 
and Day Care Management Team or R. and D.C.M.T.).
It was discovered that whilst all managers perceived expenditure 
reductions as a threat, some routinised this threat by accepting 
and operationalising reductions (R. and D.C.M.T.), whilst others 
responded as to a crisis either by avoiding the issue (D.M.T.), or
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by voicing overt resistance (F.W.M.T.). The analysis focusses on 
why threat was interpreted as a crisis by some managers, but not 
by others, and thus on what determined different managerial responses.
Hermann (1963) identifies three factors which contribute to our 
perception of an event as a crisis: limited response time; the
unexpected nature of the event; and the threat it presents to deeply 
held values, which Hermann terms priority values. Managers described 
the event of expenditure reductions as unexpected; all managers had a 
limited response time. Initially it appeared that different responses 
could therefore be analysed in terms of degree of perceived threat to 
priority values. This interpretation was popular amongst the organis­
ation’s managers, and coincided with the initial focus on organisational 
sub-cultures.
It became apparent that whilst managerial values were an important 
factor in determining responses, they were an insufficient basis from 
which to analyse the empirical data. Additional organisational 
factors were also significant, because such factors were seen to inhibit 
or facilitate reductions management at an operational level. By 
identifying these significant factors, the thesis contributes to the 
theory of expenditure reductions management.
The analysis shows a causal relationship between internal factors of 
the organisational sub-units within which managers operate, and the 
degree to which reductions management is routinised or problematic. 
Sub-unit factors identified were management team sub-cultures and
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contextual features. As these factors differed for each management 
team, so the degree to which they were able to assimilate the 
phenomena of expenditure reductions varied. By exposing the variety 
of significant factors which influenced action, our understanding of 
the meaning managers attach to reductions, and their responses,is 
expanded. Effective reductions management can thus involve radical 
change, in respect of a number of factors in addition to the narrow 
focus on financial control found in some of the literature (Dworak: 
1975; Green: 1974; Ogden: 1978; Pondy: 1964).
At the same time the thesis elaborates the diversity of managerial 
response to resource pressure, and the rationalities which underpin 
this. In particular, attention is drawn to the defensive strategies 
of avoidance, resistance and withdrawal. Diversity of response to 
stringency within organisations, and its implications, has not 
previously been explored to any great extent. In general, literature 
in this area has an organisational focus. Theory derived from this 
level is tested and elaborated using data from the micro-level, the 
major focus of which is accounts by managers themselves. It became 
apparent that certain predicted responses such as a move towards 
strategic rationality, did not in fact occur, and that unpredicted 
ones such as withdrawal did.
The analysis is limited in that the research took place in the initial 
period when expenditure reductions became a management issue and was 
conducted over a period of months rather than years. Thus the signif­
icance of resource pressure long-term is not considered.
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A focus on one organisation as a source of data raises the issue 
of whether the resultant analysis is generalisable. Whilst the 
data-base is limited, the analytical categories abstracted from it 
can be used in analyses of other organisations. Additionally the 
process of integrating theory based on the management of stringency 
elsewhere indicates that the experience of Social Service managers 
is by no means unique. Generalisations flow from elaborating 
analytical categories which are of general utility, and by establish­
ing links at a theoretical level with other studies.
Below in Figure 4 is an explanatory model of the organisational 
factors which influenced managerial interpretations of, and responses 
to, the environmental threat presented by financial stringency. The 
resultant organisational costs and benefits are also indicated.
This model provides the structure for the remaining part of this 
chapter which examines each numbered box of the figure sequentially.
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MANAGERIAL RESPONSES TO DECLINE
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(1) ENVIRONMENTAL THREAT
The environmental threat of resource scarcity has been used 
to predict managerial responses. This perspective is based 
on the concept of organisational monetarism. Characteristics 
of the threat - source (political or rational, according to 
Levine (1978)), size, and speed - have also been examined as 
a means of understanding managerial behaviour. These analyses 
and their usefulness are examined below.
Organisational Monetarism
The concept is made explicit using theories and prescriptions 
for managing organisations suffering financial stringency.
An undefined version of organisational monetarism is found in 
much of the literature and figures more explicitly in political 
statements at ministerial level. The economic concept of 
monetarism emphasises the benefits of restricting the growth 
of the money supply (Donaldson: 1982; Harvey: 1983). Trans­
posed to organisations, a positive and causal connection is 
predicted between reduced resources and innovation in the 
direction of efficiency and cost effectiveness.
A number of authors support the prediction that financial 
stringency leads to organisational benefits. Such benefits 
include: the redeployment of resources (Biller: 1980), 
institutional reviews (Bogue: 1972), new and improved manager­
ial practices (Cheit: 1971, 1973). Stringency can also improve
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decision-making (March and Cohen: 1974); improve budgetary 
processes (Stewart: 1980); and lead to positive change and 
innovation (McTighe: 1979).
Five assumptions of organisational monetarism are identified 
and examined below: an orientation towards financial management; 
ease of task specification and measurement; rational decision­
making (what Weber (1968) terms 'formal rationality'); positive 
innovation; and zero cost. The data does not support the over­
riding importance of a tougher environment represented by 
resource scarcity as a determinant of managerial responses.
Other authors have focussed on specific characteristics of 
financial stringency as an explanatory device. These are now 
considered. Political and rational sources of decline are identif­
ied by Levine (1978) and Jick and Murray (1982) as a means of 
predicting whether managers will respond rationally or politically. 
Decline for all managers in the Social Services Department resulted 
from changing Government policy. The Local Authority responded 
by requiring reductions in departmental budgets. Though the 
political source of decline was the same, managers' responses 
were significantly varied as were the rationalities used to 
justify them. Thus the source of decline does not assist our 
analysis of the data.
Murray and Jick (1985), and Gill and Pratt (1986), refine the 
concept of organisational monetarism. They identify size and
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speed of reductions as significant in determining whether 
managers choose the efficiency or the effectiveness response 
(Whetton: 1981). The former involves doing less of the same; 
the latter, doing something different or innovating. Both sets 
of authors predict that only large speedy reductions will result 
in innovation, because only reductions of crisis proportions 
will stimulate change.
S
i
Yet crisis does not invariably result in innovation (Ford: 1981; 
Hermann: 1963; Staw et a l ; 1981). The data demonstrates that 
one management group which perceived the threat of reductions as 
a crisis was also the group which responded, not by innovating, 
but by voicing overt opposition, and then withdrawing from 
reduction-related activities. This study indicates no connection 
between perceived crisis and innovation.
Typologies of reduction characteristics are potentially useful 
for research at the macro-level. In addition to the two 
categories used by Gill and Pratt (1986) - slow erosion and 
dramatic decrease - the thesis identifies a third one. The 
organisation experienced a sudden reduction in resources but 
this was not large, at three and a half per cent in absolute 
terms. It was a sudden, but incremental reduction.
Furthermore, a fourth category can be identified, where dramatic 
or large reductions take place over a number of years. Whether
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reductions exhibiting these characteristics occur and whether 
managers respond to them by innovation, increased efficiency or 
resistance would be an interesting area for further research.
The management task was to recommend reductions which had the 
least effect on clients, by examining all departmental spending 
areas and controlling spending in line with the allocated budget. 
There were to be no 'sacred cows' and future service developments 
would depend on the re-allocation of existing funds rather than 
additional monies.
Organisational Factors
Two sets of organisational factors influenced the managers' 
interpretation of the expenditure reductions.task: the sub-culture 
of their respective management teams, and features of the context 
within which each functioned. Whilst all managers regarded 
expenditure reductions as a threat, the extent to which threat 
was perceived as a crisis, or was routinised, depended on the 
fit between the sets of factors referred to above and the expendit­
ure reductions task.
The impact of internal organisational factors on the implementation 
of reductions is noted by a minority of authors, such as Jick and 
Murray (1982), McTighe (1979), Rubin (1980), and Whetton (1981).
As they worked at the macro-organisational level, they do not 
differentiate the influences such features have on organisational
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sub-units, in respect of degree or direction. The thesis 
examines both these areas at the micro-organisational level 
and, furthermore, identifies additional significant features.
Finally, the framework for analysing decline management 
suggested by Murray and Jick (1985) is expanded by identifying 
an additional component, that of pre-existing organisational 
factors ,. as a pre-requisite for understanding managerial 
definitions of decline.
The two sets of organisational factors - managerial sub-cultures 
and contextual features - are now considered.
(2) MANAGEMENT TEAM SUB-CULTURES
The analysis of culture in organisations is taken to a greater 
level of specificity than is usually found in the literature by 
discovering and examining the nature of management team sub­
cultures, and in particular the influence these had on the 
implementation of expenditure reductions.
A view of cultural variety within organisations is in contradict­
ion to the monolithic view of organisational cultures presented 
by Handy (1976), Jaques (1957), and Pettigrew (1979). Whilst 
there are references to sub-culture and group culture in, for 
example, Bennis (1969), and Silverzweig and Allen (1976), these 
remain unexamined except at the most general level. Similarly, 
what few references there are to culture in the literature on managing
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decline (Hirschhorn and Associates: 1983) focus on the organisat­
ion as a whole.
Sub-culture is defined as a group’s typifications or 'taken for 
granted' ways of thinking and working which need to be known, but 
not invariably accepted, as a pre-requisite for acceptance as a 
competent member.
The hypothesis that management teams have their own individual 
sub-culture was supported. Five levels of specificity were used 
by members to identify group sub-cultures. Cultural maintainance 
was examined. The mechanics for suppressing intra group differ­
ences were exposed, and the means by which the group reinforced 
its view of itself and out-group members. This was done via 
the collective construction of routine and critical issues 
(Pettigrew: 1979); accounts of interactions with non-members; and 
by the process of collective behaviour exhibited at team meetings.
The dimensions of a group's sub-culture were used by its members 
to describe, explain and justify their actions both to each other 
and to outsiders, and to account for the actions of non-members. 
Sub-cultural norms provided a guide to action and attitudes , and 
a means of decision making.
The thesis thus contributes to our understanding of members' 
behaviour by examining how groups attach meaning to events, using 
collective typifications. The analysis is then taken to a more
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specific level by showing how cultures are identified and 
maintained.
The thesis identifies three aspects of a group sub-culture as 
significant in influencing managers' responses to decline: the 
manner or style in which managers carry out their function, the 
definition of the manager's role, and the task areas.
Management Style
Field Work (F.W.) managers saw themselves for the most part as 
democratic, consultative and participative in their relations with 
fellow team members and with subordinates. Independence character­
ised their relations with senior management. Residential and Day 
Care (R. and D.C.) managers were perceived as directing in their 
relations with staff, and as accepting direction from above. They 
saw themselves as both giving and accepting direction. Action was 
more important than consultation, whereas Field Work managers were 
perceived as more consultative and theoretical, rather than 
practical. The D.M.T. was seen as being controlled by their leader 
and indecisive with a focus on short-term rather than strategic 
issues. They followed directions from above, and directed those 
below.
Management Role Definition
In discussing and evaluating behaviour, seven concepts were used: 
realism, responsibility (both to a significant reference group, 
and for a task); values, maturity, caring, emotionalism and
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participation. Significantly different interpretations of the 
manager's role were identified. These were evaluated in terms 
of perceived 'correct' and 'incorrect' managerial behaviour, 
rather than as examples of plurality, or different but equally 
valid action.
Different interpretations of the manager's role revolved around 
who defined reality, managers' values and tasks, and the limits 
of participation in decision making. Senior management defined 
these matters for R. and D.C.M.T.,whereas in F.W.M.T. other 
groups and individuals were regarded as legitimate influences.
As a consequence and because they provided definitions which 
conflicted with those of senior management, F.W. managers were 
less certain of their role than their R. and D.C. colleagues.
Task Area: financial control
Thr organisation's two middle management teams differed in their 
experience of and interest in financial management in general, 
and control in particular. In R. and D.C.M.T. financial control 
was a taken for granted aspect of the group's culture, of which 
they had experience and skills. F.W.M.T. in contrast were 
uninterested in, and unfamiliar with, financial control. This 
resulted from their history of resource abundance, supported 
by Council policy, and a perceived distinction and contradiction 
between financially and professionally based decisions. Unlike 
their R. and D.C. colleagues, they had no responsibility for 
financial control. Thus whilst one group had the financial
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management competence assumed by organisational monetarism, 
the other did not. Thereby, this assumption could not be 
generalised.
The data supports those authors (Cazalis: 1979; Cheit: 1973;
Cyert: 1975) who identify lack of familiarity with, and interest 
in, financial control as a problem for those managing decline.
In addition, the analysis differentiates the extent to which 
this is the case by demonstrating that absence of financial 
control is not an issue for all managers in organisations 
faced with decline.
Only Cyert (1975) suggests how this problem may be overcome 
through participation which leads to the incorporation of 
productivity goals. The pre-supposition of willingness to 
participate was not apparent in the data; the group which 
lacked financial skills and interest also resisted, and then 
withdrew from the task of reductions.
Further research could usefully discover what, if any, steps 
are taken to change managers f attitudes to financial management 
and/or to provide them with financial management skills. It is 
also of interest to speculate on the relation between the two: 
that i s , the extent to which the acquisition of skills changes 
attitudes or attitudes inhibit the acquisition of new skills. 
Similarly, one could question how far managers learn by experience
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of the need for financial control when left without money 
part way through the financial year; or alternatively, whether 
financial managers or administrators who already have the positive 
attitudes and skills, take over the management role, as Cheit 
(1971, 1973) reports. The significance of a professional perspect­
ive to the management of stringency is considered below, under 
'Stage of Professional Development'.
Task Area: strategic planning
Strategic planning was not a significant task for either D.M.T. or 
F.W.M.T.. As we have seen the D.M.T. focussed on short-term, not 
strategic issues. A lack of strategic planning was demonstrated by 
the definition of the reductions task. No priorities were 
indicated, and managers were invited to recommend reductions in 
other departments as well as their own. Similarly F.W.M.T. had 
devised no formal priorities; in fact their aim was to provide a 
universal service. Managerial groups then do not invariably value 
or formulate strategic plans and an unplanned approach influences 
responses to expenditure reductions.
Further research could usefully discover the stage at which the 
significance of strategic planning is accepted and operationalised. 
Additionally it would be interesting to learn how this is achieved. 
Alternatively it would be useful to discover if managers can deal 
with expenditure reductions in the longer term, without devising 
some form of strategy to guide their actions.
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(3) MANAGEMENT TEAM CONTEXTUAL FEATURES
The two middle-management teams operated within different 
organisational contexts. Features associated with these 
facilitated or inhibited reductions management. These 
contextual features were: task visibility, environmental 
control, pattern of spending, unionateness and stage of 
professional development.
Task Visibility
The ability to specify tasks and outcomes is of benefit in 
circumstances of reduced resources. Divisions' respective 
task technologies determined the degree of task specificity.
F.W. provided a community-based, generic and universal service. 
R. and D.C. was establishment-based and provided physical 
care services to specific and restricted client groups.
R. and D.C. managers could specify tasks and outcomes by 
reference to clients in care and to the establishments in 
which this care took place. As F.W. activities took place 
in the community there was little tangible evidence of their 
work.
Clarity and visibility of task was significant, in three 
respects. Firstly, less easily defined tasks were less well 
protected from those who had to make difficult choices about 
reductions. Conversely, specifiable tasks aided decision-
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making on priorities. Thirdly, specifiable tasks were more 
easily quantified and fitted into a budgetary-based information 
system. This final point on quantification relates directly 
to the assumption found in organisational monetarism that task 
measurement is unproblematic.
The thesis shows that this is not invariably the case, in that 
not all tasks are easily quantifiable, (for example, Balderstone 
(1972), Bozeman and Slusher (1979), Cyert (1975), Starbuck et 
al (1978). The argument is perhaps best summarised by Pfeffer X 
and Salancik (1978):
"That which is measured is attended to and that which is 
not is ignored. It is not surprising that the first 
reaction to organisational problems typically involves 
solutions focussing on efficiency dimensions for 
frequently that is the only thing the organisation can 
measure" (p.81).
An area of further research concerns the extent to which 
tasks that cannot be easily defined are included in a budgetary 
decision-making process and whether the provision of profession­
al information noted in the thesis becomes routinised, thereby 
changing the information base of the budgetary processes.
Managers of qualitative tasks may attempt to educate decision 
makers about these tasks, to insure themselves against being 
an easy target for reductions. Alternatively managers may in 
some way make their tasks more tangible, again as a protective 
device against cut-backs.
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Environmental Control
Given the task technology of each division, the degree to which 
the client environment could be controlled differed signific­
antly. Establishments provided a built-in control mechanism, 
based on physical limits of buildings. No such control was 
available for community-based services.
Further research could usefully discover whether over time, 
more control of community-based clients is formally exerted 
by restricting the definition of 'the client' and/or by 
prioritising the needs of client groups.
Pattern of Spending
Pattern of spending focusses on the degree of variety of 
spending areas available to managers making reductions. In 
the F.W. division spending was primarily on salaries for 
professional staff. R. and D.C.M.T. controlled a greater 
variety of spending areas, including the upkeep of establish­
ments. Reducing staff, the principal option open to F.W. 
managers, was seen as a much more difficult management task 
than reducing building maintenance.
Unionateness
The F.W. division was strongly unionised at both staff and 
management level, whereas R. and D.C. was not. The union 
(N.A.L.G.O.) adopted a strategy of opposition to reductions, 
including non-participation in reduction related issues.
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This strategy was thus a significant factor in determining 
the parameters of managerial behaviour for one group of 
managers but not for the other.
The thesis elaborates the. dimension of unionateness identified 
by McTighe (1979) as a factor which influences implementation 
of reductions, by showing that the significance of this influence 
varies within an organisation. Further research could usefully 
discover how long managers and staff continue to support their 
union's policy, and indeed whether and how this policy is subject 
to revision.
Stage of Professional Development
Prior to financial stringency becoming an issue, the F.W. and 
R. and D.C. divisions were at different stages of development 
in respect of service provision. F.W. managers had developed 
a professional awareness of what should be provided and this 
was reflected in current practice. R. and D.C. were just 
beginning to develop; their professional awareness and practice 
were rudimentary. The meaning of reductions, in terms of 
professional knowledge and practice had greater significance 
for managers of developed service. Reconciling this with 
service reductions was thus a difficult issue for one group, 
but less difficult for another.
Further research would be useful to discover whether the 
dimension of greater professional awareness is invariably an
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inhibiting influence in cutbacks, and how this issue is 
managed. It would also be useful to learn if the inverse 
relationship between professional awareness and financial 
control skills found in this organisation is apparent 
elsewhere.
The thesis aids our understanding of managerial responses to 
expenditure reductions by locating these within a framework 
provided by two sets of organisational factors: group sub­
cultures and contextual features. Group sub-cultures 
determine the extent to which managers value or have experience 
of strategic planning and financial control. Contextual 
features determine the degree to which expenditure reductions 
can be operationalised. Inhibiting and facilitating features 
within the internal environment of each management group are 
most significant in influencing responses to financial stringency. 
Stringency alone does not promote the automatic and uniform 
response predicted by organisational monetarism.
Further research is indicated to discover the variety of 
additional influencing factors within and between organisations, 
the degree of their significance to managers, and the extent to 
which their influence is recognised or ignored.
(4) MANAGERIAL INTERPRETATIONS
The focus on sub-cultures and contextual features demonstrates 
the degree and complexity of change required of different
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management groups if the threat of reductions is to be managed 
rather than avoided or resisted. It is this degree of change 
which determined the managers' interpretation of the threat, 
and resulted in the responses described in the next section.
Here the degree of change required for the reductions task to be 
operationalised is examined together with the utility of 
'rationality' as a device to predict and explain managerial 
responses.
For the R. and D.C.M.T., no change was necessary to the group 
sub-culture or contextual features for the threat of reductions 
to be accommodated. It was therefore interpreted in a routine 
manner, and was not regarded as problematic.
For F.W. managers, on the other hand, the threat was not suscept­
ible to routinisation without a radical change in their sub­
culture, a change such as an acceptance of the value of financial 
control. Similarly all the contextual features of their internal 
environment also required change for reductions to be managed.
The type of change required included controlling their client 
environment, or making their community-based task more visible. 
These managers interpreted reductions as a crisis, and responded 
firstly by attempting to remove the threat, and then by ignoring 
it.
The D.M.T. fell somewhere between the two extremes presented 
above. The group valued bureaucratic responses, and thus
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accepted the reductions task as a routine issue, but they did 
not value strategic planning. To alter both values and 
practices in this task area involved radical change and was 
interpreted as a threat. They avoided the threat, in the short 
term, by delegating the decision-making tasks.
Thus managers generally did not interpret the threat of reductions 
as necessitating change to their traditional values and practices, 
nor to the contexts within which they worked. In fact the degree 
of change required to sub-culture and context determined whether 
reductions were interpreted as a routine issue, a threat,or a 
crisis.
The thesis demonstrates that assumptions of 'rationality', either 
formal or strategic, which are associated with the concept of 
organisational monetarism, are misguided and unhelpful in analysing 
managerial responses. Glennester's (1980) hypothesis of multiple 
rationalities was confirmed and extended. Each management team 
responded using a variety of rationalities, or logics for action, 
which strongly reflected the influence of their respective sub­
culture and the contexts within which they operated.
Thus D.M.T. operated in terms of bureaucratic and administrative 
rationality, but not strategic rationality. R. and D.C.M.T. 
operated on the basis of bureaucratic, professional and political 
rationalities. F.W.M.T. rejected strategic, bureaucratic and
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administrative rationalities preferring professional, task 
definition, ideological, industrial relations, and political 
rationalities.
Glennester's (1980) hypothesis was elaborated as follows; 
additional rationalities to those he identified were apparent; 
bureaucratic and administrative forms of rationality were 
isolated from professional rationality (whereas Glennester 
dealt with the three together); a particular rationality was 
not confined to a specific group; groups behaved in terms of a 
number of rationalities; and there were competing rationalities 
within as well as between groups. The assumption that strategic, 
or formal rationality predominates in reductions was not support­
ed .
Before examining managerial responses, the signficance of size 
of reduction to managerial interpretation is considered. Briefly, 
F.W.M.T. anticipated losing, and in fact did lose, more money 
than their R. and D.C. colleagues. In comparision with the 
organisational factors outlined above, relative scale of 
reductions was not of overriding significance. F.W. managers 
responded to the threat of reductions as such, rather than to 
reductions of a particular size. R. and D.C. managers maintained 
a stance of following orders throughout,and for D.M.T. different­
ial size of reduction was not an issue.
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Greater reductions though, added to the sense of threat and 
made the management task more difficult; lesser reductions 
had the reverse effect. But size of reductions alone does not 
assist our understanding of why these three management groups 
interpreted reductions in the ways they did.
Managerial Responses to Stringency
The thesis identifies the diversity of managerial responses to 
be found in one organisation. It recognises, and assists our 
understanding of, defensive tactics which are infrequently 
considered in the literature.
With few exceptions, theory in the field assumes co-operation 
from managers, and a homogeneous response from organisations. 
Resistance is seldom considered; it is usually contrasted with 
co-operation and defined as either short-term (Hills and Mahoney: 
1978; Levine: 1978), or predictable (Behn: 1976; Biller: 1976; 
Levine: 1978), and based only on self-interest (Biller: 1980; 
Caiden: 1980; Greenhalgh and McKersie: 1980). None of these 
analyses was confirmed by the data. Resistance was not a tactic 
considered by R. and D.C.M.T. F.W. managers on the other hand, 
did not co-operate for at least twelve months. They justified 
their actions by reference to client and staff interests, 
that is, by factors in addition to self-interest. Similarly, 
withdrawal as a managerial tactic has received little attention. 
It has been defined as leaving the organisation (Levine: 1979; 
Scott: 1976) or absence due to industrial action (Hirschman: 
1970).
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Analysis of the empirical data resulted in a typology of 
responses which extends our understanding of resistance and 
withdrawal. In addition to co-operation, or routinisation, 
there were two defensive responses: avoidance and resistance/ 
withdrawal. These responses are now considered in the context 
of the organisational factors outlined above (see Figure 4, 
p. 256).
(5) ROUTINISATION
R. and D.C. managers were able to routinise the reductions task, 
and thus co-operate, because their team's sub-culture provided 
support. Collectively, managers valued direction and taking 
action with minimum consultation; senior management defined 
their role. The group valued and had experience of financial 
control.
The contextual features of their internal environment facilitated 
rather than inhibited reductions management: task visibility and 
environmental control were high, they had a varied pattern of 
spending, with low unionateness and professional awareness.
(6) AVOIDANCE
Bion's (1961) defensive reactions were used to produce a 
typology which focusses on the degree of flight or fight 
apparent, and the extent to which reductions tasks were 
rejected or accepted.
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Avoidance is defined as denying those aspects of the threat 
which necessitate change in a team's sub-culture (such as 
strategy formulation) but accommodates those aspects which 
do not (such as following orders). The D.M.T. avoided 
formulating a strategy for reductions by delegating the task 
to middle managers, and by denying their own responsibility.
But by following orders from councillors they did not avoid 
the issue of expenditure reductions completely.
Though this team operated within the context provided by both 
middle management teams, their response was in terms of 
R. and D.C.M.T. only, that is, they assumed that the organisat­
ional factors which applied to R. and D.C.M.T. applied equally 
to their F.W. colleagues. This however was not the case.
(7) RESISTANCE AND WITHDRAWAL
Resistance is defined as overt opposition to remove the threat. 
Withdrawal is defined as refusal to participate in any reductions- 
related task, but otherwise to continue managing as in the past.
F.W.M.T.'s sub-culture provided little or no support for 
routinising reductions management. Strategic planning and- 
financial control were devalued and did not form part of the 
group's experience. The sole right of senior management to 
define their role was denied. They rejected direction and 
valued collective decision-making and consultation.
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The context within which they worked inhibited routinisation: 
task visibility and environmental control were low; spending 
was restricted primarily to staff; and unionateness and 
professional awareness were high.
This group exhibited both resistance and withdrawal responses, 
in the following sequence.
After initially participating to some extent in recommending 
reductions, due to 'shock' (Fink et al: 1971), F.W. managers 
resisted by voicing opposition both internally, and to 
councillors. They temporarily withdrew their services. When 
reductions were decided, and were less than anticipated, the 
threat receded. Internal debate on the rights and wrongs of 
this strategy disrupted the initial cohesion to pursue overt 
opposition, and F.W. managers' confined their response to one 
of withdrawal.
Further research could usefully discover whether resistance 
and withdrawal responses are always sequential, as above, or 
whether they are cyclical. Additionally, research is indicated 
in respect of the development of managerial responses longit­
udinally, to learn how long managers can continue to adopt the 
defensive strategies outlined above. At the same time, it 
would be of interest to know what, if any, attempts are made 
by superiors to change these strategies.
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(8) OUTCOMES: COSTS AND BENEFITS
The analysis shows that managing and resisting reductions 
involved a high cost both in terms of human resources, and 
in human relations within the organisation. The zero-cost 
assumption of organisational monetarism was not supported. 
Increased conflict and control were noted though not, as they 
are frequently presented, as organisational-wide phenomena.
The analysis locates costs and benefits within specific inter 
and intra group interactions. Finally the presence or other­
wise of innovation is considered.
Resource Consumption
A number of writers who otherwise support the concept of 
organisational monetarism refer to the high cost of reductions. 
These include, Balderstone (1972), Hirschhorn (1983b) and 
David (1979). The data indicates that decline management is 
not cost free, even for managers who routinise the task. For 
example both F.W.M.T. and D.M.T. spent time discussing the 
areas of conflict within their teams noted below. Similarly, 
F.W.M.T. and R. and D.C.M.T. spent time discussing and disputing 
the 'correct' way to manage reductions.
It would be a useful area of further research to compute the 
direct financial costs of managing reductions. It would also 
be instructive to discover the opportunity costs of diverting 
resources from other activities to managing stringency.
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Organisational Change and Conflict
Theory acknowledges an increase in conflict in stringency, but 
in fairly general terms. The thesis contributes to our under­
standing of stringency-provoked conflict by contrasting the 
extent of conflict within and between particular management 
groups. In addition to the sources of conflict identified 
as resources in the literature (Scott: 1974; Levine: 1978,
1979), or the goals for which resources are used (Cyert and 
March: 1963; Gill: 1981), the thesis introduces managerial 
responses to decline management. As well as causing conflict, 
decline management also promoted harmony.
With stringency, F.W. managers reported more conflict within 
their management team, and in their relations with R. and 
D.C.M.T. and D.M.T.. Members of both these latter groups 
confirmed this. Within D.M.T. there were strong differences 
of opinion too, but there was no conflict either within 
R. and D.C.M.T. or between this team and its senior managers. 
Thus increased conflict is not an inevitable result of financ­
ial stringency, nor does conflict occur within and between all 
management teams.
In F.W.M.T. competition for resources resulted in conflict 
because such competition was unacceptable in their team sub­
culture. Different views of the best way to manage reductions 
produced conflict in F.W.M.T. and D.M.T. because the sub­
cultural norms of each group were challenged by the new tasks 
of reductions management. In F.W.M.T. the debate concerned
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whether to resist, withdraw or co-operate. In the D.M.T. 
the debate concerned whether to devise strategic plans.
Lack of co-operation on the part of F.W.M.T. was a source 
of conflict between that group and both R. and D.C. and 
D.M.T. Conversely agreement on the 'right' way to manage 
reductions was a source of harmony between the last two 
groups, because they shared what Sherif's (1953) term a 
superordinate goal: the management of reductions in terms 
of the presented task.
The thesis identifies a new source of conflict: how best to 
respond to the change associated with reductions. At a 
deeper level of analysis, conflict is explained by reference 
to definitions of 'correct' responses provided by a team's 
sub-culture.
Organisational Change and Control
Cazalis (1979) and Cyert (1978) recommend increased control as 
a means of managing reductions. Similarly Levine et al (1981) 
and Rubin (1980) discovered that centralised control facilit­
ates decline management.
Only F.W. managers perceived an increase in control by senior 
managers, which is consistent with a group which values its 
independence from such control. Yet F.W. managers withdrew, 
thereby abdicating control. This apparent contradiction is 
partially resolved by the fact that the group did not want
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control of decision making on service priorities, nor control 
of spending. Whilst R. and D.C. managers did not note an 
increase in control, senior management delegated control of 
service prioritisation.
Increased control in times of stringency is qualified in two 
ways. Firstly by reference to release of control by withdrawal 
or delegation: managers may accept or reject control rather 
than have it taken from them. Secondly the thesis identifies 
a task area over which no one wanted control: service priorit­
isation. It seems that centralised control is not an all- 
embracing phenomenon but varies with the circumstances of the 
particular case.
Innovation
The data shows that reductions did not lead to inventiveness 
and innovation. Rather there was a change towards a more 
conflict-ridden culture, which was noted earlier.
Changes in managerial practice were not implemented either by 
F.W.M.T. or D.M.T. No change was reported either in R. and 
D.C.M.T. The future was regarded with apprehension. Reductions 
were seen to inhibit professional developments, to increase 
conflict, and to demand a greater expenditure of energy on debat­
ing and on coping with the effects of a smaller budget.
- 282 -
The assumption of positive outcomes was found to be incorrect.
In fact the reverse occurred and reductions produced changes 
which in general did not facilitate task performance.
The Management of Diversity
The thesis exposes the diversity of managerial interpretations 
and responses that can be expected in times of expenditure 
reductions, and explains this diversity in terms of the fit 
between features of sub-culture and context on the one hand, 
and the task of reductions management on the other. Any 
effective prescription for decline management must therefore 
take account of the cultural and contextual diversity within 
an organisation.
Diversity needs to be managed rather than avoided if full use 
of resources is to be effected. A means of doing so might be 
to examine the basis for different responses, as outlined above.
By becoming aware of what facilitates and inhibits reduction 
management, possible changes may be identified and action taken.
In this case senior management did not manage diversity. Instead 
they supported a unitary approach to the management task exemplif­
ied by the behaviour of R. and D.C.M.T. Additionally they used a 
value-based, and therefore partial, explanation of unacceptable 
behaviour on the part of managers. The following analysis of 
the intervention underlines the significance of the unitary
- 283 -
perspective, and the threat which an alternative perspective 
based on diversity posed.
The analysis of managerial responses to decline in the short 
term highlights a number of policy issues for the management 
of expenditure reductions in the longer term. The most 
significant of these is whether or not an organisational 
strategy has been reformulated in the light of financial 
stringency. In the absence of such a reformulation it is 
predicted that the managerial responses and organisational costs 
identified in this study will continue, to the detriment of 
service provision. Control and conflict will increase, as will 
the resources needed to be devoted to managing these matters; 
there will be little creativity and innovation. Managers will 
either continue to "follow orders", that is ,collaborate or 
pretend to do so, in an ad hoc manner, with no reference to 
strategic considerations in respect of service provision and 
without the benefit of guidance provided by a planned strategy. 
Alternatively, they will continue to withdraw symbolically from 
activities associated with stringency as a means of demonstrating 
support for an anti-cuts stance and the organisation's pre­
reductions strategy. Of course neither of these responses are 
organisationally desirable and they are to be avoided particularly 
for the long term. Managers need firstly to reassess the 
objectives of the organisation and then develop a strategy to 
achieve them.
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Within this strategy they will then need to choose one of 
three funding options.
Firstly generate income from new sources in order to maintain 
current levels of service and/or to finance new service 
developments. Secondly reduce services to reflect the 
reduction in resources and finally provide the same services 
despite the lower level of funding, that is, provide services 
more economically.
Choices such as these are only meaningful within an overall 
organisational service-provision strategy and the absence of 
such strategic thinking will inhibit effective reductions 
management. The thesis demonstrates that assertions such as 
Scott's (1976)
"Can managers manage decline? Of course they can. The issue is not being unable to deal with decline, but wanting to deal with it" (p.56)
are mistaken. Managing decline involves both wanting to and being 
able to.
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APPENDIX I
MANAGEMENT TEAM PERCEPTIONS
The information set out below was obtained at an early stage in the 
action intervention. Both middle-management teams (F.W. and 
R and D.C.) were separately asked to generate descriptive terms in 
respect o f :
(a) their self-image;
(b) their image of the other management team;
(c) the other management team's view of them.
This data formed the basis for the exchange of inter-group perceptions 
referred to in Chapter VII.
Field Work Management Team
Self Image Image of R- and D.C. R. and D.C. 's image of F.W.
purposeless
non-authoritarian
consultative
participative
confronting
unrealistic
incohesive
committed
undisciplined
pessimistic
frustrated
daunted
nostalgic
attractive
facetious
tolerant
interesting
talented
competitive
vulnerable
defensive
self-deprecating
enthusiastic
hard-working
supportive
unsure
accessible
unsupported
hierarchical
authoritarian
old fashioned
inefficient
defensive
fraught
radical
conservative
inflexible
undermanned
caring
hard-working
purposeful
over-ambitious
friendly
organisationally remote 
boring
gaining confidence 
over controlled 
limited
unionised
pretentious
holier than thou
articulate
overbearing
anarchic
def ensive
inefficient
arrogant
selfish
sophisticated
envious of them
faltering
mischievous
uncooperative
elitist
intolerant
high powered
challenging
unrealistic
well-meaning
smarter
introspective
indecisive
verbose
political
intelligent
intellectually capable 
impractical
Residential and Day Care Management Team
Self Image
Nuts & bolts: 
corporate 
Generalities: 
semi-corporate 
Professional: 
non-corporate
positive
self-critical
caring
internal isolation
progressive
honest
efficient
need to develop
group support
Image of F.W.
naive 
political 
inconclusive 
long-winded 
corporate 
inexperience of 
residential situation
non-und er s tand ing
unrealistic
powerful
threatened
professional
homogeneous
divided
presumptuous
vociferous
negative synergy
collective
perceived superiority
F..W. ' s image of R. and D.C.
authoritarian 
acquiescent 
non-corporate 
fragmented 
non-general 
inexperience of F.W. 
situations
insular
motivated
a-political
inferiority complex
demanding
higher expectations 
favoured 
efficient 
uncommunicative 
over centralised
APPENDIX II
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO THE SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT
1. Introduction
The report provides data feedback, analysis and recommendations on 
the effects of expenditure reductions. It focusses on the 
Department's three management teams and their interactions. Three 
sources of data were used: interviews, observation and documents.
1. Background
Traditionally F.W. occupied a superior position within the 
Department, though this is being challenged by recent developments 
in R. and D.C. The D.D. is also A.D. for R. and D.C. A new 
A.D.F.W. was recruited at the time the requirement for reductions 
was introduced. Recommendations on reductions were invited by 
senior management (S.M.) from middle management. F.W. lost more 
resources than R. and D.C. as the protection of the latter division 
was a priority.
3. Definitions of the Cuts
Various terms used to describe the cuts and their effects are 
identified; for example, zero growth and negative growth. Operat­
ionally the term 'the cuts' was used to refer to the relevant 
budgetary processes and to managing the effects of reductions , 
together with the imposition or increase of charges. The majority 
of members regarded the effects of the cuts as being negative.
4. Responses
5.M. referred the matter of recommendations to middle managers with 
little guidance. Subsequently S.M. made recommendations to 
councillors. R. and D.C.M.T. managed the cuts and came up with 
recommendations for the required amount. F.W.M.T. resisted the 
cuts. On the first occasion they made recommendations below the 
required amount, on the second they suggested an across the board 
percentage cut. Services in this division were withdrawn on two 
occasions. Each service division recommended cuts in the other.
Both provided councillors with information on the effects of the 
cuts.
5. Reasons
S.M. saw prioritisation as a job for councillors. Like R. and D.C. 
they saw participation as a manager's responsibility and as a way to 
influence outcomes. F.M. resisted managing, again as an influencing 
strategy, and because of the perceived negative effects of 
reductions. These were at variance with their professional and 
personal values. They stated they could not manage, in the absence 
of guidance from above and in view of the conflicting messages from 
staff and S.M.
6. Interpretations
For the resisting group, managing was seen variously as supporting 
government policy, as a typical response from an over-controlled 
group, and as masking the effects of the cuts. They saw S.M. 
pushing difficult decisions down to an inappropriately low level 
within the organisation, rather than accepting these as their own 
responsibility. The differential nature of the cuts was seen as 
indicating a dislike of F.W.'s area of work, a settling of old 
scores and as a punishment for resisting the cuts. For those who 
managed, resistance was seen as unprofessional, irresponsible, and 
the result of being influenced by personal and political rather than 
workplace values. By and large, differences were interpreted in 
terms of differing philosophies and styles of management.
7. Effects
For F.W. the effects on the service, staff, intragroup relations 
were seen to be extremely disruptive. The effects on intergroup 
relations, that is, between R. and D.C.M.T. and F.W.M.T., and 
between the latter and D.M.T., were negatively perceived. Responses 
to the cuts became a way of judging organisational members.
8. Action
The aim of this action was to improve relations between R. and 
D.C.M.T. and F.W.M.T. by giving them the opportunity to share their 
perceptions of each other, specify problems and seek solutions. 
Perceptions were generated and shared at an initial meeting.
Problems raised were, for example, the roles of the representative 
and the bridge builder, the united front presented by F.W.M.T. in 
intergroup discussion, and different responses to cuts management.
9. Situational Variables
A number of variables are identified which make it difficult to 
manage cuts. These fall into two categories: task and finance. In 
the former area, the social work task, environmental control, 
unionisation, stages of development, task specificity, justifiab­
ility, and quantification, are considered; in the latter area, 
financial skills, spending areas, joint responsibility and the 
differential size of reductions, are covered. A comparison is made 
between F.W.M.T. to have a more difficult position to manage over 
and above particular management styles and philosophies.
10. Recommendations
F.W.M.T. and D.M.T. should negotiate their respective role require­
ments in the areas of prioritisation and managing the cuts, that is 
F.W. should agree to manage the effects in return for S.M. agreeing 
to prioritise the cuts. In addition, discussions should take place 
on the most effective way of exerting influence, based on the 
strategy of supplying information. This, it is suggested, can only 
be done in the context of a dialogue between union members and S.M. 
to clarify the roles of staff and management in relation to managing 
the effects of the cuts.
iv
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